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Economic Affairs

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Soviet Union

Economic Affairs

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ECONOMIC POLICY, ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT

Financial Relations of Industrial Concerns Examined

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No 1, Jan 90 pp 30-33

[Article by A. N. Maltsev, deputy chief of the Department for the Financing of the Machine-Building Complex, and V. D. Krol, Department chief economist: "Financial Interrelations in Intersectoral Associations"]

[Text] The transition to new management conditions is inevitably linked with a search for more perfect forms of economic control. A first step in the solution of this problem was the creation in Leningrad of the intersectoral state associations (MGO) "Energomash" and "Tekhnokhim." They have been operating under the new organizational structure since 1 July 1988 and function as independent production-economic complexes. The enterprises which make them up have been removed from the direct subordination of the corresponding branch ministries.

The basic tasks of the associations are accelerated scientific-technical development, an increase in the ability to compete of the output produced, the utmost development of the economic accountability relations, self-financing and self-administration of the associations and enterprises, the organization of efficient foreign-economic ties, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the social development of the labor collectives.

The highest administrative organ of the intersectoral state association is the meeting of the representatives of the labor collectives of the enterprises. This is called at least once a year. In the period between meetings the MGO is administered by a Board headed by a chairman. An executive director is appointed to implement the Board's decisions and the cost estimate for the maintenance of the management's operating personnel is approved.

State control of the association is accomplished principally by economic methods, through sending control figures, state orders and economic norms and limits down to the MGO and by monitoring its financial operations. For the twelfth five-year plan, moreover, the enterprises and organizations which are part of an intersectoral state association retain their plan indicators, norms and limits as well as their responsibility for the fulfillment of assignments. Cooperation and scientific and technical relations developed with other enterprises and organizations continue; contract work called for prior to the creation of the intersectoral associations must be carried out.

The only exception was the termination, as of their leaving the subordination of the ministries, of the transfer of funds to the latter's centralized funds and reserves. In addition, the problem of the assignment of the funds being released was not resolved when the

associations were created. Before they left ministerial subordination the 16 enterprises which make up MGO "Energomash" were to have, according to the plan for 1988-1990, sent R182.6 million to the centralized funds and reserves of the branch ministries, including R151.5 million to the USSR Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building (Mintyazhmash). These funds were used to finance expenditures for scientific and technical progress and the retooling of existing enterprises and to cover other planned expenditures.

If a redistribution of funds was envisaged under the financial plan of an enterprise being transferred, the difference between the amount of the planned redistribution and that actually carried out was accounted for in the interrelations with the budget. It was intended that the enterprises of USSR Mintyazhmash which became part of MGO "Energomash" pay the funds previously subject to transfer to USSR Mintyazhmash into the budget in the form of "Other payments," i.e., without changing established economic norms. The USSR Ministry of Finance envisaged making budget financing available to USSR Mintyazhmash in 1988 to cover the branch's planned expenditures by the amount of "Other payments" received.

However, after these changes were made in the financial plans, the chairmen of the boards of the new state associations requested the government to permit the enterprises and organizations in the MGO to transfer (beginning in the second half of 1988) the funds intended for assignment to the centralized funds and reserves of the corresponding ministries to the accounts of the intersectoral associations.

In December 1988 the Commission for the Improvement of Control, Planning and the Economic Mechanism took a decision to leave these funds at the disposal of the enterprises and organizations for the resolving of problems of the scientific and technical development of production. This decision led to a considerable shortage of funds to finance intra-branch programs in the interested ministries. The shortage amounted to R86 million in 1988-1989 for USSR Mintyazhmash alone. In this connection the USSR Ministry of Finance made provision for partial compensation of the centralized funds of the branch ministries from budget funds.

It should be noted that all the schemes for the creation of MGOs, concerns and associations being sent for coordination provide for their retention of the formation and functioning procedure and the rights established for the MGOs "Energomash" and "Tekhnokhim." That is to say, the "gap" at the ministries in sources for the financing of branch scientific and technical development programs will arise anew and they can again raise the question of compensation for falling revenues from budget funds.

At the same time, data indicating that the results of their operation and achievements in production development and the social sphere are much better than in the system of branch ministries will appear in the analysis of the

operation of the enterprises in an MGO. This is, in fact, a manipulation of the figures, for it is a result of the fact that significant funds in the form of profit and depreciation were left at the disposal of the enterprises. Thus, at the Izhorskiy zavod, Nevskiy zavod, Leningradskiy metallicheskiy zavod and Leningradskiy zavod turbinnykh lopatok production associations (previously subordinate to USSR Mintyazhmash) these funds came to 20.3% in 1988, 28.4% in 1989, and in 1990 will come to 30.5% of planned profit (according to the initial data).

With the transition to the new organizational form of control, the intersectoral associations have found themselves essentially face to face with the existing command and administrative system in all spheres of the national economy, including financial interrelationships both between enterprises and with local banking and financial institutions.

Let's concentrate on the financial aspects of the interrelationships of the enterprises and associations in the MGO (concerns) system and on possible ways of resolving the problems that have arisen. The Leningrad commercial bank "Energomashbank" has been created in MGO "Energomash" for the temporary credit servicing of the basic activity and investment policy of the association and the enterprises and other organizations. It must provide comprehensive, general-purpose temporary credit servicing, ensure cash payments when funds are available in the current accounts of clients, introduce the most economical and progressive forms of crediting, financing and settlements and introduce the achievements of scientific and technical progress and the latest equipment and technology. The bank has taken on itself the functions of the financial subdivision of the executive management of the MGO and organizes financial planning work, studies the economics and finances of the enterprises served and analyzes and forecasts their financial status, taking ongoing economic processes into account, and also takes managerial decisions.

The introduction of this form of bank interaction with the enterprises and associations in the MGO and with the executive management has permitted maximum reduction of the administrative staff and elimination of work duplication. The merging of the individual functions of the bank, the executive management and the enterprises with respect to temporary credit operations is a great help in accelerating settlements with buyers for output shipped, including foreign buyers.

Concentrating the unrestricted financial resources of an MGO's enterprises in a single temporary credit center has made it possible to assist the enterprises and associations of an intersectoral association when they experience temporary financial difficulties. Financial assistance through the MGO's centralized fund, voluntarily formed in a proportional amount coordinated and adopted in the MGO's Board, is also available. This fund is expended strictly according to an estimate approved by the MGO's Board. It should be noted that the new forms of financial interrelationships are based on the

principle of complete democracy and mutual responsibility for the state of affairs in a concern.

New in the operation of MGO "Energomash" is, first of all, a rejection of enhanced tutelage over each structural unit of the association, which independently take decisions in the area of planning, financing and reporting. The executive management does not produce consolidated statistical and accounting reports and balances.

Interrelationships with local financial, statistical and soviet institutions, as well as with the central economic departments, are also developing in a new way. Thus, interrelations with the financial organs are being formed on a territorial basis. Plans for payments to the budget, determined by each enterprise on the basis of existing economic norms and the adopted reimbursable profit (revenue) plan are submitted at the specified times to the rayon finance administration of Leningrad, while a consolidation of the data for the MGO as a whole is carried out in the Leningrad city finance administration, which monitors their fulfillment and produces quarterly recomputations based on the indicators actually achieved.

In the future, when intersectoral state associations and concerns will be created on the basis of enterprises situated in various parts of the country (and quite a few such proposals have been introduced and are being examined), it is desirable, in our view, that the financial institution serving the lead enterprise monitor the accuracy of the determination of profit (income) and, correspondingly, of payments to the budget by all enterprises and organizations constituting the MGO. Such an approach will perhaps require an increase in the number of personnel and the wage fund of rayon financial services which will undoubtedly be recouped by the end results of labor, an increase in the revenue base of the budget, if they operate efficiently.

A change in the existing system of financing certain planned expenditures of the enterprises in an MGO seems advisable. The expenditures of individual enterprises to pay off long-term bank loans obtained for capital investments prior to the conversion to full economic accountability and self-financing, as well as expenditures for the maintenance of children's preschool institutions transferred to the enterprises by city public education institutions after their conversion to the new management conditions, are presently financed from the state budget. Financing of the indicated expenditures is done by opening loan accounts on the state budget in the operations administration of USSR Promstroybank. Let's recall that the existing procedure doesn't permit the transfer of budget funds to the accounts of the "Energomash" commercial bank which serves the enterprises of MGO "Energomash." Expenditure schedules for the state budget are prepared by the executive management of MGO "Energomash," signed by the loan manager and sent from Leningrad to Moscow, to the USSR Ministry of Finance, for official registration of the transfer to USSR Promstroybank for subsequent transfer of the funds again to Leningrad (to

the oblast office of USSR Promstroybank at which the budget accounts of the MGO's management were opened) and then from the management's account to the accounts of the enterprises. That's how long and thorny the path proves to be for the enterprises to get budget funds allocated for the financing of their planned expenditures!

In our opinion, the functions of opening loan accounts on the state budget should be given to the Leningrad City Finance Administration and the Leningrad Oblast office of USSR Promstroybank, having made them responsible for monitoring the correct and purposeful utilization of these funds and for submitting the appropriate data to the USSR Ministry of Finance.

The principles presently in effect in the formation of the interrelations between an MGO and the budget are antithetical to the concept of the creation and functioning of an intersectoral association. Why? First of all because of the operation of the old procedure for formulating the draft of the state budget, based on organizing it using indicators developed "above."

The rights of labor collectives, including those in the practice of adopting planned targets, were significantly broadened after the adoption of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) and subsequent modifications and additions. This has had a negative effect on the creation of the revenue base of the budget. A significant gap has developed between the rates of payments from profit calculated on the basis of established norms and the profit determined by USSR Gosplan (estimated) and the payments resulting from the amount of profit based on the reimbursable plans of the enterprises and the self same norms. Thus, for the enterprises of the machine-building complex this gap amounted to R0.9 billion in both 1988 and 1989.

Thus, unreal payments from profit are incorporated in the budget already in the planning of the revenue base. They will not be received into the budget but expenditures based on them have been planned and must be financed. Therefore it is advisable to discontinue such an approach to the creation of payments to the budget from profit established in a centralized manner.

In our opinion one should take another route. We'll illustrate this using the example of MGO enterprises. When confirming a target for the receipt of profits (revenue) for the year being planned, the enterprises in an MGO determine the share left at the disposal of the labor collective for its own production and social development and the profit subject to transfer to the state budget on the basis of approved norms.

In turn, the financial institution, having received the projected rates of transfers of funds to the state budget from the enterprises, reports these figures to a higher level, in this case the Leningrad City Finance Administration, for correlation for the region as a whole. Later a

compilation of state budget receipts for the planned year, broken down by branches of the national economy, must be produced through the USSR Ministry of Finance's Main Computer Center. This will yield a realistic picture of the rates of planned payments into the budget.

Let's now turn to another aspect of the interrelations of enterprises with the budget—to appropriations from the budget for centralized capital investments that are part of a state order. The earmarking of funds for these purposes within the framework of the operation of intersectoral state associations, in our opinion, should be based on the extension of budgetary credit. For example, it is advisable that the financing of enterprises and projects under construction be carried out when not less than 50% of the internal resources of the entire sub-sector, in this case the proportional accumulations of the MGO's enterprises, is on hand at the start of construction and with the granting of a budget loan for a standard period not exceeding the period for mastering the drafting problem.

One can also take another route. If the construction project is part of a state order (the construction of a specific project urgently needed by the state), the initial source of financing can be a long-term loan from a state, commercial or any other bank with subsequent payment of the projected (estimated) construction cost from state budget funds upon completion of the project's construction and its "turnkey" delivery.

As far as the allocation of budget funds for non-productive construction is concerned, it can be granted in the form of a budget loan on the installment plan for 10 or more years to be repaid from the funds of an enterprise's economic incentive funds earned by the labor collective.

To accelerate and simplify the drawing-up of the documentation for obtaining budget loans we think it advisable to authorize financial institutions to issue them while adhering to the following system: a rayon finance department can issue a loan of up to R1 million; a loan of up to R5 million is to be issued at the oblast, kray and republic (ASSR) levels, up to R10 million—by union republic ministries of finance, and over R10 million—by the USSR Ministry of Finance exclusively.

Considering the ever-increasing number of MGOs, associations and concerns throughout the entire country, it is our opinion that decisions need to be taken as soon as possible to radically change the existing system of planning financial plan indicators, payments from profit to the budget and allocations from the budget, as well as the procedure for financing the planned expenditures of enterprises from the budget. Such an approach will be a new step toward the complete independence of the intersectoral state association which was the basis for its creation.

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Economic Irrationality Linked to 'Statism'

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[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Radayev and Doctor of Historical Sciences O. Shkaratay: "Return to the Sources. Reflections on the Draft CPSU Platform for the 28th Party Congress, or What Legacy Are We Rejecting"]

[Text] The country has lived for decades convinced of the need for monolithic unity. Unity meant submission to higher levels on the basis of truths proclaimed by them which needed no special proof. Society became less civilized and morality began to decline.... It seemed that there would be no end to it. And here comes perestroika.... What does it mean? We had a home. It was a good one. But it became old and run-down. Let us rebuild; that is, let us keep the home but refurbish and improve it. How? The answer, it seems, is known: "More socialism!" Three years ago this answer satisfied many people. But now more and more frequently we are hearing the questions: But what is socialism? What is socialist ownership? What is socialist democracy?

There have been various answers. Some people claim that socialism is state ownership of the means of production, true, purged of corruption and poor management; it includes kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm] production in rural areas reinforced by new machines, technology, and investments; it includes a unified and single communist ruling party, and so forth. In a word, the same "socialism" that has come down to us from Stalinist times.

Others... With others it is more complicated. Others argue among themselves, quarrel, look for new paths, and they have only one thing in common: We must no longer live as we have been living. The way we have been living is called the administrative system, "barracks socialism," "bureaucratic"; and other epithets are added as well. But what unites these terms? All of them ultimately spring from one concept which asserts that the present society of the Soviet type is "socialism carrying the heavy burden of deformations." These "deformations" are classified and bitterly rejected. But again we have not been able to escape the question that is raised: What, actually, has been deformed and to which sources do we intend to return?

This same question was asked by participants in the February (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Speaking at the plenum, Academician S. Shatalin noted that he does not understand "all the appeals on the part of members of the Politburo to choose the socialist path of development, not to stray from it, not to depart, not to run away, to consider a departure from 'socialism' to be heresy....," since it is obvious to him that there is no general agreement about what socialism is. In other words, when calling for the people to stick to their socialist choice it is necessary to give an answer concerning the content of this choice, and not only and not

so much concerning its distant prospects, but the immediate approaches to it. In this connection, it would not be out of place to determine: From what kind of society do we expect this socialist future? What kind of society do we live in?

We can talk forever about yesterday's leaders and the horrible terror, about the half-starved population in a country that is renowned for its rich black earth; we can discuss the outdated technology in a state that has great scientists and engineers. But ultimately we must understand what is happening to that very country which has a great history and a great technical, scientific, and cultural tradition. And then we must figure out in depth the strange transformation that is taking place with this society.

Apparently we must reinterpret the regime that generated so many problems, contradictions, and hardships. Let us think about this strange thing: for decades we have been discussing the fact that the country is suffering from the departmental system. It turns out that certain specific Ivan Ivanovich's in charge of specific departments were to blame. Some were removed and others took their places, but the departmental system remained. People's commissariats were replaced by ministries; ministries were consolidated and deconsolidated; bureaus were created over them; these bureaus were eliminated; and no matter what was done, the departmental system endured and flourished. A natural question: Perhaps this is a natural law? The same thing with regionalism. They fought and fought and it ended up that in no city can anyone determine even the number of schools or the type of urban development without recommendations "from above." Everything, right down to the most absurd trivia, is determined from the center.

Other questions also arise. For example, what kind of strange system is it in which since Lenin's time there has not been a single leader who will go down in history as a positive personality, one for whom monuments would be erected posthumously and not be constructed during his life and then be destroyed after his death.

"So what if several generations have not done anything? Does this mean that the country has worked poorly?" This is what is being said by those who have come to be called conservatives. But we hear the same thing from many worthy people as well. Can we really place blame on people who earnestly thought that their labor would be to the advantage of the state, the society, and the people? Therefore they exclaim: "This is an offense to the state. What are you rising up against?" At first glance this seems natural and fair. In all ages simple people have worked honestly, creating the material and spiritual base on which the well-being of their homeland and compatriots has been built. But one should think about why they have created the kind of society where the word "socialism" has been compromised and where communist parties of socialist countries are experiencing a crisis.

And here the apparent beginning of a heretical thought comes to mind: Why do we always assume that the modern world consists only of countries of socialism and capitalism? As soon as this question originated there appeared an answer which at first we perceived as extremely simple: It is possible to have the existence of formations that do not fit on our typical scholarly lists (slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism). Since the thirties we have seen in our country the establishment of a special, independent socioeconomic formation, one, alas, which was not foreseen by the classics of Marxism, one which has nothing in common either with capitalism or with socialism. Many have become so accustomed to this head-on juxtaposition that they are prepared to see any rejection of the Western postindustrial society as socialism and they greet any attempts to actually change anything in our society with accusations of "bourgeois reformism." But it would seem that the society we have constructed lies on an altogether different plane. In our opinion this is a system of statism; that is, a society based on total state power, where any life activity of the people is appropriated by the state and the interests of the people are placed below the interests of the state.

When the existence of any strange, atypical society is discovered the question arises: On what can it be based on the theoretical plane? In such cases historians, sociologists, and economists always look for historical analogues. And they find them without difficulty. Since ancient times over immense expanses of territory for thousands of years there have existed societies which K. Marx called societies of the "Asian mode of production." State appropriation of social life, the absence of private property, and instead of it common, "unowned" property, which for good reason has been defined by certain specialists as "power-ownership"—were these not the features that were ascribed as the basic ones to "real socialism"?

But why is it so difficult to attach the word "socialism" to the description of the command structure? This is not only a matter of inertia in thinking which, incidentally, is quite understandable. The invention of the word "socialism" with more and more new epithets is a concealed (or open) theoretical attempt to preserve the foundations of the former society: in the form of all-pervasive centralized management and a strictly limited market, systems of departmental social guarantees, and the rejection of private business.

To continue to describe the features of statism as some kind of anomalies and deformations means to close off the road to a study of their own internal laws. Indeed, is the alienation of the majority of workers from the authorities or the nipping of market relations in the bud—are these an anomaly of the regime? Of course not, these are typical features of it.

It is even worse when deformations are reduced to the level of subjective mistakes and the sources of all the problems are sought in the "poor rulers" (obviously, this is from the eternal belief in the "good tsar"). But it is

easy to blame the leaders. Ultimately any of their mistakes and abuses will be corrected by life if they do not affect concrete social interests.

The policy of statism won out because it had an adequate social and economic base. It spread to all continents. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the new system came into power, in the expression of E.A. Shevardnadze, after the violent breakdown of the people's democratic regimes at the end of the forties. At the same time statism quite independently sprang up in the societies that had not experienced mature bourgeois relations—China and Korea, Cuba and Vietnam—which confirms that its appearance is not random.

What strikes one immediately, even with a superficial look at the economic relations of statism, is its irrationality. Economic activity at practically all levels appears as a chain of ineffective decisions—previously unbalanced plans are imposed; problems of the vital initiative of the workers are suppressed; costly resources in short supply are squandered; gigantic objects that nobody needs are erected; there is a universal battle for the harvest after which the final product is calmly allowed to rot in the storehouses. From a purely economic standpoint this picture is indeed inexplicable, and not just from the standpoint of lofty theory, but frequently from the standpoint of simple common sense as well. (So you cannot ascribe everything to inability and incompetence, although we have never had a shortage of either of them.) But we should not give in to this apparent irrationality. Any absurdity ultimately has earthly roots. From the standpoint of particular interests everything is rational.

The main feature of our economic system consists in that it is a direct continuation of political power. There is no doubt that politics and ideology here have been above economics. The so-called "base" and "superstructure" switched places. And, moreover, it seemed that their separation lost its meaning. In this system the secretary of the party committee (rayon and higher) not only participates actively in economic processes, but also along many lines he dictates his will to the economic leaders. And the branch ministries and departments, these authorized representatives of the state, only externally assume the pose of economic executive organs. They operate as political organs. And they do not especially crowd themselves into legal frameworks, for the departments themselves are the creators of the law. A good deal was said about this at the February (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which took the first decisive step toward overcoming this kind of "division of labor."

Power—political and economic—is concentrated in the hands of the ruling nomenklatura segments and is distributed among the leaders according to their positions in the service hierarchy. And the power is extremely ideologized. No step is taken that is not in the interests of "authentic socialism," "universal social justice," or "the common good."

It would be wrong to place all the blame on the apparatus. It could not stay in power without broad support from below. And this support exists, in spite of the recent events in a number of oblasts. The overall political stability has always been reinforced not only by the threat of repressive measures, but also by the ramified system of social guarantees—in one's job where although they pay miserly sums, still they do not demand a great deal and close their eyes altogether to some things; in the retention of this job under condition of unquestioning submission and obedience to the boss ("belief in the future"). This also includes minor benefits—to grab someone else's order, a pass, a coupon for furniture, to get a child into kindergarten; finally, to obtain education and medical aid, which are far from being perfect, but on the other hand they are free. Therefore the broad segments of the less skilled workers, even while expressing their ardent antipathy toward the apparatus, frequently actually support the state system as a whole, which actually supports this apparatus.

Under the wing of a "single master" (the state) nobody works but everyone "serves"; they do not achieve results but "get in good graces." And they receive not wages but "pay" [zhalovaniye]—a term difficult to translate into European languages, which designates distribution not according to results of labor, but according to ranks and titles, branches, and even reigns, at the discretion of the higher levels.

But what contribution has statism made to the collection plate of social progress? Alas, the positive results are by no means sparkling. And it would be all right if the matter were limited to a sharp deviation in the economic sphere—in terms of labor productivity and product quality, although this is not very acceptable either. But we have also lagged far behind in the area of social relations where our superiority has constantly been emphasized. We hold 77th place in the world in terms of our level of private per-capita consumption and 28th in terms of our level of education.... Such figures show that we have politely surrendered our place not only to all developed countries, but also to many countries of the second and third echelons. And what if we were to compare the level of well-being qualitatively as well? What if we were to evaluate the tasteless goods and the ecologically impure food?

True, people could object that any new mode of production continues to be not very effective for a fairly long period of time and does not stand up to the preceding mode. They could say that the new system is still too young to reveal all of its advantages; a little more than 70 years is not time enough for the formation. Well, of course we could wait a while. But time is becoming more condensed and the gap between us and the advanced countries is growing, and the possibilities of attributing this to our young age are becoming dimmer and dimmer. But the most important and already obvious thing is that the basic tendencies are principally directed toward economic effectiveness and business expediency.

As concerns the prices of our great achievements, we have always preferred to maintain a stony silence about

this. The state has been able to support a relatively favorable economic dynamic by squandering immense amounts of resources (this is the "advantage" of a rich country). First the "cheap" labor resources were burned up. Then the system of coercion inside and outside the barbed wire began to break down and the squandering of natural wealth became the main source. And when the limit of the "free" raw material loomed large and the sight of an ecological catastrophe became distinguishable, the "normal" condition of stagnation began to develop into a crisis.

But the ultimate groundlessness of the state appropriation system can be seen when it comes face to face with scientific and technical progress. It is impossible to accelerate things in the area of science and technology if nobody (either "above" or "below") has a long-range economic interest. One cannot rely on valiant labor in places where what is needed are flexible, dynamic forms of organization of production. And the main thing is that it is impossible to do without intelligent, qualified workers.

But can we expect much from people with higher education diplomas who are downtrodden because of their place in work and life in a country where in terms of their standard of living they are on a level with the majority of semiskilled and unskilled workers, where they are constantly being put in their place, which is far from the most honored one? When the measure of professionalism is the art of following the orders of the leaders, what can one expect from the majority of specialists? As a result, while we surpass the United States almost by a factor of three in terms of our number of engineers, we receive barely one-fortieth the amount of money from the sale of licenses abroad. In Japan in 1986, 540 times more applications for efficiency proposals were registered per worker. And we are almost not even on the list of inventions that are the most significant for daily life.

The actual coalition of management elite with the broad masses of unskilled labor and workers protected by the barriers of departmental protectionism has gradually turned us into a society of semiprofessionals and dilettantes. And pumping money into more and more new areas will change little when the main people who take action are semiprofessionals. The root of their problem lies in the fact that without scientific and technical progress the statism system is even more resistant.

Statism is reaching its historical limit today. It cannot respond to the demands of the time, the striving for a new type of individual who has a much greater spiritual wealth than the individuals of previous historical epochs.

It is thought that statism has destroyed the rural areas. But why do we forget that it has destroyed the cities as well? As early as in ancient Rus the country's past has been linked to developed city life. And the rudiments of a civil society were generated by the city. "Civilization," a "civil society," "citizen," "city"—it is no accident that all these words derived from the same root. And we should not seek our future in the backwoods of rural

areas. But where are those first prerevolutionary institutions of a civil society—the great multitude of all kinds of political, religious, and philanthropic voluntary societies? They have all been destroyed by the state and its unrestrained striving for social homogeneity. In this respect we shall have to make gigantic efforts in order to recognize that the stability and wealth of society arise from its increasing diversity. Only a civil society growing up from below in alliance with a democratic state is capable of creating the prerequisites for a normal, healthy, and socially oriented life.

But for now we must recognize that the destruction of capitalism certainly does not necessarily lead directly to socialism.

But what about the present revolution? (And it is undoubtedly a revolution.) It began under the banner of “renewal of socialism,” but in essence it is a revolution against statism. Will it lead directly to socialism? The question is dictated by the fact that we have no clear modern models and the old ones are too general and also contradictory. But perhaps we have enough rigid plans and completed schemes. Would it not be enough to create “temples” for general purposes? And is it not time to return to the needs of those generations that are existing along with us and who are suffering from the diseases of the present society, and to give them that minimum of freedom and well-being which does not require a seventh generation computer?

It is hardly reasonable to replace socialism with blueprints of modern public buildings, not to mention castles in the air. Socialism, understood as a movement, is the totality of general landmarks from which people freely select their own temples and their own roads to these temples. What are these landmarks? They include the changeover to an economy with a multitude of different forms of ownership enjoying equal rights. They include the development of the market. They include the institutions of a civil society and the refusal to divide the society into segments and classes that are leading and those that are being led, reliance on all healthy social forces, and accounting for their various economic, political, ethnic, and cultural interests. They include the assertion of the primacy of general human values.

So is socialism a dream that slips through our fingers like the bluebird of happiness? The distant future? Let this question be answered by history and not by us who are living in this time.

Law On Military Enterprise Conversion Needed 90UM0161A Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economics A. Izyumov: “What Is Impeding Conversion: Is A Law Needed On Its Implementation?”]

[Text] A year has passed since M. S. Gorbachev announced from the UN rostrum that our country had adopted a radical program for unilateral cutbacks in its

military efforts. Let us recall that the program calls for reducing the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces by 12 percent over a two-year period (1989-1990), for trimming the military budget by 14 percent, and for cutting military production by almost 20 percent. The mechanism for implementing the program is to be conversion—the systematic transfer of military spending and military production to civilian needs.

At first glance, a good deal seems to have been accomplished in this area in the past year. Three hundred forty-five enterprises and more than 200 scientific-research design bureaus of the defense-industry complex have begun fulfilling state assignments for the development and production of civilian goods. Military warehouses are making surplus equipment and civilian supplies available for sale. Military-transport aircraft are helping to move more and more civilian cargo. In the USSR State Planning Committee, efforts to draw up a State Program for Defense Industry Conversion in 1991-1995 are nearing completion (the program is to be submitted to the government by the end of this year). When the program is completed, the percentage of civilian output in the total volume of defense complex production will have increased from 40 percent to 60 percent.

There is growing public interest in conversion. A USSR National Commission for Promoting Conversion has been set up and has gone to work. A Commission for Conversion has been created and is operating under the Soviet Peace Committee. Seminars and conferences are being held for enterprise managers, trade-union officials, scientists and military personnel. International contacts are also being expanded: On the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, a representative round-table meeting was held in Moscow recently at which Soviet and foreign specialists and representatives of national and international trade-union organizations discussed problems of conversion. And the convening of a special UN conference on conversion problems is slated for June of next year.

Nevertheless, to say that conversion is proceeding successfully in our country would be to embellish the facts, in my opinion. Let us begin with the fact that it is being implemented without a clear-cut system. For most defense enterprises, the decisions on conversion were unexpected. Consequently, the assignments handed down from above for the production of civilian output have become a real headache for these enterprises' managers. Given the lack of a well-thought-out plan for conversion, these assignments very often prove to be poorly coordinated with the enterprises' “basic production” and technical capabilities. The idea of using the resources of the defense industry complex to improve the operation of the agro-industrial complex, while a good one in principle, sometimes takes strange forms, to put it mildly. What else can you say about instances in which, for example, shops that used to produce missiles are starting to make milk bottling machines, and a plant that specializes in composites receives an assignment to produce milking machines?

One could accept the lack of a clear-cut economic plan for conversion were there a mechanism in place that would provide incentives for military enterprises to shift to civilian production. In capitalist countries, the role of such a mechanism is played by the market, as we know. When confronted with the threat of cutbacks in military orders (something the government usually announces in advance), corporations start maneuvering resources and promptly establish ties with new clients in the civilian sector. In particular, such maneuvering is currently practiced on a wide scale by many firms in the US, where as a result of cutbacks in military programs, the Pentagon has foregone the services of nearly 80,000 small and middle-sized firms in the past five years alone.

In the Soviet economy, where market relations are in a rudimentary form, such a model of "self-conversion" is simply impossible as yet. The situation of defense enterprises is further compounded by the fact that prices and profit margins for the new civilian output, as a rule, are much lower (often several times lower) than for the output being taken out of production. In such conditions, in order to maintain previous wage levels and to come up with money to reconfigure production, enterprises must either cut back the number of employees or turn to the state budget for help. The experience of enterprises that have made the most progress on the path of conversion—the Votkinsk Plant, for example—shows that, in practice, the second option is chosen most often as yet.

Since neither a plan nor economic mechanism of conversion has yet to be formulated, its implementation is effected largely through the use of the notorious command-and-pressure methods, which is to say that assignments for civilian goods are essentially imposed on enterprises. The producers' natural reaction to this is to try to bide their time or to put as little effort into the job as possible.

How can we ensure that conversion brings us maximum benefit with a minimum of economic and social costs?

Soviet and international experience shows that the most important condition for effective conversion consists in involving those whom conversion affects first and foremost in its planning and implementation on a broad scale—namely the work collectives of defense complex enterprises, scientists, engineers, and trade-union officials. Nor can we leave out, needless to say, military personnel and those who support the defense sector of the economy—the taxpayers.

As was noted at the aforementioned round-table conference, this is precisely the path that labor unions for workers at certain military enterprises in the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy are taking, to one degree or another. In conjunction with scientists, and local authorities, they are setting up working groups and centers for conversion at their enterprises, as well as in regions where defense industries are concentrated.

There are instances in which initiatives "from below" have been supplemented with important legislative

steps. For example, a bill on conversion that is presently under consideration in the US Congress envisions the mandatory creation of special committees at military enterprises, the formulation of conversion plans in advance, and the creation of a special insurance fund (based on contributions from current military orders) to finance the retraining and job placement of personnel to be let go from military production. Time will tell how this will be implemented in practice.

It is quite clear that our country has a special need today for a law on conversion, a law that would spell out the responsibility of the government, military agencies, local authorities, and enterprises shifting military production to civilian output. It is noteworthy that Soviet trade unions already proposed that such a law be drafted—in 1982. At the time the proposal went unheeded, for understandable reasons. But today is just the time, it seems, for our parliamentarians from the trade unions to return to this question and to support the idea of drafting national legislation on conversion that Deputies from the Soviet Peace Committee have presented to the Supreme Soviet. The lack of such legislation not only impedes the creation of a rational conversion mechanism but also threatens the social protection of workers in the defense sector. The matter brooks no delay.

A formidable obstacle to the broad participation of workers in the businesslike discussion of conversion issues consists in insufficient glasnost on military-economic matters. Despite certain advances in the sphere of purely military glasnost, the quantity and quality of information on the defense industry in our country remains lower than in most Western countries.

I anticipate a question: Would not such glasnost undermine our security? I assure you that in the era of total electronic intelligence-gathering, the range of military-economic secrets has narrowed to such an extent that it encompasses essentially only technology and research. As for other characteristics of Soviet military industry, they have long been known to the presumed enemy. The paradox is that the employees of our defense enterprises sometimes know far less about what they make than NATO experts.

In order for workers and trade unions to take a real part in the discussion of conversion issues at their enterprises, they must have access to the information this requires. Otherwise, how can the capabilities of defense enterprises be dovetailed with the needs of their potential customers in the civilian sector if no one has a clear idea of what those capabilities are?

Meanwhile, life is forcing Soviet producers of military output themselves to work to overcome the information shortage. In Sverdlovsk, for example, a recently created regional and interdepartmental center known as Ural-Conversion is already setting up its own data bank. In Moscow, defense enterprises are setting up an export association to sell their output on foreign markets. It is clear that such initiatives deserve to be emulated.

The lack of proper glasnost in questions of military production also hurts conversion in a broader sense, since our taxpayers—you and I, in other words—still have no way of judging either amounts of military aid and the sale of weapons abroad or the expediency of various military programs.

Here's a graphic example. Recently we were informed of the launching in Nikolayev of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Tbilisi. In the United States, each such ship (without escort) costs at least \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion. Many experts, including Soviet experts, have great doubts about the degree to which the construction of a new series of aircraft-carrying ships is in keeping with the principles of reasonable sufficiency in defense and the new thinking in foreign policy. As an economist, however, I personally ask myself a different question: Does it make sense in principle to spend today such gigantic sums of money to repulse a highly unlikely external threat at a time when real internal threats—economic disorders, growing crime, and so forth—are truly mounting not by the day but by the hour? Wouldn't it be better for us to use the money gained from more resolute economizing on tanks and aircraft carriers to give pay increases to our militia, for example, and to enhance their wretched equipment? It seems to me that this would raise the level of Soviet citizens' security more than yet another addition to our military arsenal.

As we see, conversion encompasses virtually all aspects of our life—from the economy to foreign policy. Accordingly, its success can be ensured only by the concerted effort of our entire society. Today, workers and labor unions, especially in the defense branches of the economy, must more actively join in the discussion and resolution of conversion problems at all levels—including the national level, establish international contacts, and borrow from the experience of their colleagues in other countries.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Armenian Gosplan Chairman on Republic's Draft Economic Independence Plan

90US0584A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
2 Feb 90 p 2

["Draft of the Concept for the Economic Independence of Armenian SSR"]

[Text] ArSSR Gosplan has prepared a draft for the concept of the republic's economic independence. The draft represents the synthesis of three alternative versions that were developed on public-initiative principles by scientific groups made up of economic scientists at the Institute of Economics, ArSSR Academy of Sciences; NIIEP, under ArSSR Gosplan; Yerevan State University; and Yerevan Institute of the National Economy.

At the request of an Armenpress correspondent, M. Ts. Mkrtchyan, deputy chairman of ArSSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan, discussed the work that has been done and the paths for Armenia's economic and social development, the implementation of which forms the basis of the concept.

When the concept was being developed, alternative versions were proposed for a number of fundamental positions that are close to one another. The existing differences in points of view concerning various questions were reduced by us into a general point of view, with a consideration of the discussions that had taken place at sessions of the republic's commission to improve the economic mechanism.

Leading scientists participated in the discussions and, when the draft was being prepared, use was made of the experience gained by the union republics.

Today our republic's national economy, despite the slight positive shifts as compared with 1988, is in a critical situation. There has been a serious delay in social and economic development; social injustice has become aggravated; the illicit economy has become stronger; the balance between supply and demand and between production and consumption has been disturbed; no steps have been taken to provide a considerable segment of the population with income above the subsistence level; and there has been an increase in the ecological tension.

The republic's socioeconomic complex has proven to be in a disorganized condition. But its rising to a new and qualitatively higher level of functioning, while preserving the old economic mechanism and structures and the old leadership and administration, is impossible.

All this forces us to seek the resolution of the problems not by standard methods, but to proceed along the path of creating a new economic mechanism, a new system of administering the national economy, a system that presupposes the republic's economic independence.

Proceeding from the situation that has developed, we feel that the basic and most important tasks confronting the republic are the overcoming of the consequences of the earthquake, the damage from which exceeds 13 billion rubles; the resolution of the problems linked with the events of the past two years and Artsakh, and also with the deportation of more than 240,000 Armenians from a neighboring republic, which sharply aggravated all our social, economic, and political problems.

The concept draft contains the basic principles, elements, and links of the mechanism of ArSSR's economic independence and is a description of the desired condition to which we are striving.

The implementation of the concept creates the necessary economic prerequisites for bringing our republic out of its critical state, for speeding up the socioeconomic development, for the financial improvement of the

economy, and for the rapid restoration of the cities and rayons that were destroyed by the earthquake.

It will make it possible to guarantee the employment rate of the able-bodied population, including the refugees, will raise the nation's standard of living and its material and spiritual welfare, and will also guarantee the rise in the technical level, quality, and competitiveness of output, the development of the citizens' creative initiative and participation, the expansion of their economic freedom, and the buildup of the spiritual, creative, and economic potential of the Armenians living in other regions of the USSR and in the foreign Diaspora.

Finally, the concept will serve the complete spiritual and economic integration with NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], the improvement of the environment, its protection and reproduction, as well as the republic's integration in the system of world-economy ties, the development of new transportation paths, and the increase in the autonomy of the functioning of Armenian SSR.

The economic independence of Armenian SSR presupposes that our republic will resolve in a sovereign manner the questions of the strategy and tactics of its functioning and socioeconomic development, the formation of an economic system of administration and its regulation, and the establishment and development of economic ties with partners outside of the republic.

The economic relations that the economic entities of Armenian SSR have with other republics and foreign states must be carried out on the basis of the principle of equivalency.

The concept stipulates the existence on the territory of Armenian SSR of varied forms of ownership, and their legal and economic equality, as well as the free choice by the economic entities of the specific form of ownership within the boundaries established by the legislation enacted by the republic and the country.

Entities that act as the owners of property are the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies, public organizations, enterprises, individual citizens, as well as foreign states, companies, organizations, and citizens—in a word, all legal entities. They also have the right to establish enterprises in the procedure established by the republic's legislation.

The economic activities of the property-owning entities are based on the principle of free enterprise.

Thus, equal opportunities are created for all entities, irrespective of the forms of ownership, and the condition that becomes the chief one for successful functioning is the gauge of economic effectiveness, the evaluation of which is provided by the market.

All the other economic relations are constructed in conformity with this initial position.

For example, directive-type, specifically addressed planning of the enterprises' activities is abolished. The state

regulation of their activities is carried out by way of regulation in accordance with legislative norms and by way of a system of state production orders, and also, chiefly, by means of economic levers—pricing, taxation, credit and investment policy, etc.

The factor that must be the central link in the republic's interrelationships with the Union is the system of budgets. The concept stipulates the accumulation of all taxes paid into the republic budget and the local budgets. It is planned for deductions to be paid into the union budget from the republic budget according to a quota that has been coordinated with union agencies.

It is also planned to create a market mechanism with all its attributes and specific problems. The specific ways to resolve them must be developed and implemented in the transitional period that has been stipulated by the concept, which period consists of three stages and which is intended to create the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the functioning of the economic-independence mechanism.

During the first stage, before the end of 1990, the necessary legislative and methodology-standards documents are being prepared. Simultaneously the appropriate preparatory work to introduce the new mechanism is being carried out.

During the second stage, 1991-1995, that mechanism will be introduced gradually—additional legislative acts and methodology-standards documents are being prepared, and the previously approved documents are being reconsidered, proceeding from the experience of their practical application.

In the third stage, until the year 2000, it will be necessary to create completely a qualitatively new system of management that synthesizes the principles of free enterprise and the state-planning regulation of the economy.

The concept consists of 18 sections. One of them is devoted to foreign-economic ties and to relations with the Armenian Diaspora.

Experimental Self-Financing, Self-Management Rayon Created In Tashkent

904A0183a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview With Sh. Nizamov by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent O. Yakubov: "Our Interviews....Independence Of A Rayon"]

[Text] Beginning in January of this year Tashkent's Frunze rayon is supposed to begin operating on the principles of self-financing and self-management on an experimental basis. PRAVDA VOSTOKA's correspondent met with the chairman of the ispolkom of the Frunze rayon's Soviet of People's Deputies Sh. Nizamov in this regard and interviewed him.

[Yakubov] So, on the morning of 1 January, Shavkat Khasanovich, you woke up and outside everything in the

rayon was operating on the principles of economic accountability and self-financing.

[Nizamov] Yes, like in a fairy tale. If only it were like that in real life. We began a systematic preparation for the transition to economic accountability and self-financing several years ago. But it was only when the higher authorities became convinced that our ideas were not purely utopian in nature but were beginning to take on a very concrete form that certain official instructions were issued. For example, among the fundamental elements of the program of the Tashkent city party organization is a statement regarding the necessity of a step-by-step transition of the rayon economy to the principles of self-financing and self-management. This program document in particular gives approval to the preparatory work which was done in our rayon in pursuit of this goal. The republic Council of Ministers assigned the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Finance and the Tashkent city ispolkom along with our organization the task of carrying out a number of measures designed around the experimental introduction of and the transition of our rayon to standardized methods of budget formulation beginning with 1 January 1990. In other words, the rayon's budget must be formulated by utilizing the principles of self-financing. But here's where the catch is. Instead of elaborating the necessary standards now, they are telling us that there are no precedents for this in the country and therefore no standards to draw from. But as I understand it, current standards should be dictated by the vital needs of the people. Without that how can we even talk about self-management and economic accountability?

[Yakubov] So, you started the new year using the previous budget?

[Nizamov] Not quite. The Frunze rayon is full of industrial enterprises and organizations and therefore contributes 265 million rubles to the budget every year. From this amount less than 20 million is allocated directly to the rayon's budget. What can you say, you can't do much with that amount of money. In our ispolkom we created a completely new structural entity—an economically accountable department dealing with consumer goods, paid services and the coordination of the activities of cooperatives. In short, the rayon has begun to create its own enterprises which have yielded a considerable annual profit. True, we have not yet received the right to allocate these resources as we see fit, but we intend to fight for that privilege with all our energy... otherwise, the idea of transferring to economic accountability and self-management will perish.

[Yakubov] How do you envision self-management at the rayon level?

[Nizamov] First of all, it means sovereignty of the people which necessarily must be supported by legislation. After all, we suffer most from the imperfection of laws and their inertness. For example, tenants demand a meeting with the head of the rayon department of public services. But he doesn't show up to the meeting with the tenants.

By law, however, he is not liable for this. But when the organs of self-management receive legal status, when the Soviet of People's Deputies becomes the legislator and when the ispolkom becomes what it is supposed to be, a true executive committee, then the principles of self-management will become embodied in every day life.

This is precisely why we in the rayon elaborated a statute regarding the status of the neighborhood and housing committees after first examining their legal basis. Both the neighborhood and housing committees are in my opinion, or, more precisely, can and should be true organs of self-management which, being a juristic entity, will begin to act under the leadership of the rayon Soviet of People's Deputies.

Who better knows what is happening in the rayon than the members of the neighborhood and housing committees?

The city authorities, for example, are opening another shoe repair shop in the rayon. But nearby live a large number of women who could organize a sewing shop. So who is in a better position to know which the rayon needs more, a sewing shop or a shoe repair shop? Probably, it is the organs of self-management which are more familiar with these questions. The lower self-management levels need economic accountability principles. This will allow them to solve many social problems, among which are questions of allocating living space. A new method has been found...the sale of state-owned apartments. An apartment becomes vacant in a particular building. The housing committee is very well aware of who needs living quarters the most. And if the housing committee has the resources, then it can sell the apartment to the family who needs it on credit after it pays a certain amount as a down payment or it can find other forms of providing living quarters to those who are in need. The various options are plentiful. It is important that people feel that they have been entrusted with power not only on paper but in practice as well and that they are the true masters of their own lives.

A long time ago in the East there was a tradition. Before one sold his house, he asked his neighbors if they needed it. And if they didn't want it, then it was sold to strangers. We don't intend to infringe upon civil or legal rights. We want the organs of self-management, first of all the neighborhood and housing committees, truly to be the local representatives of Soviet power; we want their decisions to be ratified by the legislator, in this case the Soviet of People's Deputies, and for the executive committee to help in carrying out those decisions.

[Yakubov] It appears quite feasible even in the near future that the rayon organs of self-management will be able to find solutions to questions pertaining to the social and material needs of the population. But after all, you are talking about housing problems. Can the rayon solve these without the city? Won't violations occur; won't local interests create problems in situations regarding the allocation of housing and the improvement of living conditions?

[Nizamov] Fears of this kind probably will slow down the rayon's transition to the method of self-financing and self-management. But tell me, if you please, how do you instill in a person a sense of pride about his street, his neighborhood and rayon? After all, a person will only become the true master of his land when he feels that the land, the building and apartment are his and that he is responsible for them. Maybe, I'm presenting very basic truths, but there are far too many abstract appeals and slogans in our lives and we don't pay any attention to concrete matters, shunting them off to the side as trivial.

In our rayon there are a considerable number of so-called dilapidated housing units. The problem, it would appear, is simple—the old buildings should be torn down and the people relocated to modern apartment buildings. And so the Salarskiy and Burdzharskiy settlements fall under the bulldozer's blade, and houses around Baranov Street are torn down. And the people who were born and raised here are relocated to the other end of town. Then we hang billboards with propaganda appeals in the most visible places: "People of Frunze! Let's turn our rayon into the city's most beautiful rayon!" So who are the people of Frunze? Are they the ones who, having lived for dozens of years in the rayon, are forced to move to Sergeli or to Chilanzar, Karakamysh and Karasa? Or are they the ones who will receive a new, well-built apartment in their own rayon to replace their old, demolished houses and who will understand that Soviet power is not just a slogan or an appeal. They will understand that it is the same power which displays concrete concern not about people "in general" but about each individual.

Yes, everything is already known, it has all been arranged ahead of time in the planning organs. There can be and will be no "freelancing" at the local level. That is the stereotype of past dogma and directives. But yesterday's clothes no longer fit. We have outgrown them, I dare to say, and they are too tight for us. We want to build our lives today our own way, taking into consideration people's interests and needs. And self-management and self-financing are not whims or contributions of fashion but are necessities. That is why we want these principles of economic management to become an integral part of our life and not an experiment. The same life that will be managed by the people.

Georgia's Development of Black Sea Arca to Promote Economic Independence

90US0611A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Georgian Gosplan official Bakur Davidovich Gulua by GRUZINFORM: "And the Sea Will Be Ours, and the Profits, and the Blessings: or, Several Words about the Draft Maritime Conception for Georgia"]

[Text] A national maritime conception is being developed within our republic. It is destined to play an important role in the life of Georgia, for, throughout the entire history of

mankind, maritime countries have had an advantage over "landlocked" states in the tempo of their political, economic, social, and cultural development and in establishing international contacts and trade. In our distant past, this accounted for the flourishing of Colchis, Phasis, and Dioscuria on the shores of the Black Sea.

Many centuries have passed since that time and a sea of problems has appeared around Ponta Evksin. And not only in the ecological sense, but in an entire aggregate of problems that are vitally important for the development of a coastal state and its economy. All this, naturally, is disturbing to the public and dictates a necessity to speak out publicly, to introduce our own proposals.

A GRUZINFORM correspondent met with the First Deputy Chairman of the republic's Gosplan, Bakur Davidovich Gulua, who heads the Republic Coordination Commission for developing the draft national maritime conception, and asked him to talk about the conception's goals and tasks.

[Question] How is work going on drawing up the draft?

[Gulua] In truth, the Presidium of the Georgian Council of Ministers still has not officially confirmed the new commission. However, it has been functioning as a working unit since the first days the government began to work on a conception for the economic development of the republic.

The problem placed before the commission is a complicated one, both in terms of scale and of time. Within a short time-frame, before 1 March of this year, we must present the government with the draft of a national maritime conception and, by 10 May, with a complex program for its realization.

This decision is not one that was made today or yesterday. The task of developing a maritime conception was specifically formulated back on 18 November 1989, in an address by the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, N.A. Chitanav, at a session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, as one of a series of transformations being planned by the government on the republic's way to economic sovereignty.

Effective utilization of the sea's potentials is of fundamental importance for development of the national economy, it was declared from the tribune of the session. For clarity, I consider it necessary to present the position of the government on this question in its entirety,

I quote: "Development of the Black Sea, of the geographic and economic belt along the coast, is not restricted merely to development of subtropical crops or tourism, to the creation of a broad network of resort facilities and to Georgian shipping operations. The question of the further development and utilization of this region is an exceptionally important and long-range one. Its solution requires the joint efforts of scientific organizations, Gosplan, and appropriate ministries and departments, inasmuch as its significance is complex and

encompasses problems that range from the diverse channels of international relations to industry, trade, navigation, and exploitation of the sea's riches. And, all the time, special attention must be devoted to its main function, that of tying Georgia to the outside world."

These ideas became the basis for the creation of a national maritime conception and took on real direction from the day that the Republic Coordination Commission was established for its development.

Based on the spectrum of questions being studied by it, on the variety of themes going into it, and, most important, based on its staff of scholars, economists, jurists, and specialists from various sectors of the national economy, on the representation of republic organs, ministries, departments, and scientific research collectives, one can judge the universality of its scale and of the measures being taken to deal with the problems of the Black Sea and to put the sea to work for the economy of the Georgian SSR.

It is sufficient to say that, along with Gosplan, Tbilisi State University, the Georgian SSSR Academy of Sciences, its scientific research institute for geography imeni Vakhushti Bagrationi, the Association for Protection of the Georgian Coast (Gruzbergozashchita), the State Committee for Protection of Nature and Forestry, the Georgian Technical University, the Georgian SSR Administration of Geology (Gruzgeologiya), the Georgian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, the GeSSR Administration for the Fishing Industry (Gruzrybprom), the Ministry of Justice, the Georgian Maritime Shipping Company, and many other of the republic's scientific, creative, and labor collectives are collective members of the Commission.

[Question] How, organizationally, is it planned to solve these tasks in such a short period of time?

[Gulua] A temporary creative collective, financed by the government, has been established within the Coordination Commission. It includes ten creative groups that are working in accordance with the basic overall directions of the national maritime conception. Naturally, the institutes, associations, organizations and individual scholars that belong to these working groups will also have specific tasks with regard to elaboration of themes and questions. This, specifically, is what we are doing today. In the future, it is planned to establish a single maritime center and associations, which will carry out work on the study and solution of all problems connected with the Black Sea. Indeed, the question that arises today is not about how to rectify the destructive consequences resulting from violation of the ecological balance of both the water area of the sea and of its shores, but about how to save the sea as such, having revived its healthy functions.

Destructive inertia is so deep that it is not possible by prohibitions alone, let us say, on relocating the Batumi petroleum processing plant, or by intermittent shore-reinforcement operations, to save the overall situation.

We need to resolve, and urgently, an entire complex of scientific, economic, and national economic problems.

This is to say nothing about the need to expand reconstruction and technical modernization of ports to contemporary standards, without which no littoral state can conceivably function normally today.

Only all-round, regulated economic and scientific and technical decisions with regard to renewal of the region's infrastructure will be able to ensure both a modern level in the development of tourism and a high level of fertility for the Black Sea littoral in the Caucasus.

All these and other questions, naturally, demand improvement of the management structure and of the mechanism of economic incentives, large investments, and, most important, the efforts of all society. The task of the Republic Coordination Commission is to present for general discussion the most optimal and effective program for its realization.

[Question] Is it not possible in this connection to define specifically certain aspects of the draft for the future national maritime conception?

[Gulua] The essence of this multi-level, statewide, and nationwide task can be formulated briefly: on the path toward economic sovereignty, it is not enough for the republic to become the fully-empowered owner, protector, and manager of its own part of the sea's wealth.

It is first of all necessary to solve the problem of increasing Georgia's role as a coastal state, one which possesses sovereign maritime rights and which makes its own specific contribution to international cooperation and trade and to economic development and a division of labor on the international and republic levels.

Solution of the problem of the sea as a sphere for the development of trade with bordering regions [prigranichnaya trgovlya]—and, most important, of maximum and careful utilization and reproduction of marine resources for achieving the food program—is coming to acquire particularly important significance for the republic.

Rational use of the sea as an alternative source of energy, as well as of its mineral resources and recreational potential, will unconditionally benefit our economy.

I am not even speaking about the potentials that are inherent in solution of the ecological problem and in complex, scientifically-based exploitation of the recreational resources of the Black Sea. The compass of this question is extremely broad. Both on this plane and in all other questions, we are hoping for international collaboration on cooperative principles with all the countries of the Black Sea basin.

In a word, both in the short term and in a longer-range perspective, we have more than enough problems, as well as questions. Broad public opinion will be taken into

account in dealing with them; all businesslike proposals will be carefully examined and considered for the good of the matter.

In answer to our opponents, I can firmly state that the program for developing a national maritime conception is a precise one methodologically. A course has been set for complexity in the solution of problems, which unconditionally will make a contribution of its own to establishing and strengthening the economic sovereignty of the republic. With the solution of this task, the sea will be ours, and its profits and its blessings will become ours. The main thing now is to work productively and thoughtfully.

Growth of Cooperative Movement in Georgia Observed

904A0182A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Georgian SSR State Committee on Statistics: "The Number of Cooperatives Is Increasing"]

[Text] In 1989, there were 2,420,000 manual and office workers and kolkhoz members working in the republic's national economy. In private labor—approximately 6,000 individuals (less repeated employment). On 1 January 1990, according to preliminary data on income and accounting data, there were more than 110,000 individuals, including those holding down more than one job, working in cooperatives for the production of goods and services.

Last year the number of construction cooperatives increased at especially rapid rates. Throughout the year their number grew by a factor of seven and their proportion of the overall number of cooperatives increased from 2 to 7 percent. The number of cooperatives for providing domestic services for the population and cooperatives for the raising of vegetables, flowers, mushrooms and other agricultural products increased twofold. Just as in the past, the number of cooperatives providing care for persons of advanced age, invalids and sick persons is extremely negligible. In all, there are only two of them.

The average wage for manual and office workers in 1989 was approximately 200 rubles, an increase of 7 percent compared to the previous year. In cooperatives (including persons holding down more than one job), the average wage was 300 rubles monthly.

The deferred demand of the population brought about an increase in the monetary resources of the population used for investments, for obligations of freely circulating credit and certificates. The plan for 1989 called for a total amount of 832.3 million rubles, with actual use being made of 1,153,000,000 rubles. This was 320,700,000 rubles, or 38.5 percent more than the established plan.

On 1 January 1990, the monetary funds of the population invested in institutes of the Georgian Republic Bank of the USSR Savings Bank amounted to 8,319,000,000

rubles. This included 6,891,000,000 in deposits, 995,000,000 in obligations of freely circulating credit and 433,000,000 rubles in certificates.

As you can see, a ruble earned cannot always be used for barter. The deferred demand of the population is increasing and this requires a search for additional sources for the production of consumer goods and for providing services for the population. This includes further growth in the number of cooperatives—both production and service-type cooperatives.

ESSR Deputy Finance Minister Discusses Income Tax Law

904A0182B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with ESSR deputy finance minister V. Aron: "Five Questions on Income Tax From the Population"]

[Text] The questions are answered by 1st Deputy Minister of Finances for the ESSR V. Aron.

[Question] What are the chief principles upon which preparation of the plan was based?

[Aron] The composers of the plan based their actions upon the fact that all those who obtain income pay income tax on an equal basis, regardless of the sources of their income. The amount of income tax is not dependent upon whether the income was realized from work performed at a state enterprise or at a kolkhoz, from private labor, in the form of honorariums or bonuses, from agricultural work, from lease payments or other income. A unified tax rate will be introduced in place of the many types of tax rates in effect at the present time.

[Question] What are the principal differences from the present taxation system?

[Aron] The most important difference lies in the fact that the tax is computed based upon the entire amount of income obtained throughout the year. At the present time, income tax is computed based upon income obtained in the form of wages, with each month treated separately. Moreover, at the present time the tax is computed in different ways depending upon the type of income involved. For example, if a writer works at an established post and in addition leases living space in his home, then at the present time he pays income tax separately with honorariums for his works, separately for his wages and separately for the income obtained from leasing living space in his home. In accordance with the new system, all of the income obtained will be totalled for computing the tax.

The income tax amounts will be progressive in nature—the greater the income, the greater the amount subject to taxation. The income tax amounts today are also progressive in principle and yet, owing to the fact that they were introduced many years ago, they have lost their progressive nature for the most part. If we take income

tax from wages, then at the present time its amount increases with wages up to 100 rubles monthly. Everything that is higher than 100 rubles is taxed to an equal degree—in the amount of 13 percent.

When developing the new tax rates, consideration was given to the fact that they must ensure the turning over to the budget of income tax in the amount in which they are presently being received in the form of income tax, tax for childlessness and income tax from kolkhozes from the wage fund. In the process, the tax on wages that are lower than average will be reduced and that on wages which are higher than average—increased. Thus, a computation at the present time reveals that there is practically no change in the income tax on a monthly wage of 310 rubles. But in the case of a wage of 200 rubles, the tax declines by one fourth and it increases to the same degree for a monthly wage of 550 rubles. But these rates are not the final word, but rather they require more work in the interest of finding the scale that is most fair.

It is stipulated in the plan that income of less than 1,200 rubles annually (100 rubles per month) is not subject to taxation. Thus, for a monthly wage of 150 rubles, the taxable income is 600 rubles annually (50 rubles per month), the tax from which will equal 96 rubles annually, or 8 rubles per month (at the present time, 14 rubles and 70 kopecks per month). And at the present time there is a minimum income that is not subject to taxation (70 rubles per month), but distinct from that outlined in the plan, there is no withdrawal from it during taxation. That is, a strange situation exists at the present time in which no tax is withdrawn from a wage of 70 rubles and yet from a wage of 100 rubles a tax is withdrawn not from 30 rubles but from all 100 rubles.

[Question] Is there income that is not subject to taxation?

[Aron] Taxable income does not include pensions, alimony, interest and profit from invested amounts or from insurance contracts, profit realized from state loans and lotteries, sums obtained in the form of gifts or from inheritance, amounts obtained at one's place of work in the form of grants in amounts up to 500 rubles annually and objective bonuses (gifts) obtained at one's place of work, the value of which ranges up to 100 rubles annually.

[Question] Has provision also been made for some other privileges?

[Aron] As already stated above, income of less than 1,200 rubles annually is not subject to taxation. In addition, the taxable income of parents with children under 18 years of age will be reduced by 20 rubles monthly for each child (thus, 240 rubles annually). If only one parent has income, then the family's taxable income will be reduced by 40 rubles monthly for each child.

Amounts which a recipient of income transfers to the Estonian Children's Fund, the Estonian Fund for Culture, the Estonian Peasant Fund and to the Fund for the Lakhemaaskiy National Park, for the development of

activities called for in their regulations, are not subject to taxation. The plans also provide for the possibility of distributing income over several years. This applies first of all to writers and artists, whose works require several years of effort, with lump sum payments being made on a one-time basis.

Since income tax is added to the budgets of organs of local self government, the latter are authorized to introduce additional privileges.

[Question] How does one determine the income subject to taxation?

[Aron] People are obligated themselves to take into account their income and the expenses associated with obtaining that income and at the end of the year to present the tax service with a declaration of their income. In view of the fact that income tax is withheld throughout the year from wages, honorariums and other payments, the declaration on income should indicate the amount already paid in this manner throughout the year. Using the declaration on income, the tax on all of the annual income involved will be computed and thereafter a comparison will be made against the amount paid throughout the year. If a lesser amount was paid, then an additional payment will be required. On the other hand, if a greater amount was paid throughout the year, then the excess amount will be returned to the taxpayer.

The tax service will exercise control over the correctness of the data cited in the declaration on income. If it is discovered that the taxpayer concealed his income or presented a lowered amount, then the underpaid income tax will be required from the taxpayer in a threefold amount. The already published Law Governing Taxation also contains other sanctions.

If a taxpayer does not furnish the tax service with a declaration of income, he may be fined in an amount up to 500 rubles.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the plan is preliminary in nature. Despite the fact that it has been reviewed by a committee of experts, discussed by the Board of Directors of the ESSR Ministry of Economics and undergone an initial reading by the ESSR government, we are continuing to receive recommendations and comments which should be taken into account when preparing the final variant.

ESSR Food Price Subsidies to Continue

904A0182C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Excerpt from article by Ya. Tolstikov: "Price Mark-Ups Remain in Force": "Report from the Press Conference at Toompea" [Castle Hill]]

[Excerpts] The regular press conference of the republic's government which took place on 29 January was devoted to several questions of interest to the public.

[passage omitted]

Such questions as the introduction into operational practice of a cost of living index and a draft law on taxation were also examined during the press conference. Both of these problems are worthy of separate review and the Editorial Board will attempt to do just this in subsequent articles.

I. Toome called upon those present to focus special attention on the proposed increase in retail prices, with compensation for the losses in population income. Here he had in mind the increase in prices for vegetables, potatoes and also for meat and dairy products.

As is known, the budget for 1990 makes no provision for subsidies to be paid to farms for vegetables and potatoes. But the increase in prices for these products, which Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee] had hoped to enact commencing in January, was shortly thereafter abolished by the republic's government as being unreasonable. I. Toome reported that the government decided to leave the prices for vegetables and potatoes unchanged up until 2 April of this year and to request the Supreme Soviet to allocate subsidies for this purpose in the amount of from 10 to 10.5 million rubles.

However, in April an increase in the prices for vegetables and potatoes is anticipated and they will be differentiated depending upon the quality of the products. A compensation mechanism is in preparation.

The situation with regard to the prices for meat and dairy products is considerably more complicated. Here the subsidies from the budget for covering the difference between the purchase and retail prices amount to more than 400 million rubles in the case of agroprom alone. According to I. Toome, the republic's government examined two variants for compensating for the losses of the population.

The first calls for monthly compensation that will be the same for all residents of the republic and equal to 22 rubles (with vegetables and potatoes—27 rubles). On payday an individual goes to the cashier's window and receives the wages due him, including the amount for his children. In the case of this variant, the losses of highly paid residents (income in excess of 200-250 rubles monthly per individual) will not be compensated completely, since this category of personnel consumes noticeably more meat products than the average worker.

The second variant assumes the transfer of subsidies over to the social fund, from which compensation for the losses of families of average or moderate means (with incomes of less than 200 rubles monthly) will be issued. And in our case, such families constitute a majority—75-80 percent of the entire population. Such compensation could be expressed in a direct increase in salaries, pensions, allotments and grants.

As a general rule, highly paid families will not receive any compensation under this latter variant.

The prime minister stated that the republic's government examined both of these variants and thereafter returned them to the ministries for additional work. The government will commence a review of this problem during the second half of February. It is expected that, following an additional review of the variants for compensating for losses, they will be presented to the republic's Supreme Soviet with a recommendation to carry out a national poll, one timed to coincide with election day, that is, 18 March. Such a referendum could decide which variant for compensation is most preferred from the standpoint of a majority of the population.

However, several questions arise at this point. If the electors, that is, the entire adult population of the republic, is presented with the second variant for compensating for losses in its present form, there can be no doubt with regard to the outcome of the referendum—the majority, that is, people with average and low incomes, will naturally vote in its favor. In such a case, just how democratic will such an approach be in solving this important and vital question? And will it not point towards some slippage in the direction of wage-levelling in the incomes for various layers of the population?

This is one consideration. Further, if the prices for meat and milk are raised and the population begins to obtain compensation for its losses, then inevitably there will be an increase in the demand for fish, bread, macaroni and for many non-food goods. An individual will hardly spend all of his increase on meat and milk in order to maintain his consumption of these products at the former level. And is our industry prepared for an increase in the demand for these other, that is, non-meat products and for non-food goods? And will not an increase in the prices for meat and milk lead to growth in the prices for other food products and for products produced by the light industry? And as a result, the possibility is not excluded that the compensation will be "consumed" by this new increase in prices.

This question was raised on two occasions during the press conference. However, a clear answer to it was never obtained, not even from Prime Minister I. Toome. The impression was created that the government was overwhelmed by the magic of arithmetical computations: the total amount of subsidies from the state budget could be divided by the number of residents and the sought after figure of 22 or 27 rubles would be obtained and thus—everything would be "okay." But in real life everything is considerably more complicated. It is impossible to separate an increase in prices for some products or goods from the overall problems of consumer demand.

We are partially reassured by the fact that the variants for compensation under review in the government today are by no means final in nature. New recommendations by the Ministry of Social Questions, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics must be sent to the government by 15 February. Only then will a decision be handed down which, as already mentioned, the government will present for review by the Supreme Soviet.

[p a s s a g e o m i t t e d]

Issues Involved in ESSR Changeover to IME Analyzed

18200489

[Editorial Report] Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian carries on 31 January 1990 page 2, 2 February 1990 page 2, and 6 February 1990 page 2 a three-part 8800-word article by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Nemchinov entitled "The New Economic Model: A Strategy for Changeover." Nemchinov discusses the problems and shortcomings of the current economic system and relates these to the need for changeover to IME (Self-Managing Estonia). He emphasizes the need for a market-oriented system and outlines some of the problems and benefits to be found in such a system. Nemchinov then gives a detailed account of the various issues which need to be worked out to make the process of "living under the new conditions less difficult and painful."

The issues he addresses include organizational, financial, legal, personnel, and design and technological questions, as well as problems of marketing, foreign economic ties, material-technical supply, and the human and social factors involved. He concludes that, although many of these issues have to be worked on and resolved by the directors of enterprises, financial organs, and government, "the success of IME depends to a great extent on each one of us." He adds that "it is necessary to include tomorrow's success in today's models of economic management."

Foreign Firms To Make Estonian Coins, Stamps

904A0249A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Reyn Otsason, president of the Bank of Estonia, by L. Sher; date and place not specified: "Reyn Otsason: The Goal of the Trip Was Achieved"]

[Text] As already reported, a delegation of Estonian bank workers and printing specialists visited Hungary and Austria. The delegation was headed by the president of the Bank of Estonia, Reyn Otsason, who consented to a brief interview.

[Sher] Do you feel that the principal goals of the visit were achieved?

[Otsason] To a certain degree. I have already mentioned the fact that our specialists became acquainted with the technology for printing money in different states. And negotiations produced results such that in Hungary they were prepared to furnish us with assistance in the coining of money and medals and in Austria we engaged in talks on the printing of postage stamps for us, since they do not have the printing potential for printing money for foreign customers. We were aware of this and thus in Austria our chief concern was that of relationships with banks—in the interest of solving those problems concerned with the issuing of credits to us. Our Austrian colleagues prepared a very successful program in this regard. A most important element of this program was a visit to the president of their country, Kurt Waldheim. The political attention showered

upon us created considerably more favorable conditions for the carrying out of other negotiations. We held such talks with the State Bank of Austria and a number of commercial banks, including the Danube Bank—a joint banking institution of the USSR and several foreign countries. The results turned out to be quite good. One of the commercial banks agreed to conclude with us an agreement for collaboration, which we signed. It calls for the opening up of correspondent accounts, such that the Bank of Estonia is now able to carry out operations abroad. This same bank agreed to work out recommendations with us calling for the creation of a credit fund for the introduction of new equipment. To all appearances, it will be a small fund and yet it will be able to satisfy the requirements of many of our enterprises, especially small ones, in acquiring new technological innovations. The second agreement that was signed was concluded with the Danube Bank, which agreed to examine our proposal for the issuing of credits for especially effective investments in our national economy.

[Sher] And how is it possible to determine the most effective means for the investment of resources?

[Otsason] Here a very complicated problem is lying in wait for our republic. Throughout the entire world, state banks are very rich. Thus all of them are prepared, as guarantors for credits, to have a central state bank. But the Bank of Estonia is not included among the rich and we must create for it the ability to guarantee credits. The simplest method—to transfer the reserves of gold and hard currency to the Bank of Estonia. We will not receive them. The transfer to the Bank of Estonia of a certain amount of rubles will not satisfy us. They are not rated very high in international accounts. The third possibility—the availability to the Bank of Estonia of property which has real value and which could serve as a guarantee at those times when credit is extended erroneously and the recipient is unable to make repayment.

This is a very difficult question. But we must solve it. Certainly, the transfer to the Bank of Estonia of a group of enterprises or certain natural resources is not meant to imply that the bank will direct them. But in the case of an accident, when there is no possibility of the credit being repaid, we must be prepared to part with a portion of these material values. This implies that all of the work of the republic and its bank must be carried out with a maximum sense of responsibility. Otherwise, we will become bankrupt. Our partner, by investing his resources in our economy, is accepting a risk and is justified in requiring reliable guarantees.

[Sher] The Danube Bank—is a joint facility. Has not its Soviet partner expressed any objections against the agreement?

[Otsason] To the contrary, I sense support being offered by the Soviet workers of this bank. But permit me to

return to the theme already started. I believe that we must, while relying upon the agreement with this bank, carry out a competition for credit plans and select with the aid of skilled experts those plans which will produce the greatest results for the republic in the return of credits, plans in which we can be completely confident.

[Sher] Tell me, will it be difficult to create the Bank of Estonia in a completely empty place?

[Otsason] Very much so. I can only add that the novelty nature of the task makes this work attractive. We must be able to find such points of support and to create the bank and also a reputation for ourselves that will make us acceptable as a reliable partner.

[Sher] And the last question: how is the work proceeding with the printing of our own currency?

[Otsason] We have seven proposals from different countries. Thus the possibility exists of carrying out a detailed and thorough selection.

All-Union Jurisdiction Industry's Share of Production, Profits in ESSR Detailed

18150125A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
24 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by E. Reitsnik, Chairman Estonian SSR State Statistics Committee: "Union-Industry's Share In the Economy of Estonia"]

[Text] A great share of the economic potential of Estonia (i.e., the capacity of different branches of the economy to put out industrial and agricultural production, carry out capital construction, arrange transport, and render services to the citizens) is derived from union-controlled collectives, enterprises and organizations (henceforth union enterprises), especially in the areas of industry and construction, as well as transportation.

Given below are data about the relative share of union-run enterprises in the indices that characterize the economic potential of the republic (for the year 1988, or as of January 1, 1989). The calculations make use of the balance of Estonian SSR's national economy, and data from combined reports within the range of issues considered by the Estonian SSR State Statistics Committee.

Revenues from the base funds of union enterprises were 5.9 billion rubles, or 30 percent of all the base funds of the Estonian SSR. Out of the production base funds, 4.8 billion rubles' worth, or 37 percent of funds, belong to Union enterprises.

The material resources of union enterprises accounted for 506 million rubles, or 17 percent of resources for all branches of the economy.

Union enterprises made capital outlays in the amount of 377 million rubles, or 29 percent of all capital outlays, including 350 million rubles for items to be produced, or 36 percent of the respective capital outlay for the whole republic.

The gross production of union enterprises was 2.5 billion rubles, or 23 percent of the national gross product. Net production was 0.9 billion rubles, that forms 23 percent of the national net profit.

The profit made by union enterprises was 509 million rubles, or 29 percent of the total profit for the nation's economy.

In industry, there are 57 collectives and enterprises reporting to Union ministries and trade unions. The liability on their production base funds is 3.3 billion rubles, or 57 percent of all the base funds of the industry. Their production was 21 billion rubles, or 31 percent of all industrial production, net production 0.7 billion rubles, or 39 percent. Profit was 271 million, or 35 percent of the total profit gained by the industry.

Union enterprises put out industrial-technical production, as well as consumer goods. In the B-group, union enterprises put out 13 percent of the production. Union enterprises also produce 13 percent of consumer goods (522 million rubles worth), including 8 percent of industrial goods and 22 percent of food items.

In construction, union enterprises command 16 percent of the production base funds, they produce 16 percent of the national gross product and 10 percent of the national profit.

The volume of contract work completed by union-run construction and erection firms (they number 24) was 139 million rubles, or 28 percent of the contract work of all organizations. In addition, union enterprises have also completed commercial construction and erection projects for 9 million rubles or 12 percent of all such work.

The Union-run transport organizations (rail- sea- and air-transport) have production base funds (including passenger transfer) amounting to 1.2 billion rubles, or 48 percent of all the respective base funds. They have transported (including transfers of union enterprises) 74 million tons of freight, or 28 percent of all haulables. The hauling volume was 27.4 billion ton-kilometers, or 86 percent. The volume of passenger transfer was 31 million people, or 6 percent, passenger turnover—3 billion passenger-kilometers, or 35 percent of the total data for Estonia.

AGRO-ECONOMICS, POLICY, ORGANIZATION

Payments For Land Discussed

Veprev On Land Worth

904B0163A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
25 Jan 90 p 4

[Commentary by A.F. Veprev, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Agrarian and Food Committee, on issue of land payments: "Payment For Land"]

[Text] "How did it happen that our basic means of production, the land, has no value here? Maybe that's why it has become so uncared-for and defenseless?"—R. Shmantsar, Leningrad.

"Now they are proposing to set payments for land. But won't this measure become just another supplementary extortionary tax on the peasant, the quiet taxation noose which will squeeze him out of the village?"—I. Fedorov, Arkhangelskaya Oblast.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Agrarian and Food Committee A.F. Veprev answers these questions.

Two voices and two opposing opinions. Our committee receives many letters with such contradictory judgments.

The discussion of this question in our committee, as well as in other committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has sparked heated debates. But nevertheless, the people's deputies agreed that there should be payments for land. Why?

The first argument is economic. If a person or an enterprise receives land free of charge, he essentially doesn't place any value on it. We have become accustomed to treat things with care only if they cost something. Our entire economic record proves that. We have not attached any importance to land or other natural resources. We have not valued them and have considered them simply a gift from God. But this is the environment we live in, the Mother-provider which has been generously sprinkled with the sweat and blood of our ancestors. And yet we have arrived at this sad state; the land has been disfigured, squandered and rendered unusable. This is not the first time that I cite these figures and each time with a shudder; over the past fifteen to twenty years, over twenty million hectares of farmland have been lost. The connection here, I think, is as direct as it could be: we don't place much value on land and so we don't care much about it.

But really, what a paradox. Farms which couldn't have used the land any worse than they did, do not want to turn it over to another proprietor "just for nothing," let's say, to a leaseholder or especially to the owner of a working peasant farm. Even if they give it up, for the most worthless piece of land they want such a high price

that it would stagger you. Please note, this is for land which for them was completely free of charge.

In short, the question of establishing payment for land cannot be put off and is being dictated by life itself. Words to this effect have been included in the draft law on the Fundamentals of Legislation On Land which is being widely discussed now. The draft stipulates that payment for land will be levied in the form of loans or other types of payments determined depending on the quality and location of the land. And if they lease it? In that case a lease payment will be made which will be determined by an agreement between the sides involved. But not without control. A procedure and limits on the size of these payments will be established by legislation of the union and autonomous republics. And this is very important. After all, it is impossible to foresee in the Law on Land all possible variations for the entire Union.

Let's consider this variation which is very relevant today. Currently we have a huge amount of nearly worthless land. How should we proceed here? What payment should be levied? It's entirely possible that every now and then not only will we not have to take payment for certain plots, but, on the contrary, we will help and pay those individuals who take it upon themselves to develop those lands and make them productive.

The right to determine payment levels is left exclusively to the union and autonomous republics. The Baltic republics, for example, in establishing the size of such payments, base their decisions on a cadastral evaluation of the land. Yes, they have a land cadastre there. Other regions of our country, in particular the Russian Federation, unfortunately, do not. But in no way does that mean that the Russian peasant or city dweller who wants to work the land independently will not be able to acquire it. Here an economic evaluation of the land might be of use. Such an evaluation throughout the country has essentially been completed. We have systematic recommendations made on location by scientists from VASKhNIL (Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences). What is needed now is a practical organization of the work remaining.

A far from idle question is: what will the payments for land be used for? The question is understandable. If they go into the budget of the local Soviets and are utilized to improve the land, then these resources will be spent to raise living standards, to renew the conditions of labor of people working on the land. So it would be for the good of everyone. If, however, the payments are levied for the state budget and utilized for national programs, then for the farmer and especially for the landowner this would signify a supplementary tax burden for the benefit of who knows who. It's clear that this would be a hardship, a misfortune.

The draft of the Fundamentals of Legislation on Land states that payments for land go to the budgets of local Soviets of People's Deputies, are partially centralized in the budgets of the union and autonomous republics and

are directed first and foremost to the protection of land, to the improvement of the quality of land, to the material stimulation of landowners and those who utilize the land, including leaseholders, to the implementation of these measures and also to the elaboration of a system of land tenure.

The draft Law on Land is being discussed widely throughout our country. A special working group in the USSR Supreme Soviet has been created to collect comments and proposals which are published in the press or come in letters of which up to a hundred a day are delivered to our committee alone. I would note that the majority of authors, approximately 70 percent, are in favor of payments for land. The results of this discussion will be brought before the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies for analysis.

Obviously, the draft of the law, no matter how fully it takes into consideration the suggestions, cannot be perfect because real life is much richer and more complex than a law. Nonetheless, the committee believes that it should be approved. Life itself will show what kinds of clarifications need to be introduced. After all, these are only the fundamentals. The law will certainly not be brought to perfection in somebody's offices. That's why there is no time to lose!

Opposition To Payments

904B0163B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
6 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Skuratnik: "Orchard Growers Take Counsel"]

[Text] On 3 March in Moscow the congress of the orchard growers' association, "Orchard Grower and the Law," took place.

Why was the congress convened? Because of an important circumstance; the attempt of the government to establish payments for land which has been set aside as plots for orchard growers and vegetable gardeners. This attempt can be seen in the "USSR Draft Law on Procedures for the Utilization by the Population of the State Land Fund, Set Aside for Dachas, Orchards and Vegetable Gardens."

This document does not expand in the least the rights of a huge number of orchard growers and vegetable gardeners but instead to a large degree infringes upon these rights and in essence has as its goal only the establishment of payments for land.

We orchard growers believe that taking money from the pockets of the orchard grower, the worker, pensioner or invalid who has already put his savings and labor into developing nearly worthless land is not right, because for decades the land has been given to him for an unlimited time period at no cost and if payments for the land are now to be introduced, then it must be done on a purely voluntary basis.

Instead of a unilateral draft, participants of the congress proposed the preparation of a draft USSR composite law "On Collective Orchard and Vegetable Production in the USSR." This document should be submitted for general discussion.

We are convinced that the orchard plot and everything that has been constructed on it and produced by the grower's hands should be his personal property and he should possess the right to sell it, trade it, divide it, give it as a gift and to pass it on to his heirs.

On behalf of the growers and orchard growers organizations which belong to the association, the congress sent an "Open Letter" to the USSR Supreme Soviet, made the decision to organize a public center for the preparation of the draft USSR composite law "On Collective Orchard and Vegetable Production in the USSR" and called upon everyone who so desires to express their proposals which will form the basis of this document.

All those desiring to participate in this discussion can direct their ideas either to the editorial staff of SELSKAYA ZHIZN or to: 113447 Moscow, P.O. Box 97, "Orchard Grower and the Law" Association.

New Land Law Form, Requirements Debated

Chayanov, Past Errors Cited

904B0137A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY
VESTNIK in Russian No 22, Nov 89 p 3

[Article by V. Akulinin and Yu. Vinokurov: "Land Awaits the Master"]

[Text] During the drafting of the new Land Law, first of all, the following question arose: How to give land back to the peasant and to revive the most efficient forms of land relations? This is not accidental: In the history of our state the peasant question was always considered a key one. The first Soviet Land Law—the Land Decree—determined that landlord ownership of land is abolished immediately. All land "... becomes the property of the whole people and is used by all those who work on it." At the same time, forms of land use should be free.

This ideology is expressed with special clarity in the works of the well-known Soviet economist A. V. Chayanov. He wrote the following: "Ultimately, land is the basic subject of labor. Without it labor and life are unthinkable... Therefore, everyone also has a labor right to land. What does a labor right to land mean? It means that no one can be the owner of land... Conversely, everyone who wants to work on land has the right to it. And as long as he or his family work on this land, no one has the right to prevent him from using and improving it and from obtaining income from it."

The most different points of view concerning land ownership are now expressed. Some economic scientists propose that land be denationalized and that the right of private land ownership be recognized. Others hold the

position of preserving the Land Law currently in effect. It is quite obvious that it is no longer possible to leave unchanged the policy of state land ownership formed under conditions of strict centralized bureaucratic management of the agrarian economy. However, nor should state ownership of land, on which socialist land relations are based, be rejected. With regard to the revival of private land ownership, which was revoked by the Land Decree in 1917, this in no way is compatible with the political or socioeconomic principles of the Soviet system and the prospects for its improvement and further development.

Undoubtedly, the right to dispose of land and to regulate land relations should belong to soviets of people's deputies. This is the core of the new land legislation. Only soviets have the right to make decisions on granting land areas for use or leasing, on withdrawing or redistributing land resources, on the amounts of the charge for plots, and so forth. Special deputy land commissions of soviets at all levels can engage in the practical implementation of these matters.

It is no less important to create reliable legal protection for the economic independence of land users. This applies equally to kolkhozes, sovkhoses, peasant farms, cooperatives, leasing collectives, and private homesteads. Precisely these fundamental positions and provisions were initial during the elaboration of the draft of the Land Law. A clear delimitation of the competence of the USSR and Union republics in the regulation of land relations is the distinctive feature of the draft law. The essence lies in the fact that all powers in the disposal of land resources are transferred to Union republics and local soviets. Only the establishment of basic provisions for land use and management and the disposal of land in the interest of meeting statewide and interrepublic needs and the needs of the country's defense and security remain under USSR authority. It is especially stressed that decisions on the use of land for these purposes should be made jointly by supreme Union and republic executive and administrative bodies of state power. If a mutually acceptable decision is not reached, the matter will be examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The same procedure is proposed during the development and implementation of all-Union programs for an efficient use of the country's land resources and performance of major reclamation and other operations.

It is quite obvious that economic reform in the agro-industrial complex can be effective only if land has true masters. It is a matter of transferring all land areas suitable for use, according to a state act or a leasing agreement, to labor collectives and peasant farms. Then economic reform in rural areas supplemented with guarantees for an independent use of land will open up real possibilities for enterprise and a concerned attitude toward this matter.

The draft law contains a number of new provisions for land use, which have not yet been applied in our practice. In particular, it is permitted to grant individual land

plots to workers, who wish to leave a kolkhoz or a sovkhos. They have the right to independently manage their farm on the assigned land. Cooperatives established on the basis of production subdivisions of kolkhozes and sovkhoses also have the right to receive such plots. Soviets of people's deputies can create special land resources from the state reserve and from inefficiently used areas and grant them to cooperatives, peasant farms, and individual citizens.

The special section of the draft law on land leasing is fundamentally new as compared with the legislation in effect. Soviets of people's deputies act as lessors. Kolkhozes and sovkhoses have the right to grant land only for secondary leasing (a leasing agreement). The law protects lessees' rights and creates a system of guarantees for any collective. The income received by the lessee as a result of a rise in land fertility is not the basis for a rent increase.

Thus, fair conditions for the activity of leasing collectives are created, because, unfortunately, various distortions occur now. Some lessees fall directly into the bondage of farms. What independence and initiative can be discussed here!... It is important to urgently eliminate such distortions, which hamper the development of leasing.

The following question is possible: Will peasant farms not become an alternative to the kolkhoz and sovkhos system? The presented draft law proceeds from the diversity of forms of socialist public ownership and citizens' ownership and provides the same opportunities for kolkhozes, sovkhoses, agro-industrial combines, agrofirms, cooperative organizations, peasant farms, and lessees. At the same time, peasant farms are established not instead of, but along with, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and, in our opinion, do not present any danger to their development. Only competition on a healthy economic basis is possible. The new law establishes equal rights for all land users and equally protects their economic independence. The law prohibits only the sale or mortgaging of land.

It would seem that recently a great deal has been done to reclaim land, to carry out amelioration work, to increase fertilizer application, and to lime acid soil, but at times the final results are not very encouraging. Mismanagement and violations in the technology, norms, and regimes of irrigation are to blame for this. As a result, land salinization is expanding. Arable land areas with increased acidity are not decreasing, but even increasing. Chernozem—our national wealth—is degrading and losing humus. Heavy equipment is compacting soil. With the wasteful application of mineral fertilizers a considerable part of the nutrients are being washed away and polluting reservoirs and rivers.

Why does this happen? Alas, a stereotyped attitude toward land as a gratuitous natural resource, for an occasional barbarian use of which no one will be made responsible, has been formed in the consciousness of

many managers. Therefore, no matter how much can be said about the fact that land must be managed sensibly, everything will remain as before so long as arable land and land resources belong to "no one."

The new law should place a reliable barrier to a wasteful attitude toward land. This is possible only with the restoration of its true masters—a specific peasant or an entire collective—who are independent and deeply interested in the results of their labor. Undoubtedly, the measures for material incentives for an efficient land use provided for by the draft law, as well as the charge for land, will play a positive role here.

The entire USSR land area is more than 2.2 billion hectares and zones, where natural conditions make it possible to engage in agriculture, make up about one-third of the country's territory. The per-capita provision with arable land is decreasing: 1959—1.11 hectares; 1989—0.79 hectares.

The submitted draft law takes into consideration the interests of all national economic sectors—industry, transport, forestry, water management, and housing and cultural-domestic construction. The right of land use is granted to all enterprises and organizations, including religious associations, joint enterprises, and international organizations established on USSR territory. All of them must treat land in an equally proprietary manner and cherish it as the most valuable capital.

Indisputable priority in land use is given to agro-industrial production. Strict requirements for compensation for damages and losses in case of withdrawal of land from agricultural turnover have been determined. It is established that only by the decision of the supreme soviets of republics can irrigated, drained, and arable land, vineyards, other perennial plantings, and land occupied by water-protective and reserved forest land be withdrawn for nonagricultural needs. Functions of state control over land use are interpreted in a new way. Measures are envisaged for improving land management and keeping a land cadastre so that in each specific case the use of land is carefully substantiated and the most efficient measures for improving and protecting it are carried out everywhere.

Obviously, without a fundamental change in land relations today it is impossible to attain a qualitative breakthrough in the rates of increase in the production of agricultural products.

For the time being, big investments in agriculture have not brought the expected return. Today more than 50 billion rubles are annually spent on its development. This is 2.6-fold more than, on the average, annually during the 8th Five-Year Plan. The power-worker ratio at agricultural enterprises has risen considerably. Deliveries of mineral fertilizers have increased. However, with all this final indicators in farming remain low. Last year the average yield of grain crops in the country totaled 17 quintals, as compared with 15.6 quintals in 1970, of sugar beets, 261 and 237 quintals respectively, and of

sunflower seeds, 14.3 and 12.8 quintals. If we take into consideration that during the past 18 years the country's population increased by 45 million people, per-capita production of grain and other basic farm products, in fact, did not increase.

Practice showed that the recently implemented various kinds of administrative transformations, for example, of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, liquidation of unpromising villages, curtailment of private subsidiary farms, and others resulted in irreversible economic, social, and moral losses. That is why an improvement in production and land relations in the agro-industrial complex should become a real and reliable basis for the solution of the food problem.

Incentive Needed, Leasing Not Enough

904B0137B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
1 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by V. Uzun, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Moscow: "Attractive Force"]

[Text] It can be said with confidence that the fate of perestroika will definitely depend on how the new Land Law will be and on whether it will be possible to overcome the difficult crisis, which has affected our agriculture. The slump in per-capita production of basic products in the 1980's, the country's increasing dependence on food imports, the mass departure of peasants from rural areas, land degradation, and the loss of agricultural land owing to the overgrowing with forests and shrubs, swamping, salinization, and erosion—this is by no means the full list of the consequences of agrarian policy conducted for many decades.

In my opinion, the draft of the Ownership Law in the USSR together with the draft of the Fundamentals of Land Legislation of the USSR and Union republics represents an attempt to continue this policy. Allowing diverse forms of ownership of all the other means of production, it is proposed that the existing exclusive state ownership of land be preserved. As until now, those who want to cultivate land can receive it only for possession. Will we get out of the crisis if we preserve the former monopoly form of ownership?

In my opinion, a way out of it is possible only provided diverse forms of land ownership (state, cooperative, and private) are legalized and the bulk of agricultural land is transferred to those who cultivate it for ownership—precisely ownership, not use, not possession, and not leasing; precisely to those who cultivate it, that is, peasant farms, kolkhoz members, and sovkhoz workers.

Why should land be transferred for ownership and not for use or possession? Before answering this question, we will name the powers of the owner and the user. The owner has the right to use land himself, or to sell (buy), mortgage, lease, exchange, give it as a gift, and leave it as inheritance. The user can use land for the purposes

indicated by the owner, but is deprived of other powers. Let us try to examine to what this leads in practice.

The draft of the Fundamentals of Land Legislation of the USSR and Union republics provides for soviets of people's deputies the possibility of leasing out land. Undoubtedly, owing to this, some improvements in land use are possible. However, is it really possible to compare the indicated weak revival of economic activity in rural areas through the transformation of soviets into lessors with the alternative when millions of people working on land will become its owners, when every plot will receive its master, not possessor or lessee?

If peasants are deprived of the right of land ownership, under present conditions this can result in a series of abuses. For example, the law will permit the establishment of peasant farms. With the small families that exist in our country there will be frequent cases when there will be no one to inherit the farm, either because there will be no heir, or because children will not wish to continue their parents' business. Therefore, the farm will have to be sold. Legally, however, it is possible to sell only buildings, structures, and equipment. But land cannot be sold.

Another example. Two peasant farms are located next to each other. One owner was concerned about improving the fertility of his land all his life, while the other was not. But property on land is evaluated in the same manner. Will these two farms be sold for the same price?

Common sense suggests that their price is different. If controlling bodies insist on the same price, what sense does it make to increase land fertility? It is well known that right now dacha owners, who have received land free of charge, trade it actively. With a good location and fertility land of six hundredths of a hectare and a small house standing on it, which is valued at 2,000 or 3,000 rubles, can be sold for 10,000 to 20,000 rubles and even higher. Similar phenomena, inevitably, will occur also during the sale of peasant farms.

In order that in several years the slogan "Down with Peasant Farms" may not become popular, as is now the case with cooperatives, it is necessary to search for methods of legislatively regulating processes, which, inevitably, will arise and are already arising everywhere.

Land must be given to kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers for ownership even if they do not intend to divide it. The right to a plot of land will make the possibility of leaving a kolkhoz or a sovkhoz with a share of land and of organizing one's own peasant farm real for today's hired worker.

Land is the mother of wealth, but, according to our laws, it is worth nothing. If this year, as during past years, we lose another 1 million hectares of agricultural land, neither the state budget nor specific farms will get poorer by a single ruble. It is clear to everyone that this is the absurdity and nonsense of the command system. Is this not one of the main reasons for the agrarian crisis, which we experience?

The lack of land value transforms into idle chatter all measures for an economic effect on land users, whose activity leads to a destruction of land fertility. A kolkhoz or a sovkhoz does not become poor because of this and, what is more, state bodies, which by law are considered owners of land, cannot present a claim to the user.

Next. The draft of Fundamentals of Land Legislation of the USSR and Union republics prohibits kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and peasant farms from leasing out land to outside organizations and citizens. Such a right is granted only to soviets. This makes it impossible to promptly increase or decrease the area of cultivated land depending on the change in the number of workers.

For example, on a peasant farm there will be quite frequent cases when working children temporarily do not work in connection with studies or army service. It is impossible to hire workers. It is also impossible to lease out land.

The draft law proposes that land be transferred to the soviet and that the land use act be revised. But is this really a guarantee that later one will be able to get the land back? In such a situation another illegal way out is more probable. The peasant will punctually pay the rent and in violation of the law will hire workers, or will lease out his land unofficially. The soviet at best will close its eyes to this and at worst bribe takers will demand "pay" for their noninterference.

Our public opinion gradually matures into being able to draw a fundamental conclusion from the centuries-long practice of world farming: In rural areas it is impossible to lean on the farm laborer; in other words, on the hired worker. He easily leaves his job, going from the village to the city and from region to region. Attempts to manage agriculture, using legally free hired workers, are doomed to failure. Hired workers will scatter and rural areas will become empty, which has already happened everywhere.

The stability of agriculture in developed countries throughout the world is ensured owing to the orientation toward farmers—owners of land and of the means of production—not toward farm laborers. The proportion of hired workers in most of them does not exceed 4 to 10 percent of the total number of those engaged in agriculture. For example, in France in the early 1980's there were 230,000 rural hired workers (6.4 percent of those engaged in agriculture) and in Finland, 15,000 (4 percent).

The Land Law must determine without fail measures to limit the rights of owners. These measures will prevent possible abuses. For example, if the law stipulates that the bulk of the work must be carried out by the forces of the landowner's family, this will become an obstacle to the formation of big latifundia, will rule out the possibility of shady economy operators taking possession of land, and will restrict the use of hired labor and land leasing to sensible limits.

The process of transferring land for ownership in every republic and even oblast should be implemented with due

regard for local characteristic features and traditions, which will be reflected in republic land laws. Under conditions of the acute surplus of labor resources per capita land distribution is not ruled out and in regions with large areas of vacant land it is possible to allot to every family as much as it will be able to cultivate. In some regions land could be transferred for ownership for a charge and in others, apparently, those who will undertake the development of neglected areas will have to be paid from the budget.

Today we are revising the views of socialism and are rejecting old dogmas. Let us also soberly glance at problems of land ownership. Why no one in the world (except for Mongolia) has repeated our experience and realized the theoretical foresight of the classics about the nationalization of all land?

We have carried out the peasants' mandates of 1917. However, could the peasant congress not be mistaken? Was it possible to foresee in what this alienation of land from the peasant will result and what will be the consequences of its placement at the disposal of the party and state apparatus? If the same peasants had gathered at the congress in 1930, would they have confirmed their mandates with due regard for the practical experience accumulated during the period of requisitioning of grain by force and collectivization? It seems that they would not.

The present USSR Supreme Soviet has finally taken up law creation. Undoubtedly, it will also have to investigate the old mandates. All this, certainly, is of great importance. However, it is even more important to listen to the many voices of today's peasant and to try to reflect the diversity of views and wishes in the new Land Law. It will be hardly correct to offer an unequivocal answer to the following question: Should private land ownership be permitted or not?

Land ownership is the strongest magnet, which will keep the peasant on land. Apparently, the attractive forces of leasing are insufficient for this. The owner carefully prepares a replacement for himself, training his heir all his life. The lessee does this less confidently. The situation of hired workers, whom the kolkhoz member and the sovkhov worker have become, is so changeable that they do not know in what they will engage tomorrow, not to mention the next generation.

Final Session, Divergences of Opinion

904B0137C Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
2 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by V. Virkunen: "Let the Peasant Decide"]

[Text] As already reported, the final meeting of the commission for examination of workers' remarks and proposals concerning the draft of the Land Law of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was held under deputy A. A. Nikonov's chairmanship on 31 January. In an atmosphere of a sharp, but constructive, dispute

people's deputies once again, article-by-article, discussed the draft of Fundamentals of Land Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics.

How was the draft law altered as compared with the published version? To answer in brief, the version submitted for discussion is noted for its concreteness, definiteness, and radicalism.

First of all, the term "land ownership" has appeared in the draft law, although corresponding articles will still be edited. The fact that the purchase and sale of land, mortgaging, and exchange are permitted in cases stipulated by the legislation of Union and autonomous republics and under the strict control of soviets is also important.

A dispute arose around this provision. Deputy V. A. Tikhonov introduced his own version of article 3 of the draft law. He proposed that state ownership of land be abolished and that radical land reform be carried out on this basis. In his opinion, there simply is no other way of allotting land for incipient peasant farms. Any kolkhoz member or sovkhov worker should have the right, if he wishes, to leave a public farm without hindrance with the share of land and implements of labor due him. Without such an entry, V. A. Tikhonov stressed, a USSR citizen will not receive land.

His proposals gave rise to conflicting views. At the same time, they served as a good basis for thoughts in connection with the reflection of the concept of "land ownership" in the law. Many were in favor of implementation of land reform. With overwhelming support for the proposal to grant the peasant the right to choose where to work—on a kolkhoz, a sovkhov, or his peasant farm—there were serious argued objections in connection with the abolition of state ownership of land. If it is abolished, inevitably, we will go from one extreme to another. In this case only individual ownership will receive the monopoly right. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid extremes and to follow the golden mean. In this connection a compromise was proposed: a diversity of forms—state, collective, cooperative, and private labor ownership of land. If we want, in order that there may be a landowner, land ownership is also needed. Something else simply does not present itself.

Let us try to assume that the new law will affirm citizens' right of land ownership. The following question arises immediately: Will shady economy operators not buy up land right away? Will a channel for a very profitable placement of iniquitous, stolen money not open up through the purchase and sale? In this connection deputy A. A. Sobchak noted that the proposed formula by no means opened a gold mine for speculators in land plots. Republic legislation should place a strict barrier to abuses. The opportunity of buying back land should be provided only to those who work on it, only under certain conditions, and only after a certain period of leasing or using a given land plot. Soviets should have a good idea of to whom they will sell land.

The meeting stressed that it was impossible to regard the diversity of forms of land ownership as a call for an immediate dissolution of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. A person simply must have the freedom of choice—to work on a public farm, to organize his own individual peasant farm, or to form a cooperative, an artel, or a partnership. Unfortunately, the meeting noted, kolkhozes and sovkhozes stubbornly do not want to let their workers leave with a certain share of land and fixed capital. The future Land Law should give this right to peasants.

People's deputies, who are preparing the final version of the draft of Fundamentals of Land Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics for the session, now have a great deal of work. There are only 2 weeks before the opening of the session. After the publication in SELSKAYA ZHIZN on 25 January of a special questionnaire, which established a direct contact between the Supreme Soviet and public opinion, work increased greatly. Tens of thousands of questionnaires filled by readers have already been received. Data are being processed. The results of the survey are taken into account during the elaboration of the draft law's final provisions.

On 9 February the joint meeting of two parliamentary committees—on agrarian problems and food and on problems of legality, legislation and law and order—will definitely decide on what the new draft law should be. One thing is clear: The Land Law is being born in a complicated and painful way, overcoming incredible difficulties and clashes.

At the same time, under these conditions a general consensus, a compromise will have to be worked out. Today points of view still diverge to diametrically opposite ones. Suffice it to say that at its plenum on 17 January the Union Kolkhoz Council voted against the draft law's provision on lifetime inherited possession of land. Deputy I. I. Kukhar—its chairman—openly opposed the implementation of land reform.

Questions of Property, Ownership Debated

904B0107A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by V. Virkunen, N. Kopanov: "Land, Property, Owner"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agricultural Questions and Food examined the course of the all-union assessment of the draft Basic Law of the USSR and union republics on land.

At every point in history the land problem has been the subject of heated debates on fundamental questions, of discussions and of confrontations. The meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agricultural Questions and Food, which took place on Wednesday, 10 January, also could not avoid debate. The committee heard and assessed the report of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's committee on examining remarks

and proposals pertaining to the draft Basic Law of the USSR and of union republics regarding land that were expressed in the course of national dialogue. A. A. Nikonov, USSR People's Deputy and VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin] president, spoke about this question.

Extensive work has been carried out related to studying public opinion. For a detailed analysis of the all-union assessment of the draft law on land, a work group was created that included economists, lawyers, specialists in the area of land use and land organization and representatives of the USSR Ministry of Justice, the kolkhoz union council, Goskompriroda [State Committee on Nature] and other interested organizations.

According to research data, among the opinions of citizens there prevails a positive assessment of the Basic Law of the USSR and union republics on land—from 60 to 92 percent approve of the draft law.

At the same time the variety of opinions is very large—from complete unacceptance to unconditional acceptance. Unfortunately, city residents still predominate among participants in all-union discussions. Of course, the Land Law is of interest to everyone. But we would like to have more of a response from peasants.

People's deputies have made an attempt to understand why village workers are not participating as actively as we would like in the discussion of the draft law. After all, it would appear that so much has been done to make sure that this document touches every peasant in the most direct way. Unfortunately, a stereotypical opinion that is difficult to alter is at the forefront—the village resident does not believe that change will occur. This is approximately the way the peasant thinks: my opinion will not be taken into account anyway, we have a government that knows everything better; at the most my proposal will be read, I will be thanked but they will do things their own way.

In this connection I would like to note that a passive position will not make the law better. It must be accepted by peasants and not by officials in offices. As noted at the meeting, this applies to an equal degree to the Committee on Agricultural Questions and Food. We must give the village the opportunity to choose.

Nevertheless, the land law with all of its shortcomings is still a considerable step forward. About half a year ago the concepts "proprietorship" and especially "ownership" of the land were given a hostile reception. Today both society and the body of deputies have rejected a hostile reception and have made a transition to a constructive development of the optimal solution. This was evident at the committee meeting as well.

A lively discussion ensued. Do we fully understand what our village needs? Is the proposed path toward radical reform correct? These questions were present in every speech. We are wandering amidst dogma, imitations and stereotypes that we have inherited from the past. That

which we passed off as socialism in agriculture was really, as stated by people's deputy A. A. Denisov, typical feudalism. Has it been a long time since the peasant has been given a passport and the opportunity to leave the gloom of village life? Up until the 1960's the peasant was forcibly tied to the land and could not move freely. To some degree these feudal ideas prevail over us even today.

Then suddenly freedom began to appear—it seemed that both land and freedom was being given. Peasants could work without a yoke, without force and without being fleeced. There is a draft law that confirms the manager of the land. Already in practice we have parallel economic structures that are equivalent to kolkhozes and sovkhoses—cooperatives and peasant labor enterprises. Practical experience is not standing in place and sometimes it forestalls theory. A manager of the land has already appeared.

But the distorted image of socialism that remains in the mind continues to prevail over common sense—what if this is a departure from the principles of socialism? There is no doubt that a rejection of previous dogmatic ideas about our society is occurring. What is it that we are rejecting? We are rejecting the barracks-like, command, feudal system that suppresses man's initiative.

A heated discussion developed on the question of how the peasant should be given the land—as a proprietorship or as his own property? If the land belongs to the peasant enterprise, unavoidably the concept of "private land ownership" arises. What should we do here? To what degree is the bugbear of private property dangerous, and is it dangerous at all?

Nevertheless, there were no orthodox, categorical statements made at the meeting. As a whole, the people's deputies exhibited total respect for the opinions of their opponents and looked at all points of view. People's deputy A. Yemelyanov noted that even now we are frightened and embarrassed by the words "private property." With all due respect to the terms "use" and "proprietorship" of the land, in his opinion in the current situation the peasant is more trusting of the concept of "ownership of land."

The Basic Law of the USSR and of union republics should not be a rebus, as noted by people's deputy V. Tikhonov. The articles should not contain variant readings and ambiguities. Right now the draft is not free of these shortcomings. In particular, the draft does not speak clearly about the owner of the land. Who should it be—the citizen, the cooperative, the kolkhoz or the sovkhos?

Evidently we must proceed from the fact that every citizen, whether he is a kolkhoz farmer, a sovkhos worker or the proprietor of a private labor peasant enterprise must have the inalienable right to possess land. We must renew the elementary concept of the kolkhoz as a cooperative of freely-united independent farmers. In other words, we must give people the land

and they themselves will decide whether to join in a kolkhoz or carry out their peasant enterprise simply by entering into contractual agreements.

So what will it be—proprietorship of land or ownership of land? There is a very fine line between these terms. We can stop with proprietorship if the peasant agrees to always be the proprietor of the land. But will he agree to this? After all, the land must be improved; one's own labor and capital must be put into it. In addition, not everyone, not everyone by far, will have heirs who will want to work the land. To whom should this land be transferred?

And what should be done with improved land? After all, the city resident puts his income into the savings bank but the peasant puts his into the land. What should be done if for some reason or another he decides to refuse his land allotment? He cannot sell the land. This is what the draft law states. Why can't he? After all, if there are no purchases or sales it is not likely that the system of land possession will become more flexible than it is now. This means that in, say, 10-15 years the peasant-landowner will have to have the right to sell his land. Of course this will be within the framework of the law and under the control of local soviets.

The speakers noted outright that the draft of the Basic Law of the USSR and of union republics moves away from the question of property. In this sense, it does not "rendezvous" with the proposals of the other draft law that has also been brought out for national assessment—the law on property in the USSR. If the people who made up the law consider the peasant, cooperative, kolkhoz or sovkhos as the owner of the land, how can the owner pay for the land? If he is the owner that means that he does not have to pay for it. If he has to pay for it then he is not the owner but the proprietor. The owner of the land is the one who receives the rent payment for the land.

What is this—serious internal contradictions, weaknesses in the draft law or a legal casuistry? If such questions arise, then evidently we have variant readings or even multiple interpretations of the draft law, which in laws is intolerable. Unfortunately, these problems do exist. The main thing is whether the peasant receives real rights to the land or whether all of our searching will remain on the level of a declaration.

In connection with this, an opinion was voiced that the Basic Law of the USSR and union republics on land should not be made too specific. We must give union and autonomous republics the right to make their own laws based on local conditions and traditions. Even now attempts are being made to decide all problems unequivocally for all regions from the Baltic to Komchatka. How proper is this? It is essential to foresee those social consequences that the new Land Law may lead to.

For example, in the speeches of people's deputies we heard concern about the social security of the village resident. Misgivings are being expressed that peasant enterprises and cooperatives, in contrast to kolkhozes

and sovkhozes, will not concern themselves with building housing, clubs, schools, hospitals, children's facilities and roads.

To avoid this, it was proposed that all social questions related to man's everyday concerns be transferred to local soviets. The soviet must have its own funds for social development coming from deductions from profits of all local enterprises, peasant enterprises and cooperatives.

Despite all of the different opinions of the speakers, one common idea was heard—radical reform in the village can be implemented only by means of multiple variants and variety in the forms of property and management, which was manifested in the decisions of the March 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Reform must foresee not cosmetic measures but serious acts of a legal nature that will radically alter all production relations in the village. To a decisive degree, this refers to the Basic Law of the USSR and union republics on land.

The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies demanded the acceleration of the passage of laws, without which perestroika cannot occur. To a decisive degree, this refers to the draft law on land as well. Our peasants also demand the acceleration of work by our lawgivers. For example, a general opinion was expressed at a meeting of leasees in Pytalovskiy Rayon, Pskov Oblast, at which, as reported by deputy N. Vorobyev, the draft law on land was approved in full. The peasants feel it is extremely essential to maximally accelerate the passage of this vitally important document.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Estonian Agriculture's Recovery from Collectivization

Resurrection of the Farm

904B0132A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 17 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by R. Valdma: "Forty Years Later, or About How Farmsteads Are Being Regenerated"]

[Text] Lovers of comparisons and precise determinations have called the past year in the village critical. Apparently, this is in association with 1949, which went into history as the sad date of forced collectivization and of destruction of farmsteads. However, today we have become witnesses to the beginning of the regeneration of peasant farmsteads.

By early 1990 throughout the republic there were about 1,000 families involved in regenerating their own farmsteads. Our newspaper wrote in fairly close detail about the first steps of farmers as well as about the fact that in the near future not all new farmers by far would be continuing the work they have begun, that they would become prototype or even middle managers. Of course there is no reason to idealize farm labor, although under current conditions it

involves more training and is easier physically than four decades ago. Nothing can change the seasonal nature of peasant labor. Nothing can violate the pace of the work day or alter the succession of necessary jobs. Of course, such labor should be compensated accordingly in the form of good income, which it is a sin to envy.

I recall a day a year ago that I spent in Payda. An extensive peasant forum was being held there in the local quite imposing House of Culture. Coming to participate in the forum was a considerable number of highly-placed agricultural managers. The Central Union of Estonian Peasants [TsSKE] was created at the forum. At that time, Gustav Tynspoyeg, member of the Buro of the Estonian CP Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, said: "If our initiative is successful and gains momentum then the day is not far off when in our cities there will be a line of people wishing to exchange city life for peasant life on the farm."

Many beautiful words were said from the high tribunal about the development of farmsteads in Estonia; promises were made to help farmers solve their problems and concerns. As a sign of gratitude, forum participants elected several deputy chairmen of the republic APK [Agroindustrial complex], leading agricultural specialists and specialists of ESSR Gosplan and rayon APO's [Agroindustrial associations] to the council of plenipotentiaries of their union (there are 49 persons in it). But already in November of last year the Council of Plenipotentiaries of the Central Union of Estonian Peasants faced the problem of a quorum at its meetings—over half of the people elected did not come to the meetings, including all of the highly-placed management. Those who did attend decided that the composition of the council of plenipotentiaries should be made much smaller, leaving in it people who really care about the village.

On 6 December of last year the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet finally passed the long-awaited Law on the Farmstead. Incidentally, in the course of its preparation, peasants made 39 corrections and additions through their Central Union. Of course not all of them appeared in the final text of the law. The lowest age for the future farmer remains 21, even though even now younger people have taken up farmsteads. The size of a farmstead is to be 50 hectares. In my opinion, it would have been wiser not to specify this indicator—it is clearer to the individual what kind of area he is capable of working. Still, when land is allocated for farmsteads no one will be able to say that no law exists for that. Such cases did exist in Tartuskiy, Pylvaskiy and a number of other rayons of the republic.

Farmsteads are being created most actively in Vyruskiy, Raplaskiy and Tartuskiy rayons. Their sizes are primarily not large, but even they are already putting some people on guard, including Aldo Tamma, chairman of the Central Union of Estonian Peasants. The administration sees in this a dangerous tendency—due to their small size farmsteads may be unviable. We doubt the

correctness of this view. Our current farmsteader with his doubtful technology is simply powerless before larger land areas.

As an example let us look at the equipment available to farmers. As a survey conducted by the Tartu affiliate of GOSNITI [State All-Union Order of the Labor Red Banner Scientific Research Technological Institute for the Repair and Operation of the Machine-Tractor Fleet] shows, the outfitting of the modern farmer with tractors is very low; 60.4 percent of the "iron horses" are over 8 years old and only 16.7 percent of farmers have new tractors at their disposal. There are great difficulties involved in servicing and in diagnosing the technical condition of tractors as well as in their repair. Where can the peasant acquire new technology if last year of over 1,300 tractors allocated to the republic only 146 reached farmsteads? It is true that through ERSPO [Estonian Republic Union of Consumers' Societies] it was possible to acquire 200 tractors, but their cost is double that of those sold by the APK.

For 1990 the Central Union of Estonian Peasants ordered 1,121 tractors. Kalye Lauri, APK deputy chairman, and Yan Paavel, deputy director of the main supply administration, supported it. But by order of the APK chairman starting on 17 November 1989 tractors will be distributed by rayon. As in preceding years, there is no indication of the number of tractors that must be allocated for farmsteads. It is not difficult to guess how the distribution will be implemented in practice. For example, last year in Pyarnuskiy Rayon not a single tractor was sold to farmsteads, in Vilyandiskiy Rayon only 4 were sold, and in Khaapsaluskiy and Kokhtla-Yarveskiy rayons—6 tractors.

We can understand the desire of farmsteads to have not only equipment but stocks of fuel and feed concentrates, but as of yet they are receiving just crumbs from the common table. If the gasoline shortage continues (which is quite probable) very soon life on the outskirts will cease; after all, it depends to a large degree on technology and truck transportation.

Farmers have great complaints against consumers' cooperatives. For example, here is what Ants Iman, proprietor of Mulgu farmstead in Pyarnuskiy Rayon, states: "It is not enough that for a T-16 tractor I have to pay ERSPO almost 7,000 rubles instead of 3,000, and 66 rubles instead of 32 for a ton of cement, procurers also steal from me. Here potatoes were procured at a price of 21 kopecks per kilogram, whereas in the kolkhoz procurers paid 29.5 kopecks."

Yak Kyyv, chairman of the peasant union in Vyruskiy Rayon, stated that one farmer in the rayon wanted to sell 3 tons of grain through the bureau, but it was demanded from him that he put it in bags. The price of the bag exceeds the return price by a factor of 2 and it turned out that if the farmer sold his seed this way he would bear a loss of 30 rubles.

There are many examples of injustices to farmsteads. But I will relate only how on the eve of the new year the Central Peasant Union was tripped up in customary form. The Central Union made a proposal that the republic APK training combine, under the roof of which the union was taken in, be transferred to farmsteads. It was supposed that in receiving the support of unions of farmsteads in Scandinavian countries a farmstead educational center could be created here. However, this proposal was rejected. Farmsteads were offered the use of a farmstead in Saku for study. However its owner, the NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Farming, in the form of its director, Arvo Sirendi, who was simultaneously chairman of the republic's recently-formed Agrarian Council, did not even want to hear about this.

The disappointed farmsteads do not trust any officials or words assuring them about their devotion to the interests of rural workers. The Estonian Central Peasant's Union took matters into its own hands. It developed a program for its own activities, the draft of which was published by the newspaper MAALEKHT. In part, the program states: "The Council of Plenipotentiary TsSKE has the goal of registering the Central Peasant Union with the ESSR Supreme Soviet as a public political-economic organization representing the interests of all farmsteads in Estonia." It should be added that the TsSKE considers it essential to represent farmsteads in the ESSR Supreme Soviet and therefore is actively participating in the pre-election campaign.

Party's Errors, Obligations

904B0132B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by I. Kallas, director of the agricultural department of the Estonian CP Central Committee: "Agriculture on a Political Backdrop"]

[Text] The process of perestroika and concern for the future are forcing people to act. Everyone understands and feels that we can no longer live in the old way. But we can only move forward by consolidating all progressive forces and not by being at odds with others or opposing others.

Agricultural production is being renewed; partnerships, farmsteads and various cooperatives are gaining strength. Decades have convinced us that the first condition for agricultural development should be the changes in production relations and the regeneration of the peasant as the true proprietor and owner.

Talk is not enough for moving life forward. We need concrete action and skilful work.

What was the last agricultural year like? Evidently, this question will interest the reader on a backdrop of our political debates.

Nature was well-inclined toward the farmer, a good grain harvest was collected (24.3 quintals per hectare in store-house weight), and gross production reached 935,000 tons. This is the highest indicator since 1976, when gross grain production comprised 1.56 million tons and productivity was 24.4 quintals per hectare. The quota for grain procurement was achieved and the necessary amount of seed and potatoes was stockpiled in store-houses for the new sowing period.

It is true that the quotas for the procurement of potatoes, vegetables and flax were not met. Procurement organizations procured 158,700 tons of potatoes and 58,500 tons of vegetables, which comprises 85 and 95 percent of the plan respectively, or 105 and 99 percent of the indicators for 1988. Peasants are not particularly interested in producing these products and selling them at low procurement prices.

I feel that in large enterprises criticism addressed at agricultural production through the means of mass information has a negative effect on it. It gives rise to uncertainty and indifference in people. Based on realities, we must recognize that in the near future our people will be fed by kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

The Estonian CP Central Committee in its theses on agricultural policy recognizes forced collectivization and resettlement as a crime against humanity. But no one has the right either in political or in ideological terms to negate the many years of honest labor of Estonian peasants even under the conditions of deformed socialism. A considerable amount of time will be needed until farmsteaders can feed the people.

State orders for the production of livestock and poultry have been fulfilled by 102 percent, for meat by 99 percent, and for egg production by 107 percent. In comparison to the preceding year, these products have been procured in a volume correspondingly of 99.1, 98 and 101 percent. State orders for the production of livestock and poultry have not been fulfilled by Pyarnuskiy, Yygevaskiy, Vyruskiy and Kharyuskiy rayons. For state orders in the area of milk procurement, it is simpler to state that they have been fulfilled by Khaapsaluskiy, Khiyumaaskiy, Paydeskiy, Pylvaskiy and Raplaskiy rayons.

In collective enterprises, milk yields increased by 81 kilograms in comparison to last year and comprise an average of 4,187 kilograms. Paydeskiy Rayon has the largest indicator for milk yield—4,811 kilograms; here the increase comprised 241 kilograms.

Last year Yygevaskiy and Vyruskiy rayons reached a goal of 4,000 kilograms of milk yield. I would like to especially single out Vyurskiy workers for praise. Working under difficult conditions, rayon livestock farmers headed by senior zootechnologist M. Lyokene achieved a milk yield per cow of 4,063 kilograms (in 1988—3,926 kilograms).

The largest milk yields were achieved in Arkna Enterprise—7,039 kilograms. But it should be said that there

the herd is only slightly larger than 100 head. International levels, as they say, were also achieved by Estoniya Kolkhoz, where in 1 year 6,923 kilograms of milk were produced per cow. In this case, the herd consists of 1,900 dairy cattle.

In 1989, in the republic as a whole, 1,258,000 tons of milk were procured; of this amount, 160,200 tons, a considerable amount, came from private plots.

The fact that milk production and procurement were curtailed somewhat last year is based first and foremost on the curtailment of the dairy herd. Whereas on 1 January 1989 there were 258,100 cows in kolkhozes and sovkhoses, as of 1 January 1990 there were 250,600 (a 3-percent decrease).

Egg production increased in 1 year. In Estonia there was an increase by 9 million eggs (by 2 percent). Here each egg-laying hen produced 250.6 eggs as compared to 246 last year.

Agricultural production must provide the republic's population with food products. How is this done? In 1989, 123,800 tons of meat and meat products translated into meat terms were delivered into the republic market fund. The delivery quotas were fulfilled by 103.1 percent (a growth of 6.6 percent as compared to 1988). First and foremost there was an improvement in supplies of meat and meat products to village regions; supplies to cities remained practically on the same level as last year.

The plan for the delivery of milk and dairy products to the market fund has been fulfilled by 100.03 percent; this is greater by 2.6 percent than in 1988.

Since the procurement of livestock, poultry and milk decreased in 1989, it was possible to somewhat increase their market fund by means of smaller deliveries into the national fund. Thus, we shortchanged the national fund by 74,000 tons of meat and meat products (deliveries of 59,500 tons, or 80.4 percent of the plan, including the so-called unreturned borrowing of 5,000 tons from the republic). We had to deliver 555,000 tons of milk and dairy products but actually delivered 472,000 tons (85 percent).

The condition of our store counters, especially the meat counters, is far from satisfactory. It would be completely natural to stock the counters first and then to sell the surplus outside the borders of the republic. Unfortunately, a production structure (meat) has developed here which forces us to acquire a large portion of our concentrated feeds for production outside the republic. With our current production volume, the annual need for feed concentrates comprises 1.7 million tons. Even during last year, which was fairly favorable in terms of weather, we stockpiled only 540,000 tons of forage grain in granaries. Thus dependence on the Soviet Union remains.

The union press (Vremya television program) rebukes us for our underdeliveries into the national fund, and especially to Leningrad. We must say immediately that

we are incapable of such deliveries. They have been assigned from above; the republic's government did not agree to them. We are working toward equivalent exchange. I will clarify this. To produce the amount of meat, milk, eggs and other products that we contribute to the union fund according to modest calculations we need no fewer than 1.4-1.5 million tons of feed units. We purchase a little more than 1 million tons of feed concentrates from the union fund. Where is the equivalent exchange in this? We also have to keep in mind that we procure food grain and other food products.

The shortfall in the union fund is already being felt. For 1990 the republic planned to procure 1,126,000 tons of feed concentrates; actually 966,000 tons were allocated. During the first half of the year, the republic was to receive 347,000 tons of forage grain for the production of feed concentrates; this amount was cut to 117,000 tons. All of this forces us to search the market to sell some of our agricultural products for forage grain. This is already extremely complicated due to transportation problems and can be implemented only during the harvest period. Those who have grain also have meat.

What is the future of agricultural production? Nothing will change for the better by waving a magic wand. Years will be needed to implement the IME [Self-Managing Estonia]; real positive results can be expected in 5-10 years. This important circumstance should be considered without fail when we organize our life and our work.

Today all movements, parties and groups are trying to tell the people that the government is falling apart and dying and that it can be saved only by their program and activities. In our little Estonia there have appeared many people who are threatening us with fists in a clearly determined direction. Most of them do not have a program that is precise, firm and directed toward economic progress.

Centralism, which was strictly imposed during the Stalinist period, and the gross trampling of the principles of federalism fully deformed both the economy and international relations. The people have lost their faith in the future. Of course, no one has a right to rebuke the people for the fact that ideas of national independence have become popular or for the fact that the past is being idealized.

The Communist Party was the main transmitter of inhuman policies. But can we blame today's Estonian CP and all of its members for what happened in the Estonian village decades ago? Of course not. Today's Estonian CP must demonstrate in its deeds that it has recognized the lessons of history. It must use the resources that it has at its disposal to create the economic and political prerequisites for the non-repetition of the errors of the past and take specific steps to reestablish structures natural to the village, including farmsteads.

Of course there should also be a revitalization within the Estonian CP. It should not develop as a younger brother

who listens to the teachings of the elder brother on a daily basis, but as an equal partner.

Village development will not be simple. Last year brought us the Law on Farmsteads, but left unsolved the question of procurement prices. There is no law on taxation. Equipment and building materials are unavailable. We need state subsidies corresponding to those additional expenditures that are needed under the conditions of our northern climate in order to develop the village and to compensate for the losses that were incurred by political distortions.

Evidently, within every district Soviet there should be a soviet for the problems of agricultural development in all its various forms.

The continuing growing costs of concentrated feeds, equipment, fuel, and materials needed by the village, the shortage of goods and inflation are giving rise to internal tensions. The disregard of the needs of the village is no less tragic for the Estonian peasant as the denial of sovereignty.

With a single platform, village workers should participate actively through all of their organizations and unions in the election of a new membership for the republic's Supreme Soviet. There must be a strong agricultural faction within the future Supreme Soviet capable of defending the interests of the peasants.

Emergence Of Agrarian Union In Belorussia

Scope, Goals Discussed

904B0160A Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
19 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by correspondent BELTA: "Two Systems—Side by Side"]

[Text] **Belorussian peasants from agricultural cooperatives, individual farms and leaseholder organizations have been brought together by a Union, whose formation was announced by the constituent conference which took place on 16 November in Minsk.**

The charter of the new public organization proclaims the main goal of the Union—to broaden opportunities for independent farming on available land, to defend the legitimate rights and interests of that type of farming. The leadership of the new entity has taken upon itself the concern about legal and economic consulting services for the proprietor of the farm, house and outbuildings and rented field. It carries out broker functions as well.

"The creation of the Union represents an important moment in the history of the peasantry in Belorussia," said V.F. Bashmachnikov, consultant for the Social-Economic Department of the CPSU CC. "The land and working on the land requires a special kind of person. Not necessarily a specialist with a college education but someone who has a vital interest in creative, active labor.

If we used to reject the postulate about industrious, private peasant property, then it was a mistake. And this has been recognized by a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which proclaimed the necessity of the existence in our country of a variety of forms of ownership. Peoples' Deputies have expressed the demand to provide peasant farms economic rights which are equal to those of the large-scale socialist farms. This, in effect, is the essence of the party's new economic policy in rural areas.

"I must say that, unfortunately, there are quite a few communists who either have not understood the decisions of the March Plenary Session or sincerely cannot accept them in light of their own convictions which were formed during years which were not the best for our country. Life will correct them."

The Belorussian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Peasant Farms and Leaseholder Organizations is faced with serious work. One would like to hope that those who have joined the Union are people who not only know how to speak loudly but also know how to get things accomplished. That the Union will not have conflicts with the official authorities, Gosagroprom, the ispolkoms of the Soviets of Peoples' Deputies and farm managers. That the two systems, collective and state farm and the individual peasant farm, will successfully exist and develop side by side in Belorussia and multiply the food reserves of our country.

Union Established

904B0160B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
24 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by V. Legankov: "Agrarian Union Created"]

[Text] Minsk, 23 November, (SELSKAYA ZHIZN Correspondent). Belorussian Agrarian Union (BKS)—that is the name of the new independent organization whose constituent conference took place recently in Minsk.

Peasant farms, leaseholder organizations and agricultural cooperatives have joined BKS on a voluntary basis. Collective and state farms which construct their activities within the framework of a cooperative can also join the agrarian union on a contractual basis.

BKS defines its objective as organizing broad support for the agrarian movement in the republic, providing farmers and leaseholders legal, social-economic assistance and performing services relating to material and technical supply as well as the marketing of production.

The conference ratified the union's charter and elected its board of directors. K.M. Yermolenko, head of the rural social development sector of the Belorussian Scientific Research Institute on Economic Problems of the APK [Agricultural Industrial Complex], has become the chairman of the board.

First Congress Decisions

904B0160C Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article By V. Legankov: "Where Is The Agrarian Movement Heading?"]

[Text] Minsk, 1 March (SELSKAYA ZHIZN Correspondent). The first congress of the Belorussian Agrarian Union took place here yesterday. Its participants listened to and discussed the report given by the board of directors covering the period since the constituent conference which took place in the middle of November of last year. It was noted that the new forms of farming in the republic are becoming established only with great difficulty. The farmers, agricultural cooperatives and leaseholders at their locations often have met with stiff resistance. At times it has been difficult to obtain land, bank credit and to acquire equipment. At the same time instructive examples were mentioned as well when farmers and leaseholders have received the most favorable treatment possible from local organs of power and collective and state farm management and rapidly have increased agricultural production.

Among the decisions approved by the congress, the creation of an organizational committee for the preparation of the constituent congress of a new political organization, the agrarian party of Belorussia, is worthy of special attention. It is typical that both the CPSU, normally strongly opposing this type of move, and the unofficial Belorussian People's Front, as well as certain communists who spoke from the tribune, argued insistently in favor of the need for its creation.

Moldavian Approaches To Food Question Aired

Private Farming Importance

904B0168A Kishinev SELSKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO
MOLDAVII in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 20-21

[Article by A. Gredinaru of KGU [Kishinev State University], M. Patrash of Gosplan's NIIP [State Planning Commission's Scientific Research Institute On Planning], and F. Popovich of the Goskomstat MSSR [Moldavian SSR State Committee On Statistics]: "Perestroyka Of The Economic Mechanism": "The Individual Sector In The Regional Economy"]

[Text]

Private Auxiliary Farm Advances

The Individual Needs Glasnost Too

According to the methodology which has evolved for calculating and summarizing value figures for the social product, national income, material expenditures and other categories relating to a number of major branches of the economy, data on the individual sector, practically speaking, are included on only two branches, agriculture and construction. According to officially published data

the contribution of this sector in certain branches of the economy and types of goods and activity is rather significant. In 1986, for instance, the private auxiliary farm's (LPKh) share of the country's total production of meat and eggs was approximately 27 percent, of milk more than 21 percent, of wool about 26 percent, of the gross yield of fruit (seed-bearing, stone, nut, subtropical), berries, grapes (not including citrus) 41 percent. In the Moldavian SSR the LPKh's share during the eleventh five year plan was as follows: grain, vegetables: 10-11 percent; fruit and berries, meat, milk: 20-25 percent; grapes: 15-18 percent; wool: approximately 55 percent; potatoes: 80-90 percent.

The contribution of this sector is also significant in other union republics. The data which are being analyzed are even more significant in several other socialist countries. For instance, as a percentage of gross agricultural production the LPKh in Bulgaria currently produces approximately 30 percent, in Hungary 34-35 percent, in the GDR 10-12 percent, in Czechoslovakia 15 percent, in Mongolia almost 20 percent and in Romania 35 percent. In certain service categories this figure reaches 70-80 percent and higher.

Data concerning the value of the LPKh's share of the overall production of construction products are not contained in the statistics. However, there is information about the opening of new apartment buildings. For instance, in the Moldavian SSR the population at its own expense and with the assistance of state credit constructed housing units with a total area of 3,417,000 square meters (liveable area) in the tenth five year plan and 3,480,000 square meters in the eleventh five year plan, which corresponds to 46.5 percent and 44.2 percent of the republic's entire volume of housing construction. Analogous data was compiled in the Ukrainian SSR: 30.8 and 26.8 percent. Thus, the above data and facts convincingly show that the role of the individual sector is significant in two branches of the national economy.

It appears that in the near future the role of this sector will grow considerably both in the regional as well as in the national economy. Practice already confirms this hypothesis. On 1 January 1988 there were 13,931 cooperatives, of which 286 were in the Moldavian SSR. Most of the cooperatives are concentrated in domestic services, public catering and in the production of consumer goods.

As we see from the data, the role of this sector is growing not only in the two branches of the economy which we mentioned above and on which Goskomstat [State Committee For Statistics] organs essentially formulate specific summary data, but also in other branches of the national economy: industry, transportation, other forms of activity and also in the service sphere. Selective research has shown that goods from practically all branches of industry and the national economy are produced in the individual sector. However, it is difficult to establish accurately the volume. This situation is explained by the negative attitude in the past to small-scale forms of group organization of labor in families and

the concept that in the not-too-distant future many of their labor functions will cease to exist. These ideas and evaluations were brought about by abstract theorizing which had lost touch with life and its true demands. The solution to this problem demands a more accurate calculation of the population's income and expenditures.

Selective statistical research conducted in the republic has shown that the contribution of the population's farms to the production of the food industry and branches of material production is significant: the processing of juices, compotes, drinks, various types of jellies, jams, pickled foods, oils, canned meats and vegetables, the gathering of mushrooms, berries, paper for recycling, etc. The statistical organs are aware of some of these forms of activity, although data on them in reality are not included, as was already mentioned, in the total value figures.

The individual sector also produces goods which are not taken into account: clothes, shoes, etc., construction materials made from clay and other raw materials. Tools are manufactured, certain types of furniture and lumber products and goods from other branches of material production are produced or renovated. It turns out that a variety of different services are being provided in ever-increasing amounts. The vast majority of these services, as a rule, are carried out by domestic labor. According to rough estimates, the working population satisfies 75-90 percent of the demand for day-to-day services by self-service in oblast centers, 95 percent in other cities and more than 90 percent in rural areas. The role of this sector in providing transportation service is growing; for example the transportation of passengers in private automobiles.

Thus, each year a greater and more significant portion of the output of all branches of material production and also the service sphere is contributed by the individual sector. It should be noted that recently certain types of work and services in the individual sector have begun to be carried out beyond the framework of the family. As is shown in budgetary research, in 1987 four rubles were earned for each family of industrial and professional employees and 10 rubles were earned for each collective farm worker's family from the sale of goods from the domestic handicraft industry (clothes, shoes, carpets, etc.). According to rough estimates, the income of the republic's population from the sale of these goods is approximately 18 million rubles. In the future, apparently, corresponding figures will grow even more and probably the sphere of activities will broaden. It is advisable to note that the organs of Goskomstat do not even take into account the service sphere of the individual sector. At the same time the financial organs take into account more than 40 concrete forms of individual work activities in their calculation of local taxes and payments.

In 1987 the statistical organs first began calculating values for the internal national product throughout the country which included the value of services (total value but not by sector). In addition, it has been predicted that

during the next two to three five year plans the development of the service sphere will outpace the sale of goods, and that will require an adequate knowledge of the entire situation.

The effective management of these processes is possible in conditions of an expansion of glasnost regarding the volume of labor and services in a particular sector. A good statistic, shown to the masses and to specialists, is the nation's property, a resource, but information which is inaccessible to specialists and the consumer represents a kind of loss for the national economy, a reduction in its resources. The value of any tool, or set of tools, including a statistic, can only be established in the process of a real and constant application.

The information which is currently available in the statistical organs is far from being utilized to a sufficient degree. However, this is not a rightful monopoly of the "producers" of information. In this matter, as in a production enterprise, a survey of the consumers' opinions is necessary.

Slogans, Promises Not Enough

904B0168B Kishinev SELSKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO
MOLDAVII in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Article by V. Pynzaru: "Slogans And Promises Are Not Enough To Solve The Food Program"]

[Text] Society should have a realistic perception of what shape the national economy is in and which problems need to be solved in which way. This is what N.I. Ryzhkov said in his report at the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

Today many people recognize that both the national economy and the agroindustrial complex face a crisis and, perhaps, one that is even deeper than that faced by other branches of the economy. Moreover, at a press conference which took place on 16 June 1989 at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences it was said that crisis phenomena are increasing not only in the economy but also in ecology, in our relations between nationalities and even in the spiritual life of the nation. There are more homeless children today in our country than there were after the war. Each year 700,000 families break up, 1,750 mothers strangle their newborn babies. What can you say about the economy if even the instinct of motherhood is dying out!

Certain economists react with surprise. It is difficult to imagine that a country as rich as ours is in an economic crisis. They suppose that the causes for the current situation in the economy are causes of an ideological nature.

I think that a solution to the economic crisis can be found by a step-by-step adoption of fundamental measures based on a systems approach. Today it is unlikely that we will find the kind of wise men who would be able

to tell us how exactly we need to proceed. But if we want to live better than we do today, we need to search for the solution and work better.

There are those who link the constant food crisis with harsh climatic conditions. People have a joke about that point of view: four things create obstacles for the bad farmer - fall, winter, spring and summer...

Closer to the truth are those who believe that the causes of the chronic depression of the agrarian sector can be found in the distorted economic conditions which have evolved. Of course, weather does influence food production. If production of sugar beets in the republic for the unfavorable year of 1988 was 2,315,000 tons, then this figure was almost 3.5 million tons in 1989, a year with better weather conditions. Yield rose from 263 centners/ha to 415 centners/ha, an increase of 58 percent. The production of vegetables, however, of which almost 100 percent is grown under irrigation, decreased to the level of 1988, a reduction of 12 percent, or 128,000 tons.

In this particular situation, a different conclusion suggests itself. The low yield of vegetables (157 centners/ha) is explained by the low level of irrigation utilization, a shortage of farm equipment and large losses during harvest.

In this area, perhaps due to economic considerations, new forms of labor and compensation arrangements are being utilized least of all. In the republic, 32 out of 40 rayons did not fulfill their state order for vegetables. There were 21,100 tons of potatoes sold, which is 48 percent of the yearly plan. In the Kamenskiy, Yaloven-skiy and Kaushanskiy rayons, only 4-9 percent of the plan was fulfilled.

The problem of providing a supply of potatoes to the population of the republic remains a problem area for agriculture in Moldavia. In the past, various decisions were made from above about concentration or specialization or, just the opposite, about deconcentration. However, just as there weren't enough potatoes in the republic then, there are not enough now. At the same time, there are examples of good potato harvests on the private auxiliary farms and in the orchard and vegetable grower associations, that is, where labor and production have not been depersonalized.

In 1989 the farmers of Moldavia happily provided an excellent harvest of grain. Throughout the republic, not including the individual sector, 2,973,200 tons of grain were produced, which was 273,700 tons more than in 1988. The average grain yield was 41.5 centners/ha compared with 37.5 centners in 1988. There were 41.8 centners of winter wheat harvested from every hectare and 56.8 centners of whole corn from market plantings.

The highest yields of winter wheat, 47-51.8 centners per hectare, were harvested in the Novoanenskiy, Suvorovskiy, Chadyr-Lungskiy and Slobodzeyskiy

rayons; the highest yields of whole corn, 70-80 centners, in the Dubossarskiy, Floreshtskiy, Ryshkanskiy and Brichanskiy rayons.

The republic's inhabitants and those from other regions of the country are expecting an increase in the assortment of food products, due to an increase in the production of fruit, grapes and berries. Last year in Moldavia fruit production was at 901,500 tons, which was 244,000 tons more than the 1988 level, and yields increased from 59.6 to 80 centners per hectare. But this is still not enough.

However, there were 12 percent fewer grapes produced than the 1988 level. The gross harvest was 765,800 tons, at a yield of 50.3 centners per hectare.

The best results were shown by the fruit growers from the Chadyr-Lungskiy rayon, who sold 1,800 tons of fruit more than the plan called for, and the growers from Nisporenskiy, who sold 2,500 tons more.

In a report given by P.K. Luchinskiy at a meeting of the most active members of the republic party organization, the food problem was deemed the most critical of ten problems presented for solution.

In the report, it was noted that the rate of growth of food production was lagging behind the republic's rate of population growth and its requirements. In the meantime, per capita consumption of goods in certain categories has increased insignificantly, and in other categories has even declined.

During the years of the last five year plan, the value of goods received was 844 million rubles less than that called for by the Food Program. At the same time, the potential of the republic's agroindustrial complex is being utilized only at 75 percent of capacity.

A solution to the food problem should be examined in the overall context of changes in economic relations in rural areas, the conversion of farms to a system of complete economic accountability, self-financing, self-management, and the broad development of the lease and cooperative system.

There is no more critical problem today in the rural areas than the improvement of material and technical supply, and an improvement of investment policy.

Chairmen of collective farms note fairly that at all levels people talk about the priority of the agroindustrial complex in the formulation of investment policy, but in practice this is not happening. Many, or more accurately, the majority of collective farms only receive 8 tons of cement per year, and some items are not delivered at all. The same situation exists with other construction materials. And what is happening with procurement prices? Whenever farmers in some capitalist country organize themselves and demand higher prices for their goods, we interpret that in a very special way. Here in the best of cases someone at some forum will say that prices are too

low for agricultural products and too high for the equipment that produces the goods, and that will be the end of the matter.

It was decided that wholesale and procurement prices would be reexamined in 1991 instead of 1990. The opinion of many collective farm chairmen is that the decision must be made to raise the price on grain to 25 rubles per centner. Then, possibly, a resurgence of the economy will occur on many collective and state farms. It is also necessary for the higher organs to determine that a certain collective farm or state farm is allocated a certain number of additional tons of cement, more cubic meters of lumber and other construction materials. Then you will see a new level of optimism appear and the outlook will be different.

There is one more question that needs to be decided in the rural areas. The peasant who produces grain but does not have any for himself cannot feel that he has a vested interest in what he does. This does not correspond to his nature either. What kind of a mood is he supposed to go to work in when he cannot take with him to lunch a piece of meat or lard or brynza or anything else? After all, the system of public catering is not organized in our country as it should be.

The problem has to be solved if we want to have a responsible farmer working the land; if we want the land to be cared for so that its fertility does not decline.

There is no reason to hide the fact that there were times when a peasant would cry that he did not have any land or had too little. Now the land cries that there is nobody to cultivate it. The land wants to see its master every day.

I think that the idea of the ancient Greek scientist, Columela, is relevant today. He wrote, "The land is not an old woman; it is a girl forever fresh and young, always capable of being fertile if one skillfully caresses her youth and playfully supports her vitality."

The ploughman in working to produce grain, considering other equal conditions, pollutes nature to a lesser degree, enriches soil with organic matter and creates well-being in society. In 1989 when the gross harvest of all categories of grain was 3.4 million tons while the plan had called for 3 million tons, there was a real opportunity to increase the allocation of grain to the collective farmers and state farm workers.

Here is what Nazar Sergeyevich Dorosh, chairman of the Frunze collective farm in the Orgeyevskiy rayon, had to say about grain production: "On the average we harvest up to 3000 tons of grain per year. The state order is for 700 tons, 300 tons go for seed, and our safety margin—2000 tons—go to satisfy the feed order for the hog-raising complex. If this allocation is strictly followed, not a single ton of grain remains for the collective farm workers." What is the solution? To violate this procedure for grain allocation? And what do you do with the complex to which grain has to be delivered at the ratio of 5.8 centners of feed units to each centner of meat? Nazar

Sergeyevich responds that it is more profitable for the collective farm to allocate two centners of grain for each centner of meat to the collective farmer, provide him with young pigs and produce inexpensive meat. That is how the food problem could be solved.

It is an important thing for the collective farmer to be provided with high-energy food year round. How else can you carry out hard physical labor? After all, 69 percent of all the work in agriculture is carried out by hand, and women do 91.2 percent of their work by hand.

The problems are critical and require concrete measures for their resolution. Slogans and promises are not enough to solve them.

Peasant Interest Required

904B0168C Kishinev SELSKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO
MOLDAVII in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 9-10

[Article by S. Roshka, Teacher in the Department of Philosophy of the Frunze Kishinev Agricultural Institute: "What Hinders Perestroyka": "Regulations For The Peasant"]

[Text]

Living Organisms Cannot Survive The Callous Attitude Of The Day Laborer

The Peasant Working On The Collective Farm Only Performs Those Tasks Which Fall Into His Job Description

An all-union conference on the subject, "Philosophical and Methodological Problems of Scientific Maintenance of the APK [Agroindustrial Complex]," took place in Dnepropetrovsk. Representatives of the Kishinev Agricultural Institute, among whom was the author of these lines, participated in the conference. A report was given by Academic V. Shevelukha from VASKhNIL [Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences].

Since we had the opportunity to participate in the work of all three sections and to express our ideas about the questions under discussion, we formed a definite opinion about the problems discussed at the conference, with which we want to acquaint the readers of this journal.

As is known, the Leninist cooperative plan for the socialist transformation of the village, which became the basis for party activities, did not last long, only during the years of NEP [New Economic Policy], during which the doubling of agricultural production was characteristic. Forced collectivization defeated this plan and, in essence, led to the industrialization of the village.

What are the special characteristics of agricultural production which were denied by technicians and scientists so insistently and for so long and to which we have returned, thanks to perestroyka?

First of all, it must be noted that agricultural production is incompatible with private wage labor, since intermediate work essentially does not lend itself to measurement in units of abstract time. Live organisms (plants, animals) do not endure the callous attitude of the day-laborer.

If in industry, where an individual deals with a firmly fixed object of his labor, the entire activity of the worker can be regulated by exact standards but the work of the peasant cannot be regulated because it does not depend solely on objective economic factors.

In agricultural production, a special role is played by the moral factor: an attachment and love for the land, orchard and animals. A predisposition to that kind of endeavor which is carried out not as dictated by fear but by one's conscience.

The report given by Academic V. Shevelukha, and other presentations as well, clearly stated the idea that the process of denying the special characteristics of agricultural production turned into a universal introduction of the command-administrative system of management. A negative consequence of such a system is the elimination of personal responsibility for the land, the alienation of the peasant from the results of his own labor and the process of caring for the soil, plants and animals.

For many years nobody showed any concern about the land. Having lost the person who took care of her, land, the mother-provider, began to bear less and less. The day laborer in the state farm, as well as the peasant in the collective farm, deprived of his rights, only mechanically carries out orders received from above, when to plow, where, what and when to plant, how to care for plants and animals and when to harvest.

The direct producer never gave any thought to the future fate of the crop, because others thought for him. As it turned out, the latter did not trouble themselves greatly, as a result of which a third of the produce is lost; it spoils on the way to the consumer. A result of this level of diligence became the complete alienation of the peasant from the land, from its daily concerns, something which has brought the country's agriculture to a standstill.

A change in peasant psychology is characteristic for this period, its divergence into "mine" and "ours." If the peasant carries out all the work on his own private plot conscientiously, taking care of each plant, then on the field belonging to the collective farm he only carries out that which is part of his job description, for which he receives a salary.

As was noted at the conference, in some regions of the country the transfer to new forms of labor organization was perceived as a new campaign, and people did not lose any time in reporting about its completion ahead of schedule.

Two tendencies have been the most widespread. A rejection of the lease mainly by specialists, and an

unhurried, gradual implementation of lease arrangements on the basis of a one- to two-year agreement. Supporters of this arrangement are the peasants themselves.

In our republic, by the way, attitudes toward the lease also differ. As practice has shown, the leading specialists in some farms have come out against the lease, arguing that nobody in rural areas wants to acquire the land in a long-term agreement.

Another group of specialists view the issue more soberly, believing that the future belongs to the lease. However, it must be introduced gradually, in order for the peasant to become convinced of its advantages.

In conclusion, I would like to comment about what the long-term or indefinite lease promises in the framework of the leaseholder having the right to pass on the land and means of production to his heirs.

Being the one responsible for the land, each leaseholder will strive to achieve good and stable harvests which, undoubtedly, will lead to the solution of the food problem. Secondly, he will try to accustom his children from a very young age to farm work, will teach them to treat the land and nature as a whole with care. This, in the opinion of specialists, is the best form of any type of upbringing.

Of course, this alone is not enough to interest our youth. A wise social-economic policy in the rural areas is also necessary, which is directed towards the elimination of the seasonal nature of agricultural work. The relocation of the food processing industry closer to the source of raw materials is also needed.

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MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT

Silayev Discusses Equipment for Private Plots, Peasant Farms

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No 2, 5 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Article by I.S. Silayev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Bureau on Machine Building of the USSR Council of Ministers: "Dependable Technology for Peasant Households"]

[Text] New forms of labor organization are entering the economic life of the village with confidence. Lease and cooperative relations are becoming the norm for many production collectives. Peasant and individual subsidiary enterprises have received a great impetus. In addition to kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and lease and cooperative collectives they are being called upon to make a considerable contribution to the implementation of the country's Food Program. However, their further development

and improvement depends to a large extent on dependable technical supply and the strengthening of the material base. Village workers are waiting for mass deliveries of essential small-scale machinery from industrial workers; serial production of such equipment has already begun in native plants.

Unfortunately, until recently we gave insufficient attention to this branch of agricultural machine building. Emphasis was placed primarily on developing large-scale, high-powered equipment made of a large quantity of metal. Of course it was impossible to effectively utilize this kind of equipment in private subsidiary enterprises, in peasant household plots and on dacha and orchard plots. The manual labor that was utilized here could not provide the necessary return from the land, which had a negative effect on the general effectiveness of agricultural production in the country.

Today, in addition to the active improvement of powerful technology for creating a technological revolution in the village, we must make a sharp turn in the direction of creating the most varied small-scale means of mechanization and in the near future we must supply peasant households as well as individual proprietors of plots of land with the necessary machines, mechanisms and work implements. The best machine-building enterprises and experienced scientific-design collectives, including the collectives of the defense complex, are being recruited to solve this great and important state task.

In accordance with the decisions of the March 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and zonal meetings on the introduction into agricultural production of progressive forms of labor organization, an interbranch program has been developed for the production in 1989-1995 of small-scale equipment, and for the mass delivery of machines and equipment for peasant and individual subsidiary enterprises of citizens. In the process of preparing this program, there was a reexamination of the system of means of small mechanization in agriculture that was in effect in 1986. The standardization for small-scale motors was worked out and confirmed, an assessment of the need for the basic types of mini-machines was made and the schedule for assimilating them and the production volume were determined.

Also, specific enterprises were earmarked to take on the responsibility for the serial production of small-scale technology. The interbranch program for developing it has been called upon to become the basis for the development of annual and five-year plans by industrial collectives. To successfully carry out these plans, a decision was made about the priority supply of the branches involved in the assimilation of the production of means of small mechanization with material resources and with financing. With this goal, it has been recommended that ministries and departments confirm branch programs on the development and production of new technology and on the formation of the corresponding production capacities. Supplies will be implemented in accordance with state orders and production contracts.

The interbranch program has determined the nomenclature for the basic and priority energy sources for mechanizing work on small household plots and in orchard-garden partnerships. This involves motor units with two capacity levels and one-function motorized instruments. The mechanization of work in small-goods production and partly in subsidiary enterprises is to be achieved on the basis of small-scale tractors. At the first stage of mechanization of labor in small enterprises it is planned to saturate the fleet with power devices with the priority assembly of machines of a universal type. At the second stage the delivery of equipment assemblies for the overall mechanization of labor will be implemented.

I would like to emphasize that the realization of this great program has been begun not from zero. The experience of producing small-scale equipment, although not great, already exists in a whole series of native machine-building enterprises. Minsk Tractor Plant has been producing the MTZ-05 motor unit, which has a good reputation among village workers, since 1981. It is true that its production volume is still very limited. Enterprises of the aviation industry have organized the production of MB-1 motor units and Krot power cultivators on a much larger scale. For several years now KMM-1 power reapers have been arriving in Tsentrosoyuz [Central Union of Consumers' Societies] stores from Klimovskiy Plant of Agricultural Machinery; Robi power cultivators which are being produced jointly with a Hungarian firm are also available, as are the Super-610 motorized units from Kutaiskiy Plant for Small-Scale Tractors, an apparatus for individual milking of cows (Rezeknenskiy Plant of Milking Equipment), household separators, feed crushers and other means of small mechanization of peasant labor.

Although during the last 2-3 years the assortment of goods for production-technical purposes for peasant enterprises and orchard and vegetable partnerships has increased somewhat in stores of consumers' cooperatives, the situation still remains tense. There is a large demand for these goods and they are obviously in short supply. Understanding this, leading industrial collectives are planning a sharp increase in the production of small-scale equipment in the near future. Production associations imeni V. V. Chernyshev (Moscow), imeni Baronov (Omsk), imeni Ya. M. Chernyshev (Moscow), imeni Baranov (Omsk), and imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov (Perm) and Krasnyy Oktyabr Plant (Leningrad) of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry this year will increase their supply of motor units and power cultivators by a factor of 2-3 as compared to last year.

The production collectives of the USSR Ministry of Automobile and Agricultural Machine Building, for whom the development and production of the means of small mechanization must be, as they say, a vital interest, are striving not to remain behind the workers of the aviation industry. Over 20 tractor, combine and automobile plants have been activated to produce small-scale power equipment. In the next 2 years the Minsk Tractor Plant plans to double the production of MTZ-05

motor units, which will satisfy the average annual demand for them by agriculture. In 1991 the production volume of this motor unit will reach 25,000. The same number of plows, two-row ridgers, harrows, cultivators, trailers and soil rototillers will be manufactured for it. The increase in production of the motor unit that is in demand will enable us to remove limitations on its dissemination. It will be sold not only in Belorussia (as has been the case until now) but in other regions of the country as well.

It should be added that this year in Minsk the production of the MTZ-050/080 small-scale tractor with a selection of equipment from the MTZ-05 motor unit will begin. Gomselmash [Gomel Agricultural Machinery] Production Association will begin the production of the AMZhK-8 mini-tractor with an equipment set. In 1991 wheel-caterpillar mini-tractors with an equipment set will start rolling off the serial conveyor of Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. In 1990 for the first time the Kharkov Plant of Tractor Self-Propelled Chasses will manufacture its own model of the MZ motor unit. It will produce 6,000 motor units and the same number of rototillers, reapers, plows, wagons and cultivators will be delivered by the Kharkov workers to the trade network during the first year of assembly-line production. Later the output of this equipment will be increased considerably.

The MB-1 Kaskad motor unit, which is manufactured by plants of the aviation industry, is popular among farmers. The fact that it operates dependably is not the only reason. Its main advantage is that it has a large selection of attachments and trailer equipment, which enables farmers to carry out practically the entire complex of operations in the peasant or individual subsidiary enterprise. In addition to the customary wagon, plow and reaper this little unit is equipped with a feed crusher, rotor hay turner, a water pump, a cultivator, a potato digger, a wood-processing attachment, a snow remover and an additional two-disc mower. Last year of the general volume of motor unit production the output of the Kaskada reached 52,000 units. In 1990 it is planned to increase its production to 135,000 units.

In addition to the two ministries we have discussed above other departments are participating in implementing the interbranch program on the development of small-scale agricultural technology. These include USSR Minstankoprom [Ministry of the Machine Tool Building and Instrument Industry], USSR Minmash [Ministry of Machine Building], USSR Mintyazhmash [Ministry of Heavy Machine Building], USSR Minelektrotekhpribor [Ministry of the Electrotechnical Assemblies Industry] and USSR Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building]. For each of them there is an exact list and schedule for the development of the means of small mechanization. For example, the enterprises of USSR Mintyazhmash have pledged to organize the production of power pumps for irrigation, household electrical pumps, electrical sprinklers, trailers for roaming bees, root cutters, wood-processing machinery with attachments for feed preparation and water-heating columns.

During the next 2-3 years this technology will start to arrive in the village on a mass basis.

The list of the means of small mechanization, the production of which will begin in 1990-1991, also includes the BS-1 type of concrete dissolver-mixer (a good aid to those who are building houses), the vibration machine tool for the preparation of building blocks, a solar (household) water heater with a shower stall, a mini-transporter of universal dimensions, electrical water heaters of different capacities, electrical heating elements, special UV lights for farming (30-60 watt), an electrical plate for the village house, Yauza-1 and Yauza-2 wells, a panel hotbed, a gasoline-powered saw and many other items.

Among all of these machines and mechanisms village residents will probably be especially interested in the microhydroelectrostation for individual use, the assembly-line production of which is being organized by the collectives of the USSR Ministry of Heavy Machine Building. MicroGES [Hydroelectric power stations] with a capacity of up to 1 kilowatt and up to 5 kilowatts will be produced. They will be used in distant settlements, at shepherd stations, at field camps, and in mountain settlements—in other words everywhere where there are no permanent sources of current but where water resources are available, even the most insignificant. With this same goal in mind USSR Mintyazhmash will produce wind energy mills with a capacity of up to 4 kilowatts.

A natural question arises: How much of a particular type of equipment do we need in order to saturate the unbounded agricultural market and to fully satisfy demand? Without a precise answer to this question it is difficult to deal with the problem of organizing production. The prognosis of need of means of small mechanization was developed on the basis of statistical data on the quantity and size of land areas used privately by

citizens and by orchard-vegetable garden partnerships and on the size of land areas cultivated by average and small enterprises, as well as on the basis of the size of the herd of basic types of agricultural animals being maintained in households.

According to an agreement with USSR Tsentrosoyuz, which is the main customer for small-scale equipment, the average annual demand for motor units with equipment sets has been established at, for example, 200,000 units, and for small-scale tractors—78,000. This production level will be achieved by 1990 for motor units and by 1993 for mini-tractors. It should be noted that machine building has been given a very difficult task regarding the pace of growth of objects for the production of mini-tractors. The problem is complicated by the absence of a special motor. Right now a decision has been made to develop a tractor modification of the modernized MeMZ-966 motor of the Zaporozhets automobile since this car is being removed from production. At the same time the development of original designs for tractor motors will continue.

USSR Minavtoselkhoz mash is now carrying out negotiations with foreign firms concerning joint production of such a motor. It is examining the variant of procuring equipment for organizing independent production of a native model. Today plants are directing 1,000 mini-tractors into the trade network; by 1991 demand for them will be satisfied by over 60 percent. With the organization of the production of motors the delivery of small-scale tractors will increase.

The successful implementation of the program to create the means of small mechanization must have the most positive effect on the further development of peasant and private subsidiary enterprises, orchard-vegetable garden partnerships and lease family collectives. This will undoubtedly push us forward in solving the tasks to improve food supplies to our country's population.

FOOD PROCESSING, DISTRIBUTION

Conversion Efforts Result in Green Hot Dogs

904D0069A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Varshavskaya under "Conversion: Hopes and Reality" rubric: "The Shoemaker Bakes Pies..."]

[Text] The story sounded like an anecdote at first. A solid defense firm in the scope of the widely propagandized conversion set about to issue quite peaceful automatic machines for the production of sausages. The line is wonderfully compact, the productivity is fantastic and the packaging is automated. No doubt about it, it is the rosy dream of food industry workers! Pleased, they grabbed the proposal of the defense industry workers with both hands. Do it...!

They did, 20 units. And just as everyone prepared to shout "hurrah," they looked at these sausages that the line was spitting out with the speed of a machine gun burst. They were...green! Well, not entirely green, of course, but kind of grayish-greenish. But you must agree that this made them no more similar to the usual appetizing pink links than machine gun bullets.

How is that? Why? The members of the commission froze in astonishment. And therefore they figured out almost immediately that technology is not being adhered to. Either the skillful defense workers cut the time for the aging of the sausage meat or they reduced the time for the drying, searing and cooking of the product, or they changed the temperature of the process. In general, they knew about mechanics and automation but, alas, the recipe for sausages was not their field.

In addition, it turned out that this "technological wonder" costs 230,000 rubles! It is almost four times as expensive as the good old set of equipment for the making of sausages. The new line will not pay for itself even at the end of its service life of 10 years.

They thought and thought about what to do with the automatic machine and came up with a radical solution—write it off! So they wrote off all 20 manufactured units.

But we note this: the automatic lines for the production of frankfurters that were supposed to be prepared by the Podolsk Design Bureau have already been included in the plans of sausage shops. Some shops were able to build them and informed the population of this. But the long-awaited hot dogs are still not available. The people still face empty store counters. And how could one explain to them why the new enterprises are not producing the promised assortment?

The adventures of the sausage line developed by defense industry workers are, of course, a unique phenomenon. But if one takes a closer look at it, one can see features characteristic of our current course of conversion. The incompetence of designers from defense enterprises in

the area of their new work is one thing. The remarkable expensiveness of the equipment that they are developing is something else.

Specialists from Gipromyasomolprom [State Institute for the Project Planning of Enterprises in the Meat and Dairy Industry], whose business is to incorporate new equipment in the plans of future meat and dairy combines, are simply in shock. It is unknown how to "start" the enterprises set up under these same plans. The work of the defense industry workers is not going well and the deadlines for the manufacture of ordered equipment are being extended again and again. For milk production, say, the enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry were supposed to begin series production of 30 units of equipment in 1989. What about it? Only five of them were accepted for production. The rest have not yet been assimilated.

"The trouble is that the defense industry workers overestimated their possibilities," thinks T. Borisneva, top specialist with Gipromyasomolprom. "And not enough time was set for performance of the work."

It turned out that it is impossible to develop equipment for a branch in a purely mechanical manner without looking into the specific nature of the branch, even if one "copies" some line of a foreign model down to the smallest details.

This is what happened with a vacuum-evaporating device for dairy combines. They made it on the basis of the most promising models. And they miscalculated! The reason is that there, in the West, milk comes to the combines with a lower acidity. And this means that our "backward" milk will stick. For this reason, it is more expedient for our food industry workers to have equipment that perhaps is less economical and progressive but more suitable for our conditions and standards.

A program for the establishment of new equipment for processing branches was set up for the period from 1988 to 1995. Will the defense enterprises be able to meet the target in the remaining 5 years? For it appeared that it is not enough to have a strong production base and good designers. What is needed is a fundamental restructuring of production and the retraining of specialists. And this takes time. Meanwhile, the plans of future enterprises are drawn up for 2 or 3 years in advance. The specialists from Gipromyasomolprom cannot perform their work until defense industry workers are retrained. The formulation of plans and construction of new enterprises issuing meat and dairy products is being delayed for an indefinite time.

But let us suppose that the defense enterprises are able to create high-quality advanced equipment for the meat and dairy industry in the shortest possible time. Who will buy it? The milk plant in the city of Belebei, for example, refused to buy an experimental model of an electrodialysis apparatus. Too expensive! And the Simferopol Milk Plant, where it was planned to perform tests, refused to cooperate, because the Leningrad

"North Plant" of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry demanded 26,000 rubles just for the testing of a homogenizer.

Or take equipment for a meat processing complex with a capacity of 2 tons of meat and 1 ton of sausage per shift. The "universal machine for the processing of intestines" now in existence previously cost 470 rubles. Defense industry workers announced its new price: 8,000 rubles. How is it supposed to process intestines that would make it more than 17 times more expensive? It seems that its productivity changed little and other characteristics remained practically the same....

Other kinds of industrial equipment also became noticeably more expensive. And the entire set for the complex increased in price by a factor of six and a half.

"Considering that cost accounting is now in effect, the situation is becoming critical," says B. Uryash, deputy chief engineer of Gipromyasomolprom. "Will a buyer be found for such a combine? And even if some kolkhoz or sovkhoz millionaire pays for it, what will be the production cost of the meat and sausage produced at the enterprise?"

It is not difficult to see that if the production cost goes up, then the price will naturally rise too.

One responsible person in one of the defense ministries (under the condition, to be sure, that he remain unidentified) graciously agreed to raise the curtain of secrecy over the mystery of price-setting at defense enterprises.

"Despite the high prices, the output that we produce for the agro-industrial complex is not profitable for us," the person reported.

The small-scale output of products, the lack of necessary equipment and, as a consequence, the large amount of manual labor all led to a catastrophic decline in labor productivity. If we add to this the high wage rates (15 percent higher than in other branches) and high overhead.... It turns out that even if the defense enterprises produce what was formerly done at plants of the Ministry of Light and Food Industry, the prices will rise by a factor of one and a half to two. But it is necessary to produce new products and even from more expensive (and higher quality) materials. So prices creep upward at a dizzying rate.

But conversion was proclaimed triumphantly and the defense enterprises were given the task. There is no getting out of it, it must be carried out at any cost....

A seditious thought: must it really? Are we not forgetting common sense for the sake of a resonant declaration? There is no doubt that it sounds effective: some plant reduced the output of guns by a million rubles and produced so many sausage lines for this sum. Only what does this mean? It means that expensive equipment that formerly produced guns now works with less productivity and with idle time, whereas in the neighboring

shop, on the other hand, many workers rivet the sausage machine by hand. For this cannot be done on a machine tool meant for guns.

We know from the classics that it is a disaster when a shoemaker bakes pies. For this is not his business. If he does not stitch boots, then he can at least sew slippers or at the extreme handle some kind of leather work. But certainly not pies!

After the failure with the automatic sausage machines, by the way, the Podolsk Design Bureau for automated lines decided to create something less remote from its basic sphere of activity. And without putting it off for long, it developed a line for the production of disposable needles. Many departments immediately took an interest in the line and there are already buyers for it. It turned out that our defense industry workers can master the production of new peaceful output and can do so without excessive distress and expenditures if they only channel their accumulated experience in the right direction.

For this reason, let us examine once again whether the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry really needs to make milk lines, whether the Ministry of General Machine Building has to produce machines for the filling and covering of sausage meat and whether the Ministry of the Defense Industry should make boxes for the stunning of cattle? To what extent does this correspond to the specialty of the enterprises?

It is necessary to develop a conversion program carefully and in a balanced manner. Otherwise conversion, which gave the society so many hopes, will become the next costly ineffective campaign.

Conversion Progress at Voronezh Plant Reported

90UM0227E Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent A. Pyatunin: "Conversion of a 'Mailbox'"]

[Text] Not very long ago the Voronezh Mechanical Factory was referred to by the number of its "mailbox," even though to local residents what it produced was no secret. Now, however, instead of filling orders submitted from the "defense side," many of its shops have started to manufacture nonmilitary products. The first 30 high-output grinders have already been shipped to agricultural industry processing enterprises. They are designed to prepare ground meat and fish in a vacuum. Each unit, costing only two-thirds as much as an import model, will provide a savings of up to 25,000 rubles a year.

The factory's collective has completed retooling for other priority consumer goods. In the coming year, for example, plans call for producing 150,000 units of the popular Rossiyanka kitchen gas range. Factory designers, engineers, and laborers will also make our medics happy.

Defense Industry Conversion to Food Processing Equipment

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[Interview with A. Ye. Shestakov, Deputy Minister of USSR General Machine Building, by VESTNIK AGROPROMA correspondent Yu. Grachev; date and place not given. The first two paragraphs are a VESTNIK AGROPROMA introduction.]

[Text] It is generally known that the USSR State Commission of the Council of Ministers for Military-Industrial Problems, in collaboration with agro-industrial complex organizations, has developed a special program for creating and implementing series production of high-output technological equipment for APK processing industries by defense-oriented enterprises. It is planned to create by 1995 3,000 pieces of new equipment and deliver machinery and mechanisms valued at 17.5 billion rubles.

Questions related to how the creators of space rockets are involved in this program are put by our correspondent, Yu. Grachev, to A. Ye. Shestakov, USSR deputy minister of General Machine Building.

[Shestakov] Our ministry is a leader in research and development of technological equipment used by the baking, confectionery, sugar, yeast, oils and fats, essential oil, and the potato processing industries; and in equipment employed to produce meat cold cuts and prepared meats. We series-produce, in addition to the above machine systems, a variety of technical items for nine branches of public feeding and trade enterprises. The scope of our work is quite wide, as you can see. I must also say that we have been involved in peaceful production for quite some time, and we are constantly expanding this production. In 1987 the rate of this growth showed a substantial increase.

To meet the requirements of the state program, by 1995 the Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building] should manufacture and supply APK enterprises with new equipment valued at R4 billion 160 million. The task is such that we must take extraordinary measures aimed at reorganizing defense production and retooling some plants for peaceful production, which often happens to be unfamiliar to workers and design collectives. This of course is often associated with substantial difficulties of retooling for the new production. However, the high intellectual and production potential of our enterprises encourages us to anticipate successful accomplishment of the task handed the space rocket branch.

[Grachev] Alfred Yegenyevich, two years have passed since mass conversion was initiated. What have the plants under your industry done along the lines of this plan?

[Shestakov] Last year, our collectives satisfied the requirement of manufacturing and delivering processing

equipment in the amount of 100.8 percent. The requirements posed by the state plan were satisfied in full measure. The 1989 plan is expressible by a substantial figure: R342 million. There is a 21-percent increase in production volume compared to 1988. In the last 10 months, the agro-industrial complex took delivery of R260.5 million worth of equipment. We are ahead of schedule; we will start 1990 with a good lead. The point is, next year we are to supply the national economy with equipment valued at R470 million.

[Grachev] Are there many branch enterprises involved in this effort?

[Shestakov] As of the present, 24 plants have taken up peaceful production. Agro-industrial equipment accounts for 22.5 percent of our production. This figure will almost double next year. Thirty-six defense plants will make the change to producing machinery for processing branches. In the next two or three years, civilian machine construction's share will attain 60 percent.

The machine builders' agenda lists more than 700 items of technological equipment to be created for APK processing industries. Included are machines for baking bread, biscuits, and gingerbread; automatic lines for producing pelmeny; lines for preparing and vacuum-packing prepared meats; equipment for processing dehydrated potatoes, quick-frozen salad potatoes, and potato chips; machinery for baking "eclairs"; integrated equipment for minibakeries.

If you were to ask me about the specific activities in progress at particular enterprises that have joined the conversion system, first on my list would be the collective at the now nationally known scientific production association Energiya, which together with other enterprises belonging to us, has taken on the task of creating baking and confectionery machinery. This includes dough-kneading machine A2-KhTT; the dough-shaping A2-KhPO-6; the A2-ShLT caramel line; KRM-2 and KRM-3 rolling and stretching machines; candy-wrapping machines; UPT cottage cheese unit; milk valves, and much more.

I can also tell you that the capabilities of this association's collective are virtually unlimited. The point is, the fallout from the work on the Energiya-Buran space rocket system has enabled it to offer more than 600 modern technologies, new materials, and bug-free technical equipment that can be successfully set to peaceful purposes. The realization of these attainments has invigorated and strengthened development of the national economy, including the agro-industrial complex.

I would also like to point to yet another scientific production association that has made a remarkable contribution to processing equipment production. This is the NPO Rotor. It is responsible for manufacturing an integrated bakery products equipment. Especially interesting is a part of this equipment—a small machine that can be used in rural feeding rooms, bread shops, and small bakeries.

The ensemble employs a very simple principle. Two hoppers receive various kinds of dough and whatever filling is to be used: meat, fruit, vegetable, etc. The filling is introduced into the dough by means of a rotary unit. A special device located at the outlet stamps out the pieces in the particular shape desired. This machine is made in the fashion of the better foreign types, and I am sure that it will find favor with cooperatives, family and rental collectives involved with baking.

[Grachev] You have touched on the subject of minibakeries. This question is dear to the hearts of many rural and city residents. I understand that you have a special program dealing with setting up enterprises of this kind. Has any progress been made in this regard?

[Shestakov] Yes, the program does exist, but substantial difficulties are standing in the way of progress. Our suppliers are letting us down. The trouble here is that there are six ministries that are responsible for organizing minibakeries. Ours is the lead enterprise. We manufacture three equipment types for these enterprises. The equipment ensemble consists of 13 separate items. The task as devised was to build 30 small bakeries in 1988, 100 in 1989. The task has not been accomplished due primarily to the absence of a kneading machine that provides mechanical discharge. Plants of the MGO Tekhnokhim have failed to deliver the machine.

To make at least some kind of progress, we decided to "sidestep" the problem by introducing into baking production a unit fitted with a conventional semi-mechanized discharge. We have produced about 70 equipment ensembles for minibakeries. The machine will be installed in towns and villages of Moscow Oblast. In time, when series production of this equipment will become stabilized, it will be made available to other areas of the country.

[Grachev] Could you tell us the details of the minibakery?

[Shestakov] The small bakery can be set up in any low-density populated place, thus solving the problem of supplying people with fresh and tasty bread. Each bakery is capable of producing 220 kilograms of loaf bread per hour. It employs the so-called unleavened dough technique. The technological process consists of 11 operations: feed-in of flour; sifting; batching; mixing; portioning; rounding; preliminary rising; shaping; final rising; baking; and unloading onto carts. All the work can be handled by four or five persons. It would be more accurate to say that they operate the machinery, which actually does all the work.

For the convenience of customers, it is planned to install the minibakeries in small residential neighborhoods, in delicatessens, and bread stores. I say again that their purpose is to bring the goods to the consumer. Our ministry has general responsibility for providing this equipment to such locations. It should be installed by local agro-industrial committees. We recently reached an agreement with the Gosagroprom of the Non-Black

Earth Region of the USSR; one of its trusts is to assume this responsibility. I think that similar arrangements will eventually be made with other committees.

However, minibakeries constitute only a small part of our work of technical refurbishing of the baking industry. This sector has long been in need of modernization. Many plants that were erected before the war have become obsolete both in their production technology and in equipment. There is much manual labor and a low order of mechanization, with production conditions quite severe in many cases. There is a reason for the large number of letters written to the editors complaining of poor quality of baked products sold in the state system. This is due to the backwardness and low technical level of production.

The baking industry is the focus of attention of collectives in eight design offices and research institutes, and of 19 industrial enterprises that come under the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building.

Our ministry recently compiled a catalog of technological equipment for APK processing industries that is being produced by defense complex enterprises. The baking industry section lists 41 machines. I would especially like to mention the R3-KhPG, a three-section oven designed to bake loaf bread made out of wheat flour grades 1 and 2. Its intended use is in small bakeries, public feeding enterprises, and aboard ships. This item falls into the higher quality category.

Also in this quality category is the A2-KhPO/7 horn-shaping machine, which is also one of the components of the integrated small bakery ensemble. It can produce 3,600 horns per hour.

The A2-KhPYa-25 electric baking oven is designed to bake bread and rolls in large enterprises. Output is 642 kilograms per hour. Our industry manufactures units that can bake bread in even larger amounts. For example, the A2-KhPYa-50 electric oven bakes 1,100 kilograms of bakery items per hour.

Something else on the list I would like to mention is a production line designed to bake 0.8-kilogram loaves of bread of wheat flour grades 1 and 2 and one-kilogram loaves of rye and wheat-and-rye dough, in tunnel ovens with a tray size of 50 square meters. This powerful unit produces over 1,300 kilograms of product per hour. That is its output. Bake time is under 60 minutes. Oven weight is 42 tons.

[Grachev] Alfred Yevgenyevich, in the beginning you mentioned that Minobshchemash collectives are also engaged in the production of equipment for processing potatoes, which the people rightly refer to as second bread. What does this production amount to?

[Shestakov] We only recently took on this problem. However, realizing its importance on the national scale, we have expanded production of potato processing equipment. Our plants are in the process of retooling for

series production of integrated equipment designed to produce quick-frozen salad potatoes, dehydrated mashed potatoes, potato chips, potato pancakes, and french fries. Deliveries of this equipment will increase. The demand is large, since storage and processing of tubers in our country is still unsatisfactory. Large amounts of potatoes grown and gathered by rural toilers simply perish due to improper handling and absence of the necessary processing equipment.

The same may be said about processing of vegetables. Only small amounts of good-quality canned fruits and vegetables reach workers' tables. A major cause once again is shortage of series-production machinery and absence of modern production equipment. We are attempting to somehow fill this gap; we have signed on nine scientific research and design collectives. They include, among others, collectives that offer substantial scientific credentials: the NPO Vypel; the TsKB for Heavy Machine Building; the KB for Transportation Machinery Construction. Each organization has been charged with specific tasking. Some of them are working on pneumatic systems and accessories; others are developing metering devices and quick-freeze apparatus; yet others specialize in hydraulic systems and controls. These directed efforts make it possible to successfully resolve the problem of improving the quality of series-production machinery and retooling for new products.

I would like to stress that in our producing equipment for peaceful purposes we apply on a broad scale the advanced methods associated with design and technological development employed in the production of military items. This has a most beneficial effect on quality of equipment that is manufactured and tends to shorten series-production time. I include with these proven methods computer-aided design; mathematical modeling in full and reduced scale; objective measuring devices; technical diagnostics; and automated quality control of parts, assembly units, and finished articles at all stages of production.

[Grachev] Thus, one of the major conditions for defense enterprises to make a successful change to peaceful production—equipment for APK processing industries in this case—is a reliable scientific footing. In other words, also needed here is rapid and skillful restructuring of scientific and design forces to channel capabilities toward resolving the new and important tasks.

[Shestakov] Exactly. It is a fact that making a change to manufacturing a fundamentally new product, especially one that is unfamiliar, always entails considerable difficulties. They are of a technological, organizational, and, I would say, a psychological nature. A reliable scientific footing for each stage of mastery of new production promotes resolution of difficulties with the least amount of turmoil. Everyone knows that our branch possesses—this is stated without exaggeration—enormous scientific potential. That is why it has been charged with the considerable amount of production of highly diverse processing machinery.

We are charged with developing eight machine systems. (I have already spoken of them.) To make that a reality, each one is made the responsibility of a group of scientific design collectives. Thus, development of machine systems for the meat processing industry has been assigned to 11 research institutes and design offices; for the baking industry, to eight; for the confectionery industry, to 11; for the sugar and yeast industry, to five; for the oils and fats industry, also to five; and for potato processing, to nine.

We were among the first in the defense complex to suggest that our most experienced specialists and scientists be designated as designers-general of the most complex machine systems. Dmitriy Alekseyevich Polukhin, one of the leading defense industry specialists, became head of a scientific design collective working on baking equipment. Appointed to the position of designer-general of new meat-processing equipment was famous scientist Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Konopátov. The position of designer-general for potato-processing equipment was taken on by Vsevolod Nikolayevich Solovyev, a scientist and specialist prominent in our sector. Vladimir Fedorovich Utkin, an experienced leader and man of science, was appointed designer-general for oils and fats machines.

Our scientists and designers, with their enormous background in creating space rockets and other defense equipment, are rapidly changing the fundamental principles of peaceful production, converting it to a higher scientific and technical level. However, their efforts sometimes collide with difficulties of a purely departmental nature. The fact is that development of agricultural product processing technology is being carried out by other collectives that have no ties whatsoever to the defense complex. After the Gosagroprom and Minlegpishchemash were abolished, their scientific research institutes were cut off from equipment creators. This isolation has a profoundly negative effect on scheduling and quality of new machines.

We are of the opinion that scientific research collectives involved in the development of production technologies must necessarily unite with collectives that create the equipment for these technologies. The proven value of this association is vividly attested to by the experience gained by all branches of the defense industry. By that experience and more, incidentally.

We were given permission to experiment with the creation of potato-processing equipment by combining with a scientific research institute of the Belorussian Gosagroprom, which is involved with purely technological problems. It is now a full member of our department's collective. Several powerful defense-oriented design offices, scientific research institutes, and even three significant plants have been attached to it. The result is a unique collective offering a closed cycle of research, technological, and production-organization operations. It has confidently taken on creating new

equipment. It has proved equal to the difficult task of developing automatic lines for potato processing.

This union of scientific-technological and production forces has made it possible to effect a considerable increase in the plan for manufacturing and delivering potato-processing equipment in the coming year. I believe that setting up similar associations for the production of other machine systems would be beneficial with regard to acceleration and improvement of products.

[Grachev] After the abolishment of the Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry, the latter's plants were transferred to the defense people.

[Shestakov] That is so. The plants belonging to Minlegpishchemash were transferred to five defense-oriented ministries, including the Ministry of General Machine Building.

[Grachev] What constraints were imposed on the amalgamation? The enterprises' specialties were at variance.

[Shestakov] The union was less than smooth. That was not particularly because we were joined by collectives that were of a vastly different orientation. The technological level of these plants is very low. Old equipment and buildings; inadequate production areas; obsolescent technologies; in many cases, poorly qualified workers and specialists—this is what made matters difficult. It was necessary to reorganize production, reconstruct the plants, and select and train new cadres. The process is still under way; it will take a long time. To bring enterprises of the former Minlegpishchemash up to the level of defense-oriented plants is a task that cannot be done in a year's time. It is necessary to bring to bear large capital expenditures and the mobilization of all of our scientific and technical, technological, and construction and installation forces. This kind of work has been in progress from the very first days of the amalgamation; its fruits are already being felt. The figures give some indication of this.

The Ministry of General Machine Building took in food production enterprises that had a total production (expressed as a ruble amount) of R225 million. As of today, we are producing processing equipment worth R342 million. Of this, 76.5 million is the share of defense plants, while 265.5 million is attributable to the enterprises of the former Minlegpishchemash. We can see that the growth is almost R40 million. This is not bad for a beginning, since only one year has passed since the collectives combined. It is natural that output of technological equipment for the agro-industrial complex will increase as production develops.

It is not too early for me to speak positively of a number of food-oriented enterprises that have exhibited successful restructuring, improved production, and growth in series production of necessary products. Heading the list of such collectives are the Kiev NPO Pishchemash,

the PO Smelyanskiy Mashzavod, the Bolokhovo Mashzavod, the Kalinin PO Pishchemash, and the PO Rostprod mash, among others. Thanks to successful production modernization, the conveyor belts carrying series-production equipment in those enterprises are functioning reliably and uninterruptedly. New and modern machinery is being mastered there.

Thus, the Kiev Production Association Pishchemash has completed retooling for powerful I8-KhTA-6 and I8-KhTA-12 dough units. They are designed to prepare leavened wheat dough in a continuous cycle. Each unit weighs more than 6.5 tons; output is 15 and 30 tons of dough per day. Sixty-nine units will be shipped to baking industry enterprises this year, with about 100 slated for the coming year.

Beet sugar production could not do without machines such as stackers. For example, the Sh1-PKF stacker is indispensable for unloading sugar beets from trucks, removing earth and weeds, treating the root crops with chemical preservatives, and placing them into pits. Series production of these machines, which weigh almost 85 tons, is carried out by the Kalinin PO Pishchemash.

Also, this year the collective of the Rostprod mash Production Association will provide the agro-industrial complex with three A1-ELM continuous production lines for the manufacture of toilet soap. Vacuum drying of a toilet base and mechanical processing of soap shavings from a soap rod will be employed on this line to produce every hour 2,000 bars of soap weighing 100 grams and 120 grams.

I could cite many more examples. They would all indicate that the creation and series production of technical equipment for processing industries is acquiring stability, making it possible to effect continuous growth in quality and quantity.

Comments by the Editors of VESTNIK AGROPROMA: We wish to remind our readers that this is not the first time that our country is carrying out conversion of the defense complex. This process is difficult, for realignment of enterprises always affects the interests not only of the collectives directly, but of related industries and suppliers of accessories and materials as well, since they too must restructure and adapt to rapidly changing production conditions.

This often results in breaking of established economic ties and has an adverse effect on interaction between individual branches of the national economy. It then becomes necessary to seek new partners to set up production contacts, which by itself requires considerable effort, time, and additional financial outlays.

Thus, defense production that has made the change to manufacturing equipment to be used by APK processing industries is already experiencing an acute shortage of electric motors, reduction units, geared motors, rubber items, polymer materials, stainless steel, etc. All of these items are produced by enterprises that come under the

USSR Minelektrotekhpribor, Minstankoprom, Minneftekhimprom, and Minmet. However, they themselves are working under tight schedules. What can be done to interest them in manufacturing additional equipment for the APK? It is completely obvious that this problem can be resolved only by a specific program that must be developed by the interested sides.

This is another instance where we cannot do without the efforts of the USSR Gosplan. It may be a good idea for it to review the state orders with a view toward provision by lead ministries not only of ensembles of equipment and production lines, but also of accessories made by related enterprises operating on a cooperative basis. In any event, it is entirely clear that success in attaining greater processing equipment production is tied to a firm state mechanism for interbranch cooperative deliveries.

Not less important is the question of effecting start-up and adjustment work at newly created agricultural product processing facilities. For example, Minobshchemash collectives are generally responsible for production and timely delivery of the necessary equipment. The client must shoulder everything else. Is that reasonable? Foreign experience indicates that a wiser, more reliable, and economically more advantageous approach is for the producer himself to perform installation, adjustment, and start-up of new equipment.

In this regard, the Minobshchemash has a suggestion to offer—one which we feel is a clever idea: that it take over the Orgpishcheprom, the All-Union Specialized Trust for Start-Up and Adjustment, which has its own network of departments and sections located in various areas of the country. This trust, which was previously a part of the USSR Gosagroprom, has been more or less cut off. We believe that it can become more effective within the defense complex system.

Finally, one of the most troublesome questions: the price of equipment supplied to the agroprom by defense complex enterprises, including enterprises of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building. Producers often

raise prices sharply, thus placing a heavy burden on the economy of both agriculture and APK processing industries. Here are some examples. One of the plants under the NPO Energiya, after retooling for production of portioning and rounding machines for the baking industry, set a price that exceeded the list price by almost three times. The PO Polet offered to sell production lines for "eclair" pies at a contract price that also was three times greater than that listed. Also, the price of 12,000 rubles was set for bread slicer A2-KhR3-R, for which the Progress plant retooled, instead of the list price of 3,000 rubles.

The board of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building acted quite properly by censuring the plants supplying processing equipment for their overcharging.

GOODS PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION

Consumer Goods from Yurginsk Machine-Building Plant

90UM0227C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Kostyukovskiy: "A 'Liliya' for Housewives"]

[Text] Not so long ago it was forbidden even to mention what was being produced by the Yurginsk Machine Building Plant Production Association.

Incidentally, that is most likely still true for some of its production. However, the main products are gradually being displaced by consumer items that bear no "secret" label whatsoever. The first lot of the small washing machine Liliya has been produced. This year, 10,000 units are to be manufactured. Production of scarce spare parts for the Zhiguli is in the process of expansion. The enterprise plans to tool for the production of complex items, such as automatically-controlled heating systems and dishwashers for the home.

ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION

Scientists Counter Opposition to Moscow's Severnaya TETs

904E0056A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 2

[Article: "We See No Alternatives" and appended medical opinion; first paragraph is source introduction and antepenultimate paragraph is source introduction to the medical opinion]

[Text] We continue the publication of papers on the Severnaya TETs. It has long been the focus of attention by our newspaper, which has granted the use of its pages to opponents of the various approaches.

The USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a decree about urgent measures for improving the country's ecological wellbeing. We completely support this timely and important decree. At the same time, in practice, attempts are being made to use this resolution for the purpose of prohibiting the erection of important socio-economic facilities that will completely satisfy existing ecological norms. Such an approach will lead inevitably, and in particular, to hampering the erection of power-engineering facilities that are designed to supply our cities with heat and electricity, a move that threatens the execution of socio-economic development programs. We assert that this is the situation in regard to erection of the Severnaya TETs in Moscow.

The Severnaya TETs of Mosenergo [Moscow Regional Administration of Power System Management], which has an electrical capacity of 750/900 megawatts and a heating capacity of 3,000 gigacalories per hour, was designed as an ecologically clean enterprise. This station can be a model in regard to the ecology since, in the first place, the most ecologically clean fuel—gas—has been adopted as the main and reserve fuel for it. Second, in order to curtail harmful discharges into the atmosphere, an installation for scrubbing stack gases of nitrogen oxides, which is to be delivered by the FRG and will enable the oxide content of stack gases to be reduced 10-fold below that of existing boiler units, is called for. The stack gases are to be discharged into the upper layers of the atmosphere, since the stack will be 250 meters high, thereby allowing for a concentration of no more than 0.1 PDK [maximum permissible concentration].

Introduction of the Severnaya TETs will enable more than 250 small uneconomical boilerhouses with low stacks, as well as more than 70 similar boilerhouses in Mytishchi, to be eliminated. This will improve the region's ecological environment.

The discharge of polluted effluent into the environment will be precluded practically completely. The TETs was designed with a closed waste-free technology. The requirement for service water for making up the maximum irretrievable losses should be met through the Klyazma water reservoir (this is no more than 4 percent, which does not disturb the water balance).

The necessity for the construction was stimulated by a social order of Moscow, that is, by the striving to solve the housing problem by the year 2000, and also by the lack of heat in the northern part of the capital. Therefore it must be said frankly that satisfaction of the requirements of certain groups of the population to prevent erection of the Severnaya TETs will inflict a blow on housing, social and cultural construction in the northern part of Moscow and in Mytishchi, since the heat capacities of TETs-16, -21, and -23, which supply the northern rayons with heat, have been practically exhausted. If there will be no new TETs, we will have to stop the construction of more than 1,100 facilities intended for introduction in 1990-1995, including 318 apartment houses, 111 schools, 84 kindergartens and nurseries, 63 medical facilities, 36 cultural facilities, 58 athletic structures, 258 stores, dining halls and cafes, 130 transport facilities, and so on.

The following have been examined as alternative options to construction of the TETs:

1. The erection on the TETs site of a boilerhouse with a capacity of 3,000 gigacalories. In this case, overconsumption will reach 800,000 tons of standard fuel equivalent. Discharges of nitrous oxides into the atmosphere will increase from 2,874 to 3,722 tons per year.
2. The erection of rayon and tract boilerhouses. However, this will require a large number of land sections in built-up parts of the city and construction of the accompanying distribution networks. An overconsumption of fuel and an increase in the tending-personnel manning, as well as a worsening of the ecological situation as a result of discharges of stack gases into the lowest atmospheric layers because of the low stacks, are inevitable.
3. Conversion of the heating supply of Moscow's northern area to electrical space heating. What is wrong with this option? It will require the erection in Moscow or in the oblast of a large condensation electric-power station. In order to cover the area's estimated load, which is 3,000 gigacalories, this station's power capacity, taking into account grid losses, will exceed 3 million kW. Overconsumption of fuel will reach 2.5 million tons.
4. Supplying heat by using heat pumps and solar installations. But such solutions are being used throughout the whole world only for small consumers, the loads of which are orders of magnitude lower than the Severnaya TETs's load. Moreover, solar-heat supply for Moscow is unacceptable, since in this zone (56 degrees North latitude) the thermal capacity of solar installations is sharply reduced during the heating season. The use of heat pumps and solar installations in the near term is unrealistic because of the lack of adequate finished scientific and engineering work.
5. Meeting the thermal loads of Moscow's northern area by reducing heating-network losses. This proposal is often advanced as an alternative to the construction of new sources. It is poorly effective in practice because of the relatively small amount of actual heat losses (6-8 percent on the average), and also because of the long

time (30-35 years) needed for replacing all of Moscow's heating networks with heating lines with new insulating structure.

It must be kept in mind that since the decision to cancel construction of the industrial zone has been adopted, the erection of the TETs will not worsen the ecological environment in this area.

As is apparent from the data cited, today there is an absence of a reasonable alternative to erection of the Severnaya TETs—a new power-engineering facility that will meet today's rigid ecological requirements and give Moscow's northern area the electrical supply that it badly needs.

[Signed] Yu. Rudenko, academician and secretary of the Power-Engineering Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences; M. Styrikovich, academician; E. Volkov, doctor of engineering sciences; and Ye. Sokolov, chairman of the consultant's commission of RSFSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Protection of the Environment] on Examination of the Severnaya TETs Design and doctor of engineering sciences, and five other signing scientists.

Appended to the scientists' letter was the conclusion of B. Velichkovskiy, academician-secretary of a division of the AMN SSSR [USSR Academy of Medical Sciences] and AMN academician. We consider it necessary to publish his text also.

In regard to the question of the possible effect of Severnaya TETs discharges on the health of the people of Moscow's northern rayons and its suburbs, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences charged two scientific collectives—the NII of Public and Municipal Hygiene imeni A. Sysyn of the USSR AMN, which has much experience in hygiene research in this area, and the NII of Hygiene imeni F. Erisman of RSFSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Public Health], which is involved in matters of hygiene and is associated with construction of the indicated TETs—with analyzing the papers of Mosenergo-proyekt [Moscow Design Institute for the Design of Power-Engineering Facilities] on the facility in question. As a result of the analysis conducted, both institutes came to the conclusion that the Severnaya TETs, by virtue of the use of natural gas as the basic fuel and catalytic scrubbing of stack gases of nitrous oxides not only will not increase the basin's air pollution in the area concerned but will lead to an improvement of it, since it will enable the elimination of a large number of small boilerhouses which are an important source of the air's background pollution.

AES Director on Problems in Dismantling Nuclear Power Units

904E0056B Moscow GUDOK in Russian
4 Jan 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Valentin Aleksandrovich Zverev by O. Stolyarov (Novosibirsk): "The Nuclear Unit Is Spent. What Is Next"; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] Nuclear-power engineering is going through a confidence crisis in our country. The main cause is Chernobyl. The atomic workers are charged with all of the sins. One of them is the grave inheritance for our descendants in the form of spent power units. It is said that a nuclear graveyard requires enormous expenditures for keeping it under surveillance for tens of thousands of years, and dismantling it down to a so-called "green meadow" will require as much expense as did the building itself of the power unit.

The No 1 unit at the Novovoronezh nuclear station was shut down five years ago. What has been its fate? Our correspondent met with NVAES [Novovoronezhskaya AES] director V. A. Zverev.

[Stolyarov] Valentin Aleksandrovich, how is the reactor's first power unit making itself felt?

[Zverev] Its operation is missed, for sure. After 12 years it was put on a pension. But such are the rigid safety rules. Like in aviation: an airplane works its prescribed service life and it is retired. No work is done on it. The power unit awaits its hour.

[Stolyarov] What do you have in mind?

[Zverev] The future dismantling of the unit. The point is that a joint Soviet-Bulgarian-Czechoslovak enterprise, Dekom, has been established and it began operation in January 1990. Its mission includes development of a world-class technology for removing power units from operation, doing work on rebuilding, deactivating, regenerating and processing materials, and burying radioactive waste for the participating countries and for other countries.

[Stolyarov] But this business is unknown to you. Obviously, some kind of a staging of the operations is planned?

[Zverev] We have already had to rebuild and repair reactor pressure-vessel internals, including those in the first power unit.

The feasibility study has been assigned to the joint enterprise, and then the engineering design, and after that the financing operations for disassembling the first power unit will be opened up.

The technology of the operations, as I said, is known. England, the U.S. and France have already disassembled one each, and now Japan is engaged in it.

[Stolyarov] Valentin Aleksandrovich, have the specialists estimated what dismantling of the first power unit will cost?

[Zverev] The total will be about 120 million rubles. That is a lot of money but it must be remembered that the operations are experimental. Later, when the technology has been perfected, the cost of such work will drop.

[Stolyarov] What will there be at the site of the first power unit?

[Zverev] I don't know yet. I have just returned from France. At the Chinon AES we were shown what remained of the dismantled unit A-1. The reactor and the constructional structure with its induced radioactivity had been removed. Right now there, under what remains of the spherical shell, is a museum of development of the nation's nuclear power.

[Stolyarov] And how much time did the French spend dismantling the power unit at Chinon?

[Zverev] About six years. But it must be considered that the technology was being developed at the facility. Incidentally, we will be able to take their experience into account: the French also expressed the desire to join our joint enterprise. I think that in 1990 the appropriate papers will be signed. Other West European countries have also shown an interest in the enterprise.

[Stolyarov] There has been much talk about the cause of the West's turning away from the construction of nuclear power units and the protests against nuclear power....

[Zverev] I will speak about France. Twenty power units will be built in that country by 1995. But this does not mean that the share of nuclear power in this country is being increased. France intends to maintain the level reached—three-fourths of all the electricity is being generated at AES's. Eventually, new units simply will be built to replace those shut down at the site of the dismantled ones.

France is building units rapidly and of good quality. They no longer intend to erect gas-graphite reactors, only water-water reactors, of the same type as at Novovoronezh.

It is typical that high-capacity AES's stand almost at the edge of the city. The Chinon AES, with an electrical capacity of 4,270 MW is located half a kilometer from the city limits. One cannot help but say that the developed countries are living well because they have a much higher electric-power consumption per person than we do, and have advanced power-saving technology. We also must follow this path.

As for public opinion, in Vienna, where, before my trip to France, I spent time at a session of a MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency] section, which examined the question of taking power units out of operation, I talked with colleagues from the FRG and Finland.

It turned out that in these countries of the "greens"...they are fighting for AES's. "The 'greens' movement will come to you some years later, just like Parisian styles," my collocutors told me.

[Stolyarov] Valentin Aleksandrovich, let us return from foreign affairs to our own. How is the NVAES doing?

[Zverev] It must be said that difficult times have broken out for our region in regard to power supply. Voronezh Oblast, and that means also a number of divisions of the South Eastern Railroad, will have to settle for a meager power ration. I will cite some figures. In 1983 our station generated 17.8 billion kilowatt-hours. This year we shall produce only 19.9 billion kWh, in 1995 only 5.6 billion. Right now there is an extremely tangible shortage of electric power, for the oblast needs 21 billion kWh. Moreover, regional economic self-sufficiency is approaching. The oblast will have to buy electricity. There is just the question: whose, if everywhere the public has begun to come out against power-engineering facilities? I shall not be surprised if electricity will become more expensive.

At our station the sixth power unit will generate current in the best case in 1998. This is if standard construction times are maintained. But that is not all: we shall place at the sixth unit a district-heating turbine of 1,200 gigacalories per hour for withdrawing heat for Voronezh. And this is hundreds of millions of kilowatt-hours per year that will not be generated.

Power engineering is the base of any country's economy. Whatever the status of power engineering, that also is the standard of living. And it is inconceivable to me why neither the government nor the USSR People's Deputies do not solve this problem as one of the first, and basic, problems. They do not see the forest because of the trees: our country is slowly but surely approaching an energy crisis. And, consequently, poverty. We, not having created or built anything basically new, do not allow even that which we have today to be organized and operated—it is all the same, whether we are talking about thermal, nuclear or hydropower. Indeed, the situation will be immeasurably more painful and longer lasting than with detergent and soap.

[Stolyarov] And a last question. Persistent rumors have been going around that they are getting ready to build close to the NVAES a so-called regional burial ground for radioactive waste. Because of the dismantling of the first power unit, these rumors can flare up with new strength.

[Zverev] These rumors did have real soil under them. In those days, which we nowadays call stagnant, such a decision was almost adopted. The geologists even found a suitable structure for a burial ground. Our AES's specialists decisively resisted. Why allocate valuable chernozem for a burial-ground area, when there are wastelands in the country? These arguments were concurred with. So it is that today the rumors are groundless....

In concluding our conversation, I will add something of my own. Next year a section of MAGATE, which we spoke about before, will have a meeting in Tokyo, and in 1992 in Novovoronezh. I hope that by that time we will be able to show the international experts how the dismantling of the first power unit is going.

Statistics Indicate Chernobyl Disaster Consequences
18220002A

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 7 for 12-18 February carries on pages 12-13 a 1200-word article by Academician Yevgeniy Konoplya of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences who is director of the Institute of

Radiobiology. He cites statistics on the degree of post-Chernobyl radioactive contamination still existing in areas of the republic. In addition to the presence of cesium-137 and strontium-90, plutonium-238, 239, 240, and 241 have been found, as well as americium and curium. Konoplya also provides data on the number of locations and population affected, as follows:

1-5 curies/sq km	922 populated points	364,700 people
5-15 curies/sq km	942 populated points	259,300 people
15-40 curies/sq km	325 populated points	92,600 people
40-60 curies/sq km	48 populated points	6,500 people
more than 60 curies/sq km	22 populated points	3,200 people

Konoplya adds: "There has been an increase in the republic of hyperplasia of the thyroid gland, nervous disorders, hypertonia, heart disease, diabetes, and chronic bronchitis. The immune and other systems of the body have been destroyed and there are more invalids. I think that to a large degree this is a result of radiation."

Bryansk Oblast Receives Donations for Chernobyl Cleanup

18220003A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by M. Stepanov: "Unhealed Wound"]

[Text] The All-Russian Cultural Fund has donated R30,000 to the special fund for aid to the rayons of Bryansk, suffering from the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl AES.

More than once journalists and scientists have directed society's attention to the state of affairs and the situation of the Belorussian and Ukrainian rayons stricken by radiation. But very little is being said in the press about the Russian oblasts scorched by Chernobyl—Tula, Orel, Kaluga, and Bryansk. Yet in Bryansk alone the zone of intensive contamination includes 269 settlements, villages, and towns where more than 114,000 people live, including more than 30,000 children. The All-Russian Cultural Fund was one of the first to support the initiative of the Bryansk writers for creating a special aid fund (account number 747001 in the Bryansk Oblast branch of USSR Gosbank). In addition, the All-Russian Fund has appealed to its kray and oblast divisions, requesting aid for the suffering people of Bryansk.

Views on Unemployment Examined

Regional Patterns of Unemployment

904F0075A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Viktor Peredentsev: "How to Jump Over an Abyss"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KULTURA introduction]

[Text] Unemployment. Where has it come from to our country? Could it be that it has come from the cartoons which used to fill our newspapers and depicted gloomy Western proletarians with sandwich boards "Looking for Work?" Indeed, Western unemployment gave their bread to our expositors for a long time. However, now that we have discovered real unemployed in our country it makes sense to look at the issue in a different manner. Will we call the phenomenon what it is, or will we continue to hide behind noncommittal code words such as "incomplete employment?"

Let us not conceal that in the course of a transition to the goods-and-money relations and a market-oriented economic system the extent of unemployment and the rate of its growth may increase considerably. Our failure to act at present may turn into a catastrophe tomorrow.

Specialists in labor resources have always known that unemployment in our country not only exists but is quite high... Many areas have been called labor-surplus for a long time and continuously. What does this mean? That there are more workers there than the national economy needs, that the latter is just not up to providing for the full employment of the populace. However, such people may also exist in labor-short regions. The vagrants of our large cities and beach bums so well known in the ports of the Far East—don't they belong to the same category?

Balances of labor resources are drawn up annually in all republics, krais, and oblasts. These documents contain data on the number of labor resources, on the one hand, and their distribution among the sectors of the national economy on the other hand. Everything else is lumped together in the final, "total" line—"employed in the household and on personal farmsteads." In some oblasts, this line shows 3 to 5 percent of the labor force while in others 25, 30 percent or higher. This includes those who are indeed employed on personal farmsteads, women taking care of small children, mothers of many children, obvious parasites, genuine unemployed, and even the servicemen of the Soviet Army.

As we can see, there are many paradoxes here. For example, all kolkhoz [collective farm] members are considered to be employed in the national economy regardless of whether they work on the kolkhoz or not. This is why the actual unemployment rate at present can only be determined approximately, by the estimates of experts.

Central Asia is the most labor-surplus region. The most probable number of the unemployed here is about 2 million, probably even more than that. This problem is no less acute in Transcaucasia, North Caucasus, and Moldavia.

Fine, we have called a "spade" a spade, thank glasnost for that! Let us go on getting rid of customary euphemisms. However, having "legalized" unemployment, we should resolve the main issue—what is to be done next? First of all, of course, register the number of these people, organize their vocational training, and think about introducing benefits for those who cannot be given a job at present.

What next? Strategically, our goal should be to have jobs available (have them appearing, expanding) in locations where there are people capable of taking them, and for people to be able to live where there is a need for jobs. After all, at present we have millions of vacant jobs along with millions of those willing to work. However, they are separated by an abyss because the jobs and the people are in different areas of our country. How did this happen? Because in the process of locating new industrial construction projects little thought was usually given to who was going to work there. Equally little attention was paid to how and what with the rapidly growing population of a number of republics was to be occupied. The interests of departments which have no regard for people and for social problems prevailed.

About 90 percent of cotton are exported from Central Asia in raw form. The raw materials are hauled many thousands of kilometers away, and then a considerable share of the final product is carried in the opposite direction. The share of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in their own production of fabrics, knitted goods, and hosiery is considerably lower than in the country as a whole. Young girls from the ruined Non-Chernozem Zone which has long been depopulated to begin with go to the textile mills of the Central and Northwestern Economic Regions; meanwhile, there is nothing to keep the girls and women born in the hot sun of the south occupied with. Is this not absurd? However, from departmental positions all of this looks otherwise. The logic here is traditional: Economic performance indicators in the textile industry of, for example, Ivanovo Oblast are better than in Central Asia. This is how everything hinges on a short-term advantage.

This is just the simplest and the most graphic example. Let us look at, for example, the South Tajikistan Territorial-Production Complex. In the narrow sense of the word, these are just three industrial enterprises: the unique Nurek Hydropower Station, an aluminum plant, and an electrochemical plant. These production facilities provided very few jobs but required tremendous outlays. This is to say nothing about the fact that these plants should not have been built in valleys with poor air circulation for ecological reasons. Would it not have been better to consider setting up labor-intensive production facilities here?

As recently as 1970, the number of those working in the national economy of Uzbekistan amounted to 85 percent of the entire able-bodied population; by 1987, this statistic declined to 75 percent. In Tajikistan, it came to 72 percent in 1987 (for comparison, in Latvia—95 percent).

There may only be one way out of the existing situation: the structure of the national economy needs to be changed fundamentally, and many hundreds of thousands of jobs have to be created rapidly.

In these areas, a tremendous influx of labor is assured for 20 years to come—these are people who will soon enter productive age, who have already been born. As far as the country as a whole is concerned, there will be virtually no increment of able-bodied population. According to the 1970 census, in the Russian Federation there were 85 people under the age of 5 for every 100 people (in the 40 to 45 age bracket) whereas in Uzbekistan there were 302 and in Tajikistan 322 people.

For many years, many ranking officials from Central Asian republics counted on primarily agricultural development. "Not all the regions have to be industrial, there can be a highly developed agricultural region." "As soon as Siberian water comes here, in Uzbekistan alone we will employ additionally 3 million people." I heard such and similar statements, and not only in private conversations. It is clear now that Siberian water will not come, at least not in this century. However, even if this were to happen—they use so many people on local fields right now that there is no way to call this rational.

Let us note that in the most developed countries of the world only 2 to 3 percent of the total labor force are employed in agriculture. Meanwhile, they feed not only their people but also many neighbors. Meanwhile, in Tajikistan 44 percent of the able-bodied population do agricultural work (according to official data); in reality, it is still more, of course. As a matter of fact, at present Central Asia has a tremendous agrarian overpopulation, that is, hidden unemployment.

Creating additional jobs in industry is a possible way out. Certainly, this means labor-intensive and relatively non-capital-intensive industries. Can Central Asia itself finance it? For me, there is no doubt: It cannot. This is an all-union socio-economic problem. The union as a whole has to provide decisive aid in this case.

However, this is not all yet. The already mentioned oversaturation of the agrarian sector with labor resources interferes greatly with its transition to new, more advanced methods of labor organization. After 2 months of traveling through the region, we did not succeed in finding a single case of leasing in agriculture.

I am sure that the issue of allocating normal lots for fruit and vegetable gardens to the peasants needs to be resolved immediately so that they could feed themselves and the urban populace to a greater degree than is the case. At present, the diet of rural inhabitants is extremely poor, and prices at the urban markets are soaring.

Just give the peasant the land, and he will provide for himself and for the country vegetables and marvelous grapes, unsurpassed watermelons, melons, lemons, and pomegranates! He has long been dreaming of an outlet for his energy.

Impact of Market Economy on Unemployment

904F0075B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Igor Zaslavskiy, chief of the sector of employment, Research Institute of Labor, USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems: "According to the Laws of the Market"]

[Text] The freedom to choose one's occupation, place of employment and residence, and the cancellation of all kinds of administrative restrictions should be the main condition for combating this phenomenon...

We may read in any history book that unemployment in our country was eliminated as long ago as 1930. In reality, this is how it looked: they closed down the labor exchanges and canceled benefits by decree, in a forcible manner which Stalin liked so much.

"Complete" employment was insured by forced labor and exile to logging operations. They combated the turnover of personnel through "written pledges," and if someone still quit they took away his ration cards condemning him to starvation. This was a serfdom of sorts in industry. However, most importantly, the creation of inefficient jobs began: Three to five people worked where one person was needed.

At present, the situation is even getting worse. In the environment of new methods of economic management, an abrupt reduction of inefficient jobs and managerial personnel has begun. In 3 years, as many as 3 million people have already been released in the sphere of material production. Research done by the Research Institute of Labor shows that neither the enterprises nor the relevant departments have been able to offer suitable jobs to more than 20 percent of those let go. Our job placement centers turned out not to be much help in this matter. Despite the particular acuteness and the threat of unemployment emerging from time to time only and mainly on a regional scale (given the presence of a large number of vacancies in the national economy), it is becoming obvious that a radical reform of the state management of these processes is necessary in order to solve these problems.

In this reference, it is important to understand that only a labor market is capable of becoming a regulator of social and labor relations in a multisectoral market economy and ensuring an effective rather than fictitious mechanism of full employment. It will necessarily entail not only the abandonment of staffing quotas assigned from superior echelons but also the existing system of residence permits. The freedom to choose the kind of job, the place of work and residence, cancellation of all

kinds of administrative restrictions (labor booklets, questionnaires, protracted quitting procedures), and creation of the real guarantees of job placement should become the main premise.

This is why a legislative acknowledgment of the non-employment in social production, forced or voluntary, which actually exists in our country would be an important step, and so would be actual respect shown for the right of citizens to choose their jobs themselves on the basis of personal interest rather than social needs. Ultimately, the right to work is primarily a right rather than a duty of citizens, and we should not violate this. We should recall the first codes of labor laws adopted in 1918 and 1922 which also referred to aid to the unemployed through state benefits.

Given a developed labor market, an environment will unavoidably emerge in which enterprises will be forced to compete for gaining the best cadres. Competition will require efficient operation.

Social Profile of the Unemployed

904F0075C Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences K. Kirsanov: "What Kind They Are..."]

[Text] A certain stereotype emerged long ago in our country: an unemployed person is someone who wants to find something to do but cannot do this due to circumstances beyond his control. Actually, the picture is much more diverse.

The first category consists of people who are indeed prepared to work on any or almost any terms. There are about 3.5 million of those in our country. This largely came about due to the surplus of labor in some regions of our country. People would be glad "to turn their fate around" but this is virtually impossible given the existing system of rigid attachment to housing (residence permits). This is also how we may classify the handicapped. They almost do not fit in our state mechanism.

Recently, many people have been left out due to restructuring in some elements of the economy, among other things, due to the reduction of the number of employees at enterprises—exactly in production collectives rather than in the offices and main administrations of the ministries where a mere reshuffling is under way. For example, at one of the enterprises of Zagorsk, 50 out of 250 people have been laid off. A new technology has been introduced in these shops. Therefore, if the enterprises of our country achieved productivity corresponding to that in the world (with the volume of output and services remaining the same), about 32 million people would lose their jobs. Is this an alarming number? However, let us take into account that we have about 16 million vacant jobs. This means that there is an opportunity for the people to find something to do.

The situation is more complex in the case of specialists with specific skills who aspire to labor conditions commensurate with their knowledge and erudition. It is accepted that this kind of the unemployed altogether do not exist in our country. However, keeping silent about one's ills is not the best way to cure them. According to my calculations, there are about 0.5 million such people in our country at present. Engineers, accountants, economists, lawyers, and educators look for work not just for "the daily bread" but for the work which is in line with their inner needs. According to my calculations, the number of people in this category should increase abruptly in the nearest future. Our system of job placement is so imperfect that we may expect many dramatic collisions, conflicts, and personal tragedies. Therefore, the forecast in this sphere is not consolatory.

There is one more kind of the unemployed whom the custom is to not even mention. These are "card-carrying troublemakers." Frequently, they are only guilty of having an opinion of their own and arguing for a point of view different from that of the management. Their number in our country is likely to be about 200,000. As a rule, some time later they also return "to the ranks." The emergence of a democratic law-governed state is pulling the carpet from under the managers used to flouting the law. At present, we may be certain that the number of "unemployed obstinate individuals" will decrease gradually.

Now about those who do not want to work at all. They also exist. In this group, we should first of all distinguish those who have become addicted to wine, narcotics, and so on. The number of alcoholics, drug and substance addicts may be estimated to be approximately 7.5 million. On many occasions, they are employed someplace. However, absenteeism and "leaves without pay" are characteristic of their behavior. Production losses due to this are tremendous. In America, all of this is definitely taken into account and included in one of the chapters of official unemployment statistics.

We cannot keep silent about other people who are not socially useful. They are criminals of various kinds, speculators, and corrupt individuals who have managed to evade the punishing sword of justice and now live off their secreted funds. According to my calculations, there are 1.2 million of them. We would very much like to get rid of them and cleanse the country. Alas, in the 5 years to come we may expect the number of these parasitic unemployed to grow most abruptly.

We should specifically distinguish here a new category of people owning certain capital which has appeared relatively recently. They may report to work diligently and look like your regular toilers. It is not difficult to guess what their contribution to production is. It is sad, but their ranks increase by 40,000 to 50,000 new members annually...

We may state by way of generalization that unemployment as a social phenomenon is also inherent under

socialism, and losses to the national economy due to it approximate those abroad (compared, for example, to the United States). There should be complete glasnost with regard to this issue. We should take a sober view of real life.

Employment of Former Convicts Viewed

904F0075D Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Yevgeniya Gorbatsovskaya and Anatoliy Rastegayev, senior scientific associates of the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Procuracy: "Give Them Status"]

[Text] Thirty-three thousand people who have not been placed in jobs after returning from correctional facilities have been responsible for a 10-percent increase in repeat offenses in 1 year alone! If these people are not returned to normal life the crime situation in our country will hardly change for the better.

The notion of "a person not working" has become quite clear—in social consciousness—it means a parasite. We try to combat this phenomenon harshly and severely everywhere. In the 1960's, only an administrative penalty for parasitism existed whereas in 1975 Article 209 appeared, this time in the Criminal Code.

Has this produced tangible results? Unfortunately, statistics indicate that the situation has not improved.

This is where one begins to doubt: Are we right in approaching all those who do not work uniformly? Our research indicates that three strata of the population have been classified as parasites: operators of the "shadow economy" who live off the proceeds of crime; people who subscribe to the ideology of social dependency due to the absence of particular incentives for active labor; and those who have retrogressed and dropped out of social and labor life—compulsive alcoholics, drug addicts, and people who have returned from corrective facilities.

Should they be discovered by the relevant organs, all of them are threatened by this very article of the Criminal Code. Meanwhile, the second and third categories of such persons frequently find themselves in this role, unseemly for them and for our society, for objective reasons. Some are not interested in labor because it is irrational, unproductive, and is not in line with their requests, needs, and personal particulars. They simply would not hire another segment of these people or would try to get rid of them (in the course of 1 year, 45.8 percent of the contenders were turned down, and 76.8 percent were laid off).

The crime situation in our country will hardly change for the better unless we make vigorous and altogether unconventional decisions and take measures for resocializing this category of people and bringing them back to normal life.

We see a way out in, firstly, providing incentives for the labor collectives which hire this contingent of people voluntarily rather than within a quota imposed by the upper echelons. These enterprises should enjoy certain preferences because they assume the burden of this complex responsibility. Secondly, resocialization services are necessary which could set up labor shops on a state or mixed basis where yesterday's pariahs could reestablish their identity.

However, it appears that at present it is no less important to sort the issue out from the point of view of legislation, to consider and adopt a status of the unemployed which would set forth both the rights and responsibilities of a citizen who has not been placed in a job for some reason and the rights and responsibilities of the state with regard to him. This is the most humane way of a law-governed democratic state.

It Is Our Misfortune!

"...The employment of labor resources and unemployment are an acute social problem. We are concerned about the government proposals not reflecting it sufficiently. Taking into account this looming adversity, it is necessary to develop a specific, clear-cut program which will ensure comprehensive and efficient employment of the populace.

"We cannot procrastinate in a situation when unemployment has become a fact of life in a number of regions of our country and the cause of many negative phenomena which result in social tension. Since we have begun perestroika in the interest of people rather than at their expense, the issues of their labor employment, improved professional skills, and timely assistance with retraining should be resolved in advance at the state and local levels, and social guarantees should be assured in the process."

From a speech by Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions S. Shalayev at the 2d Congress of USSR People's Deputies

It Is Our Hope!

"I do not appreciate the sighing and sobbing on account of the fact that supposedly our own unemployed have appeared.

"Why should we force everyone into a factory shop or onto a field? We would do better to engage in mechanizing hard labor and increasing the efficiency of all work. Those who wish to be paid a lot for honest work should be paid accordingly.

"Any technical progress unavoidably demands that a separation occur into good, competent workers and those who have to face a choice between working and leaving.

"You will tell me that this is immoral, and that this runs counter to the principles of our society. Getting what is unearned, drinking, being absent from work, and stealing—are these principles? Let us put an end to fairy tales about the social advantages of our system before we end up in an abyss! We need unemployment."

From a letter by engineer V. Popov, Moscow

What do you think?

Express-Interview

...Husband and wife M., both with college degrees, both do not work. He has not worked for slightly over a year, and she has not worked in 3 years.

"Why?"

"For several reasons. The depreciation of the labor of all is the first reason. No matter how you work and how much effort you make you will get your chicken feed anyway."

"Now we have economic accountability and cooperatives..."

"This is yet another propaganda sham and a snow-job. A cooperative means free enterprise. In our country, it is impossible. There are too many bureaucratic checks. He will survive who finagles, even if just a lit bit..."

"However, you must be getting by somehow. After all, you do not go through the bushes gathering bottles and do not beg on the church porch?"

"We work. I do contract roofing work at dachas, and my wife does some sewing."

"What next?"

"Perhaps, we will leave [the country]."

Express Interview

...Zina K. is slim; her face is ash-yellow, her hands and feet bear syringe marks. She is a drug addict. She makes money for drugs (exactly for drugs rather than to live because there is no life as such) by selling her body. She has been doing this for 5 years now. Her son is 8 years old.

"About 3 years ago I understood that I was on a perilous path, and was dragging my son along. I sought treatment voluntarily, and started looking for a job. They quickly dispatched me everywhere. It turned out that they did not need me with my checkered past. I had to go to old buddies where they gladly 'took me in.' They 'pitied' me."

Express Interview

...Lyudmila P., 36, a former employee of one of the "cultural" offices of Moscow. A year ago, she did not go

along with the management and got hit by staff reductions. In the job placement service, they offered her jobs such as platerer (painter, cook, apprentice spinner or weaver, and even welder)...

"I would have gone to some other city, at least for several years, where specialists in my field are needed. However, in this case I would lose my Moscow apartment which I waited for for so many years. I have a son who is 13, after all..."

"What next?"

"This is the question which I would like to ask our government and our parliament which spends hours discoursing about human rights. How are they going to resolve the issue of job placement for people like me?"

A Flash Fact—Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]

In 1988, 26.4 percent of the able-bodied population of the republic did not take part in social production, out of which 40 percent in rural areas. In Komsomolabadskiy, Khovalingskiy, and Ganchinskiy Rayons, this statistic comes to 50 percent and higher.

The average annual increment of able-bodied population in the republic comes to 68,000 people.

A Flash Fact—Voronezh

According to the data of the oblast administration of internal affairs, the number of those not working for about 3 months is 10,201; 1,893 persons have not worked in social production for over 3 months.

At the same time, enterprises of the oblast lack 10,000 employees.

In the city, hundreds of specialists with college degrees are looking for an opportunity to use their expertise. They are teachers, lawyers, medical personnel, economists...

A Flash Fact—Riga

According to the data of the Latvian SSR Goskomtrud, 1.7 times more people were let go in the republic in 1989 than in the previous year due to staff reductions.

The problem of unemployment tends to get worse. By the year 2005, 120,000 people will leave the sectors of material production, whereas the natural growth of labor resources by this time will amount to 137,000 people.

Migration of Work Force Leads To Urban Overcrowding

904F0070A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Staroverov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences: "Why Are the Cities So Crowded?"]

[Text] For many years now I have been tearing down announcements by Moscow professional schools, other educational institutes and enterprises, in the most populous areas of Smolensk Oblast, inviting young men and women and demobilized soldiers to undertake work or pursue courses of study in Moscow and the capital oblast.

Those invited are guaranteed benefits unheard of earlier for the province: monetary awards, free food, uniforms, various social groups, swimming pool athletic sections and, upon the completion of their training, visas and well organized housing conditions in Moscow or the capital oblast. Peasant children are being recruited in this manner and the best youth and manpower are being withdrawn from the province. And there is no end in sight. Our land awaits a master!

Permit me a minor deviation. My father, a skilled roofer and tinsmith, always had several pupils. He developed highly skilled specialists without the benefit of a PTU [vocational and technical school]. It is with great love that they still remember him today.

Thus from childhood the children, grandfathers, fathers, mothers and grandmothers learned to work their land. And a valuable generation developed. Prior to 1930, my grandfather taught me to be an owner of land. But when all of the cows of the village were herded into his closed barnyard and his young horse was rounded up for the purpose of making soap, my grandfather succumbed to a heart attack. During those years, the rural youth completed their training to become owners in a village. And the parents declined to teach their children to become farmhands.

Is it not time for perestroika to once again teach youth to become owners?

I. Tsynman, Smolensk, CPSU member since 1946

Despite all of the plans, decrees and assurances by leaders at various levels, as stated quite correctly by the author of the letter, the practice of "recruiting peasant children" for work in the cities is continuing. Many have stated that the withdrawal of intelligent and energetic young men and women from the countryside is today dooming it to extinction. Still some are aware that such movement is not benefiting every city.

It is easy to become convinced of this fact using Moscow as an example. The number of Muscovites has more than doubled compared to the figure for the pre-war years. The capital is clearly incapable of accepting such numbers of new settlers and ensuring them and the native Muscovites with living conditions worthy of a civilized society.

Not only the housing lines but also the lines in front of stores, movies, theatres and exhibits and those waiting for transport services are increasing in length. Yes and how could they not grow: with an increase in industrial production by a factor of 250 during the years of Soviet rule, the number of theatre seats has declined by twofold

and the average statistical Muscovite can attend a performance at the Bolshoy Theatre only once in 84 years. A tremendous concentration of population, industrial enterprises and transport, especially freight transport and a weakly developed social infrastructure, including public health, a considerable number of the institutes of which provide services for different national groups—these and other circumstances are making life for the Muscovites more intolerable.

But perhaps if it is not the city, then could it be the former peasant who stands to profit unconditionally? Let us look and see how they are solving their problems. The overwhelming majority of new settlers are youth. And thus it would be superfluous to compare several sociological factors. Prior to the 1930's, eight out of every ten native rural inhabitants interrogated in the central oblasts solved their own problems of marriage and living conditions, whereas among the capital "recruits" who elected to come from rural areas—only three. Among the former, one out of ten had legal entanglements and among the latter—one out of every four. An unsettled psychological state was characteristic of three out of five of the new Muscovites, whose ages ranged from 20 to 30.

Whereas those people who came to the city at a juvenile age prior to the 1930's became accustomed to city life, almost one out of every three who were 18 to 21 years of age wished to return to the countryside and of those who lived in the city until they were 22-24 years of age—one out of every two. They did not return, partly because they had acquired a profession which could not be used in the country and also because they feared to a considerable degree the gossip of their fellow-villagers and did not wish to grieve their parents.

However, although this mass flow of new settlers benefited neither the countryside nor Moscow (or other large cities), nor a considerable number of the new arrivals themselves, nor in the final analysis society, which was interested in the welfare of all of its members, nevertheless this did not signify that there were no forces interested in this movement. Such forces do exist. These are the departments and ministries. They link the new enterprises to existing cities in order to avoid spending money on the creation of a production and social infrastructure. And if they do not succeed in doing this, then by fair means or foul they will attempt to expand existing enterprise through the creation of new production operations.

Naturally, large-scale cities possessing an intellectual-technical potential, a completed transport network and municipal services are the ones who long most for such an arrangement. The extent of this appetite is confirmed by the following fact: In 1969 the ministries and departments presented USSR Gosplan with technical-economic justifications for new construction projects and for expanding production operations, which in the final analysis forecast growth in the number of Muscovites to 18 million. At the time, the government moderated these appetites somewhat and yet not in a sufficiently consistent manner and, as a

result, today the figure for the end of the current decade has been exceeded by 1.2 million.

Over the past few years, industrial construction in Moscow has been discontinued completely. And accordingly the limit for accepting various types of workers was closed down. However, this continued for only a short period of time before exceptions appeared for certain departments. And a return to one's own circles was not excluded.

The initial appetite for new recruits appeared in an industry which always experiences a shortage of workers. This was explained and is explained by the fact that Muscovites do not wish to enter this sphere. But here is the paradox: hundreds of thousands of limited workers were accepted over a period of two decades and still the personnel shortage continues. Moreover, the number of employees in industry is declining with each passing year. Actually, the recruits do not wish to work at Moscow enterprises, and after obtaining their visas they change their sphere of labor. And all of this takes place owing to the fact that technologically the Moscow enterprises have fallen behind not only the NTR [scientific and technical revolution] but also behind plants and factories located in other cities. Here there are large quantities of obsolete and low productivity equipment. But modernization has been carried out and is being carried out in a sluggish manner: why have the departments created a tense life for themselves, when the problem can be solved by means of a limit? And if not directly, then in a measured manner: the acceptance of various types of youth into Moscow SPTU's [agricultural professional-technical schools] continues to be and is planned to be stable in nature.

But what does the acceptance of diverse types of workers at industrial enterprises signify? It means that we must accept new builders in order to construct housing for the new settlers, new transport workers and workers for the social infrastructure, in order to serve the industrial and construction limit. And all of this is dependent upon the city's budget, for the enterprises pay a purely symbolic amount for labor resources, an amount which is a mockery to an economic computation, since it does not cover even one percent of the inevitable expenses. And they must pay first of all the territory from whence an individual came, reimbursing it for the expenses incurred for raising the worker. And, secondly, a payment should be made to the city to which a new settler goes, in order to reimburse it for the expenses for the social infrastructure required for the life of the newly arrived city-dweller. In reality, this sum amounts to tens of thousands of rubles. And once this account was presented, the departments and enterprises would display haste in modernizing their production operations and reducing to a minimum their manpower requirements. Otherwise, the planned general conversion over to complete cost accounting as the foundation for the new economic mechanism would be of no assistance.

However, for Moscow this was only one aspect of the problem. The other—the need to eliminate unnecessary

production operations, institutions and establishments as quickly as possible. And there are more than one thousand of them—both large and small.

In principle, measures have been planned for the elimination of unnecessary production operations and services in the capital. But one way or another, they are constantly being disrupted by the departments. Meanwhile, if all of these measures were carried out, not only would the manpower shortage disappear, but in fact we would then have to deal with the problem of ensuring employment for all Muscovites. The sphere of services would then feed upon the residue labor resources and become one of the principal places for the application of labor. And competition will appear in the provision of services for a Muscovite, and service worthy of the capital will appear.

Problems which are peculiar to Moscow are also to be found to a certain extent in other large cities, each of which is a capital in some respect: or a republic, region or kray. And each of them requires a system of measures which will reduce the requirements for new settlers, the flow of which today is not solving the problems of these cities.

The letter from I. Tsynman contains a second plan which holds that when protecting a village which lacks sufficient labor from encroachment by a city upon its children, concern must be displayed for ensuring that the children do not have a need for abandoning their native region. But this is a special subject and one which requires serious and thorough discussion.

Strike Committee Co-Chairman, Mine Director Discuss Vorkuta Strike

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in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with V.K. Kopasov, co-chairman of the Vorkuta City Strike Committee, and Yu.R. Lobes, director of the "Vorkutinskaya" mine, by V.Krakovskiy: "Truth Above Ambition"]

[Text] We are at the "Vorgashorskaya" mine. Excitement pervades office hallways and lunch rooms. It is the end of November, the height of the strike. The area under the Strike Committee sign is also crowded and crammed. I have come here to meet S. Kozlov, deputy chairman of the strike committee and the ideological driving force behind the strike, who just arrived from Moscow.

He sat with his back to the door, sorting through his mail. To my request to give an interview to RABOCHAYA GAZETA he replied curtly, without turning:

"I do not speak to the dishonest Soviet press."

Most of those present supported him cheerfully, even though other voices were also heard. Lev Moiseyevich

Volovik, an activist of the so-called socialist trade unions and a lawyer practicing there, piped up:

"Is that the reactionary paper that will be the organ of the 'United Workers' Front'? No interviews to them."

Nevertheless, we did have a frank conversation, but with different people. Valentin Kazimirovich Kopasov, co-chairman of the Vorkuta City Strike Committee, and Yuriy Rudolfovich Lobes, director of the "Vorkutinskaya" mine, talked about lessons and causes of the Vorkuta labor conflict. Elected to that responsible post by the collective almost two years ago, Lobes convinced his miners that bad peace was better than a good quarrel and that a strike would not serve their interests.

We preserved the text of the discussion in its entirety, with all redundancies and repetitions, on the request of the participants, who set it as a condition that not a single word would be changed.

[Kopasov] There were several reasons for the strike, in my opinion. They included lack of information about the implementation of Resolution No.608, deliberate distortions of our demands and actions in the media, unwillingness on the part of the government to engage in a dialogue with miners and disregard for our petitions. In short, the strike was not out of the blue. We had appealed to party and government leaders and to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In response we got either silence or futile attempts at a dialogue. But they cannot deceive everyone: the people are highly sensitive to the smallest insincerity. This is what the November strike showed: that they must talk seriously to workers and without lies.

[Lobes] My opponent and I do not disagree on this point. We must honestly admit that the trip to Moscow and the October 17 meeting with L.D. Ryabev did not satisfy the miners. I was disappointed with the attitude to the problem that we encountered in the apparatus of the USSR Council of Ministers. Those circumstances acted as an unneeded catalyst for the second strike. It was the conservative thinking on the part of the apparatus that influenced the people. Even N.I. Ryzhkov was surprised at the latest meeting how the strike committee could pass through the thick mesh of the apparatus without lingering anywhere or getting some problems solved. In short, the apparatus had done no work on issues that were of concern to the miners. No one even bothered to calculate how much meeting the miners' demands would cost the nation.

[Question] Since our perestroyka is a revolutionary process, like any revolution it has both supporters and opponents. Who do you think benefits from the miners' second strike? Who gains by it?

[Kopasov] From the economic point of view, the strike did hurt the country's economy. But if the government knew this, why had it waited until November 17? From the political point of view, the strike showed our strength and tenacity in attaining our goals. It also showed the workers' readiness to put forward political demands, i.e.,

to engage in political struggle. So, with all the pluses and minuses, the question does not have a simple answer. At the same time, we do understand that forces on the left and on the right are trying to exploit our movement.

[Lobes] I have an ambivalent feeling about the strike. The workers' movement is now a reality. Our government understood this already. We must also understand that no one wants to do us harm. Both Kuzbass and Donbass have educated leaders. But the negative center of the workers' movement has shifted to Vorkuta. The city strike committee often fails to show a constructive attitude. It refused to engage in a dialogue and could not rise above the mistakes of L.D. Ryabev. A negative role in the situation at the "Vorgashorskaya" mine was also played by the stance and personal ambitions of local strike committee leaders I. Guridov, S. Kozlov, N. Terekhin and S. Masalovich. They preach an ideology of intransigence, leeching on the workers' movement and promoting their own views. Their actions unquestionably harm workers, perestroyka and the state.

[Question] Do you agree with the assessment of the strike given by L. Chulkov, a "Vostsibugol" official, at the meeting between miners and N.I. Ryzhkov, when he called it a strike against the people.

[Kopasov] Absolutely not. The miners' demands were supported by other residents of Vorkuta and the North. They included the abolition of bondage-like practices, demands for northern pay rates for young men and women, the issue of pensions, etc. Was that against the people? Looking at it from the material point of view, the share of Vorkuta coal in the country amounts to only 3-to-4 percent, plus whatever else is burned in the dumps. And speaking of being against the people, we get letters, cables and contributions from all over the country, from people who support our cause. Let us add everything up and analyze everything before talking of being against the people.

[Lobes] What went on at "Vorgashorskaya" for a full month was, of course, antipopular. A two-hour warning strike would have been enough, and it should have been handled competently. But as it happened the miners put hundreds of thousands of workers, their brethren, under the gun. Valentin Kazimirovich speaks of letters and cables. Yes, people wrote and cabled them. They were ready to give their own money to put an end to it. Winter was shifting into high gear, and winter has no feelings. Instead, the miners said: give us the paper right away and give us everything else we want.

At the meeting with N.I. Ryzhkov, people from our mine were in a majority. They met many union representatives from the FRG. They learned that even though in the FRG workers strike democratically, strict order is nonetheless maintained. There, they would not think of putting forward demands at hundreds of local points. Our miners learned that every demand there is thoroughly argued and the government or the firm get time to implement it. But look at what happened here.

The government, I must say, was shaken up. It did not even bother to calculate how much it would all cost.

[Question] In most cases, strikes in capitalist countries merely lead to market shifts. Usually, society as a whole suffers little from them. In this country, on the other hand, due to our rigid planned economy, strikes disrupt the whole economic system. There are plenty of examples of this already. Is it not too high a price to pay for attaining even most noble goals? And could a goal be called noble if others suffer?

[Kopasov] I think that your question already contains the answer. The rigidity of the planned economy and the total insensitivity of the administrative command system caused the strike. If we compared the economic damage from the strike to that done by the existing economic system, the former would be minuscule. This is as far as the cost of the strike is concerned. As to others suffering, let me tell you something: during the strike, we never denied coal if it were for the people, for the population. For instance, the strike committee ruled during the strike to load coal for the city of Cherepovets.

[Lobes] We are yet to feel the full brunt of the strike and to calculate the total amount of damage and losses. I am convinced that the price tag will surpass our worst fears. At all mines, social issues are no longer being addressed and capital construction is in abeyance. We have caused massive harm to ourselves in the first place and to our immediate partners, too. The damage was both economic and moral. Let me repeat that we have not yet computed everything. Once we do, we will be shedding bitter tears.

[Question] Do you not think that the unjustified second strike in the North undermined the respect in the country for the miners' earlier, legitimate demands?

[Kopasov] Speaking of undermining respect. I think it was done with the help of the media, as well as irresponsible statements by L.D. Ryabev, L.A. Voronin and other leaders. Our reasons for striking were spelled out: we wanted five demands to be met, which as it turned out did not require so much money. Even N.I. Ryzhkov admitted this. Had the government met them, we would have stopped the strike.

[Lobes] The miners' demands were legitimate and they were supported. I myself was born in Vorkuta and worked here as an ordinary miner. I have seen enough. My father spent 30 years in Vorkuta mines. I know firsthand how hard it is. Much injustice was done to northern miners. But in the past no one had ever listened to them. Now that they were being heard, they suddenly grew stubborn and new demands began to snowball, as it happened at "Vorgashorskaya." The respect for the miners' movement was unquestionably undermined.

Kopasov is complaining about the press. Indeed, mistakes have been made. But this is not important. On the contrary, the press was tireless in calling for a dialogue. But neither side wanted to listen.

[Question] What role do you think numerous visitors to Vorkuta and Vogashor from assorted fronts, committees and trade unions played in recent events?

[Kopasov] Miners are an independent and democratic people. Attempts to represent our strike as an achievement of informal movements have failed. No front had any impact on the decisions of the conferences of miners' strike committees. And, speaking of visitors, Judge Revako's visit to Vorkuta did more to prolong the strike than all the fronts combined could have ever done.

[Lobes] But where did political demands come from? No, we must be totally honest. I agree that the workers' movement, if stripped of extremism, could help the government to make necessary corrections in its economic policy. But in our case, there were also politicians who hoped to ride the wave and to make a big political play, i.e., to seize power. The "Vogashorskaya" mine was literally taken over by envoys from the "Nagornyy Karabakh" society, the Russian People's Front and the Democratic Union. Many wondered what they wanted. We tried to explain this to the people. They did not come to our mine and to other enterprises which were not on strike; they went instead where there was trouble. N.I. Ryzhkov was right when he told the miners: take care not to become a blind tool in their hands. They will achieve their goals and forget about you and your problems on the very next day.

Already so many issues in living and labor conditions on mines have been resolved as we had been unable to achieve in many a decade. But we must not jockey for position or engage in politicking. If a mistake surfaces, we must admit it honestly and start a direct dialogue with the people.

[Question] The old proverb says: the law is strict but it is the law. Could you say that the court decision declaring the strike illegal and finding the strikers liable for the damage contradicts the legal norms established in this country?

[Kopasov] We are not scared of the strictness of the law but we are deeply outraged by the fact that it is antidemocratic and flawed. I am surprised when I hear statements that the law is strict but it is the law. How can we build a law-based society on such a law, what will this process lead to? The miners are the ones who will make up for the damage from the strike, anyway. And what about members of the Supreme Soviet who voted for that law, comrades Voronin and Ryabev whose statements led to the strike and Judge Revako who applied that law and did not have the courage to admit that it was incompatible with the implementation of Resolution No.608? Will they have to pay? They all knew that the second strike was not new but a continuation of what happened in July.

[Lobes] So, the strike was an old one, but demands were new, and political, too? My opponent ought to check his logic. A law-based state must have a law on strikes. Yet, it was drafted in a hurry, in an attempt to catch up with events. The miners met it with hostility and interpreted

it as a deliberate attempt to shut them up. This goes to show that everything is important in politics, even the timing of various decisions.

In general, I want to say that even bad laws are better than lawlessness from which our people have already suffered enough. But there was confusion as far as management's law suits against strike committees is concerned. A telegram came to Vorkuta signed by comrades Ryabev and Shalayev, stating that the suits will pass to the discretion of labor collectives. I do not want to say that in the existing situation some other course of action was possible. I myself refused to file such a suit. But you must agree that this does not foster respect for the law and for today's law-making process in general.

[Question] I hope that the two opponents will give answers to my last question that will be similar in spirit and meaning. You agree, do you not, that it would be possible to overcome quickly the consequences of the labor conflict that turned into a political one? How could it be done once and for all?

[Kopasov] Of course I agree. It could be done most rapidly and decisively only after the law on property passes and after all economic relations are restructured. Once workers in this country become true, not false masters at their enterprises and start working for themselves and not for the plan and the command administrative system, there would be no need for them to strike. This idea was what turned an economic dispute into a political one.

[Lobes] I am convinced that the causes of the conflict are economic. We say that workers must become true masters of their enterprises. But what really happens in the

coal industry? We have reached the point when this basic industry, like some miserable supplicant, lives off government subsidies while the miners walk around hat in hand. Someone may think this situation normal, but not I. We must make the miners independent without further delay. We must allow collectives to decide what to do with the coal they produce above state orders. But coal prices should also be in line with socially necessary labor expenditures. The miner must know that his welfare depends on his own diligent labor. This would guarantee discipline and all other components of labor relations. In such relations, there would be no place for strikes. In short, economic perestroika in the coal industry cannot be postponed any longer.

Much of what preoccupied the participants of this discussion has been answered by life itself. The "Vorgashorskaya" mine became independent at the start of the year. A concern has replaced the old "Intaugol" association in Inta. But the main impediment has not been removed. I mean the inability and even unwillingness on the part of the former leaders of the strike committee at the "Vorgashorskaya" mine and some individuals in the city strike committee to engage in a constructive dialogue not only with management and local authorities, but with each other. Such ability was not always in evidence among municipal authorities, either. For instance, dogged altercations continue over turning the city strike committee into a workers' committee and the issue of its official registration has not been settled. One wishes that both sides in the dispute understood once again that they have no alternative way to solve conflicts except through a dialogue, just as we have no other platform besides perestroika.

CIVIL AVIATION

Aeroflot Performance, Problems Critiqued

904H0132A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Loktev: "On the Runway..."]

[Text] A year ago we had occasion to meet with A. N. Volkov, the minister of civil aviation. At that time, after our lengthy conversation, the article "Let's Come Down From the Skies," in which Aeroflot's chief told readers bitterly, but frankly and in detail, about the chronic "weak spots" in the sector and pondered ways to get out of the critical situation, appeared in PRAVDA.

The emphasis in that article was deliberately put on the most critical problems: flight safety, cost accounting and enterprises' independence, the condition of the fleet of aircraft, airport technical facilities and services, and so forth. Whatever you take from this list, there are more gaps than anything else. But how and with what do we patch them up? Where do we find the funds for the numerous needs of such a large and complicated system?

There was something for the minister to rack his brains over, to try his physical strength and the endurance of his nervous system... It cannot be denied that it is not easy nowadays for managers who bear their official cross honestly and without respite.

I will not venture to make an unequivocal judgment about how much lighter the burden of these problems has become over the year, but in any case, the "ceiling" of Aeroflot's international activity has become a little higher.

At a recent press conference, the results of work by the Ministry of Civil Aviation's International Commercial Administration looked quite good with respect to many indicators. Last year 4.68 million passengers took advantage of Aeroflot's services on international routes (10 percent more than in 1988).

With the shift to operation in accordance with the principle of foreign exchange cost recovery, receipts increased by 25 percent over the year before last—the highest increase in the history of international service. Today our aircraft are flying to 98 countries and the aircraft of 35 foreign airlines are flying to Soviet cities.

These facts and figures are only a small part of the data which may be cited to Aeroflot's credit, of course. The results of work by the MKU [International Commercial Administration] could become even more impressive, if... Yes, unfortunately, once again we have to speak about the commonplace "if" that sets our teeth on edge...

One day at a meeting with journalists, one of our Aeroflot managers asked if they knew what an "iron wall" was. Not a stone wall or the Wall of China, but an iron wall. There was no response, and then he explained what it was. "Once we were meeting the representative of

a Western airline. During his inspection of Sheremetyevo Airport, he remarked with some irony, pointing to aircraft standing at the side of the airfield: 'Yes, now I believe that Aeroflot is a powerful and strong organization. Only a very rich airline can allow itself the luxury of an iron wall such as this...'"

It is like an anecdote, isn't it? But after all, a foreigner hit a 10, as they say: he hit the nail on the head. It is no secret today: the proportion of our aircraft in good working order has reached 50 percent, we are ashamed to say. There are aircraft, but they are not flying. There are not enough engines, flight control equipment, fuel, and other "small details." And they lag behind the Boeings and Douglasses in their technical and economic indicators. But the Ministry of Civil Aviation cannot cope with these problems alone. This is very clear. We need new aircraft that are reliable, economical, and comfortable. Very likely, we cannot do without the collaboration of leading foreign firms which have the appropriate specialization to develop advanced aviation equipment in good time. But this is the concern of another department, as they say—the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. No offense meant to those at that ministry, but we cannot believe the promise that the new Il-96 airliner will be brought out on the routes this year. And afterward, how many of these aircraft will replenish the fleet? Two, five, 10? It has been firmly fixed in our memory: if a new aircraft takes off by the next holiday, this does not mean at all that it will be ready for safe operation on the airways in the near future...

We cannot speak about any substantial progress in passenger service yet, either. Even if we just take the problem of baggage distribution. Passengers are receiving their baggage within an hour from only 80 percent of the international flights (I am not mentioning how long this procedure takes on domestic routes). And the baggage carts? There are enough of them today, but they are in the custody of a cooperative which charges a ruble for one (this service is free in developed countries). But what does a foreigner pay with when he has dollars or marks in his pocket? This is a rhetorical question, however; I do not claim this, but the cooperative members and taxi drivers say that they have no aversion to any foreign currency.

In short, there are problems, and they are serious enough that they cannot be overlooked. Last year the International Commercial Administration concluded a number of profitable contracts with foreign firms, Aeroflot became a member of the IATA [International Air Transport Association], and the network and geographic scope of international routes were expanded from Tashkent, Minsk, Kiev, Sochi, Leningrad, and Vilnius...

Recently we had occasion to fly abroad for the first time from an oblast center, not from the capital, and we were personally convinced, as they say, of the practical results, not the ones that were proclaimed, of the decentralization process in Aeroflot, without which the independence of territorial aviation enterprises is impossible. A

group of journalists from Moscow and the Ukraine arrived in Lvov for an event of importance to local airmen—the opening of a new international route to Belgrade. A day was left before the first flight this year to the Yugoslav capital, which made it possible to become more closely acquainted with the commander of the Lvov Unified Aviation Detachment, Vitaliy Andreyevich Gusev.

He is well-known in the city, with prestige for his views on life and complex sociopolitical problems. And of course, he is highly professional in his work. It is not without reason that he is the chairman of the STK [labor collective council] of the Ukrainian Administration of Civil Aviation. He has over 30 years of flying behind him, 16 of them in the Far East.

"We have enough problems," Gusev says, "but there have also been reassuring changes. Last year we flew on the Lvov-Warsaw and Lvov-Prague routes, and we carried nearly 1.5 million passengers, including over 40,000 foreign passengers. The enterprise is profitable, and we have introduced cost accounting. We received almost 5 million rubles in profit in 1989."

"But what do flights abroad give the enterprise, aside from trouble?"

"Chiefly convenience for the people of Lvov and, well (he smiles), hard currency. Up to 60 percent of the foreign exchange profit stays with us, and this is a great help; the most important thing is the brains to make use of the money."

It must be said that Gusev and his "team" are using the money earned competently. In February 1988 the aviation enterprise acquired a run-down little brick plant, and they are building housing for the airmen with the organization's own resources; in 2 years, over 100 families have received apartments, and next in turn a building with 120 apartments will be rented...

Several cooperatives with different specialties have been established under the Lvov Unified Aviation Detachment, and the main point is that they are operating in accordance with state rates.

All in all, the commander is pursuing a wise tactic—concern for the people is repaid generously in production matters. And the collective pays him with its confidence: he was reelected manager on an alternative basis in 1988.

The Yak-42 landed at Belgrade Airport on 9 January. A. A. Maslov, the general manager of Aeroflot in the SFRY, greeted the journalists and passengers on the first flight from Lvov.

"Our work has now been increased," Aleksandr Aleksandrovich began his improvised press conference, "but we are sincerely pleased. We have established good business contacts with the Yugoslav side. Lvov has become the third city, after Moscow and Kiev, to be linked by air with the Yugoslav capital. Last year Aeroflot carried nearly 200,000 passengers on the Soviet-Yugoslav air routes..."

And Aeroflot's representative in Zagreb, B. M. Yedidovich, was pleasantly surprised, we may say:

"I follow the articles in PRAVDA, just as the entire Soviet colony in Yugoslavia does. It appears that lately the newspaper has been finding its reader. I fully share the idea of establishing "Friends of PRAVDA" clubs everywhere in the country. It would be good if such clubs were also to make their appearance where Soviet specialists are working abroad. I am personally thinking about this and hope that there will be such a club in Zagreb."

This was an unexpected conversation. It cannot be denied that it is pleasant to hear a kind word about our newspaper abroad, just as every Aeroflot employee undoubtedly would like to hear a foreigner say: "Fly Aeroflot."

Parlous State of Aviation Complex Noted

904H0104A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Razboynikov: "A Landing Without a Takeoff: Why an Enterprise Which Turns Out Aircraft Is on the Verge of Bankruptcy"]

[Text] Ulyanovsk—The An-124 aircraft—the "Ruslan," turned out by the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex, broke the absolute record for range on a closed route and lifting an incredibly heavy cargo and set a direct course for world fame, it seemed. Periodicals came out with optimistic predictions for the future. Later on the reports diminished. And here is the latest news: at the end of last year, the collective that had built the airborne Hercules turned out to be on the verge of bankruptcy. This giant, which recently was being proclaimed an enterprise of the future, was in debt for several million rubles to the power engineering workers alone. They had nothing with which to pay the wages. The plan had failed in all indicators. As noted at the bureau of the Ulyanovsk Gorkom of the CPSU, the plan for turning out the "Ruslan" was fulfilled by only 20 percent, according to the results for 11 months.

The new year has begun. And the aircraft builders have reported back: last year's target was fulfilled in all indicators. By aircraft as well. Only it is unclear how they managed to produce four-fifths of the annual program volume in just 1 month. Did they stamp out some tail sections or make three times as many wings? No, our "firm" formula simply came into play—they corrected the plan. But there have been no more aircraft from the fine reporting figures.

How did such a thing happen at an enterprise that is filled with the very latest equipment? Very simply: even highly productive equipment can operate poorly, and labor productivity can decline even on good machine tools in the process. After filling the enterprise with modern equipment, they were unable to put the work organization and management of the production process at the proper level here.

I recall that they showed me an innovation: flexible automated production lines. The engineer accompanying me enthusiastically described its advantages. The trip along the line was spoiled by a trouble-shooter:

"While three persons worked here before, now there are four," he commented.

When I wanted to determine why the machine tool utilization factor was low in the complex, they told me somewhat uncertainly: we have our own specifications, and it is hard for a person who is not technically trained to understand them, they said. Specifications are specifications, but how do we explain the fact that the above-norm stocks here are calculated in the tens of millions of rubles? Imagine: the machine tools are spinning and people are scurrying about, but the output is not going for assembly, but to the warehouses. In connection with the forthcoming reduction of orders for the "Ruslan," all these parts may turn out to be unneeded by anyone at all. Who will be responsible then for the ruble after ruble already thrown to the wind and for those which may still have to be wasted? After all, individual units of a second section of the aviation complex are being put into operation at the same time, and the complex already has above-norm equipment valued at 4 million rubles that has not been installed.

S. Kormanovskiy, the chairman of the labor collective council, said as much:

"You make a part considered in the 'emergency' category, but it lies about for 2 weeks afterward and no one needs it. Moreover, we usually find out by 1000, and sometimes only by lunchtime, what we should be doing that day..."

Isn't that the reason why 2,048 persons left one production subunit alone last year? And 1,479 were accepted. What is going on with the workers—nearly one-third of the foremen have been replaced here. And this is at an enterprise where they manufacture aircraft, where high skill and professionalism are required from each person.

Nevertheless, the first series Tu-204 will take off at Ulyanovsk as planned. Alas, this will not be soon. They are well behind in mastering production of the aircraft. And perhaps we will once again hear only about its records. But will the aircraft builders once again be turning out above-plan tail units for the warehouse with labor enthusiasm?

Pros, Cons of Leasing Airbus Examined

904H0104B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by V. Belikov on press conference held by the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry with the participation of V. Ivanov, deputy minister of the aviation industry; A. Aksenov, deputy minister of civil aviation; I. Katyrev, chief designer of the Il-96; and T. Anodina, doctor of technical sciences from the Ministry of Civil

Aviation: "Promises Instead of an Aircraft: Aeroflot Is Faced With the Question of Waiting for the Il-96 or Leasing the A-310"]

[Text] Most of the 3-hour press conference was devoted to a discussion of the advisability of Aeroflot leasing five A-310 widebodied aircraft manufactured in West Europe. Conditions for the lease were reported by IZVESTIYA at the end of last year (No 362).

[Ivanov] In the final analysis, Aeroflot will decide whether or not to lease. But we cannot support this undertaking by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, because five A-310's will not solve the problem of the demand for air service on a large scale. Moreover, the Western Airbus, in our view, will be inferior in its level and capabilities to the Il-96 airliner when it makes its appearance on the airways. It would be better if Aeroflot reexamined the possibility of using its foreign exchange earnings to invest in the development of domestic aircraft manufacturing.

[Aksenov] In order to help the Ministry of the Aviation Industry with foreign exchange, it must be earned first! Aeroflot simply has no such funds at present, but a lease makes it possible for the airbuses to pay for themselves. As far as the advantages of the Il-96 are concerned, they will appear no earlier than 1993, when we finally succeed in bringing the airliner up to the required level.

We are not turning down any of these aircraft, but we ask the aircraft industry to increase their deliveries to Aeroflot in the next five-year plan—to give us five more aircraft. We will find work for all of them in the country and on foreign air routes, on which we have begun losing 5 percent or more of the passengers paying foreign currency each year. They are no longer flying in our obsolete aircraft, and this is turned into millions of dollars in losses. We must return competitiveness on international routes to Aeroflot.

The situation on domestic air routes, as all readers are aware, is not too good, either. The reasons for this situation, which was called "catastrophic" by one of the participants in a conversation with journalists, were cited in the meeting. Aeroflot remains in a difficult position because of failure by the Ministry of the Aviation Industry's plants to deliver engines to replace the ones that have exhausted their service lives.

[Ivanov] Not one new aircraft engine plant has made its appearance in the entire postwar period. Capacities have been increased only by renovating the existing facilities and replacing their equipment in the old buildings. We must admit that we have been in debt to civil aviation for a long period of time, and for this reason I consider increasing the output of engines to be the number one task for our ministry. In order to carry it out we will be developing this sector of aircraft manufacturing in every possible way, particularly by making use of the capacities which are being made available in connection with the conversion and reduction of military equipment output.

But how do matters stand with the updating of airliners and in particular, with the delivery of the long-range Il-96-300 to Aeroflot?

[Katyrev] Of the three aircraft needed for flight testing, we have managed to complete 225 of the required 700 flights in only the first aircraft. The second Il-96, which arrived recently from the series plant in Voronezh, was grounded after four flights for modifications and corrections. We will receive the third aircraft for testing only in mid-year. In the meantime, unfortunately, we are unable to confirm the high fuel efficiency claimed by the engine manufacturers in actual flight, because the new PS-90A's will require time for development.

Finally, the fundamentally new digital automatic flight control system is malfunctioning a great deal. As a way out, we will propose that the first Il-96 series operate with this complex, but with limited functions—to the extent of what the Il-86 already "knows how to do" today, though without such advanced equipment.

[Anodina] We must not forget that flight safety depends on the level of reliability of the electronic equipment on the Il-96! Today the central component in its entire automatic flight control system provides for only 3 (!) hours of trouble-free operation instead of the required 5,000 hours. According to the most optimistic estimates, the equipment's required level of readiness may be reached only in 92 or 93 years.

[Ivanov] Over the next 6 months, the developers intend to refine the avionics to the point that we hope by 91 or 92 years we can still begin passenger flights in the Il-96-300.

The question of leasing airbuses for Aeroflot has been drawn out for an excessive period of time. The new promises by the Ministry of the Aviation Industry to deliver the long-range Il-96 on time are not confirmed by the many years that this aircraft has been under development and flight tested. Moreover, there are grounds to assume that the "raw" aircraft will be refined further for a long time in the process of Aeroflot's operation, as in the past.

But we need to carry hundreds of thousands of passengers today, and five leased A-310's will be a great help to the Ministry of Aviation in getting rid of the lengthening lines at the ticket counters.

Airfield Repairs Completed

904H0132B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 1

[Report by A. Pavlov: "Lay the Blame on Someone Else"]

[Text] "Dushanbe. Tajik Administration of Civil Aviation. To Yu. Korenevskiy. Leninabad, the aviation enterprise. S. Sidorenko. Please restore flights to Pendzhikent

from Dushanbe and open the Pendzhikent-Leninabad route. The runway repair has been completed. The people are very indignant. Dzhabbarov, gorispolkom chairman."

Upon receiving this telegram, Yu. Korenevskiy, the chief of the administration, immediately saw that a competent commission was sent from the Leninabad Aviation Enterprise, to which the Pendzhikent Airport is registered for local air routes. On the day that it departed, S. Asanov, chief of the Dushanbe Airport Airfield Service, and I flew to Samarkand. We met the people from Leninabad there and continued the trip together.

There is no denying that it is not easy to get to Pendzhikent from the republic capital, and it is even more complicated from Leninabad—all of 6 hours by vehicle. The fastest and most convenient form of transportation is by air, of course. However, since April aircraft have not been flying to Pendzhikent because the runway commissioned 5 years ago had fallen into disrepair and the inspectorate of the Tajik Administration had closed this airport in the interests of safety.

It goes without saying that the local authorities found themselves in a difficult position: they not only had to find a general contractor (this was the DSU-11 [road-building administration] of the "Leninabaddorstroy" Trust), but a considerable amount of money as well—350,000 rubles, and of course, construction materials. The bitumen, for example, had to be brought in from Fergana.

While this combination of problems was being resolved, the most favorable time had come to apply one more layer of paving asphalt to the runway, taxiway, apron, and parking areas. They began the work only in August. But inasmuch as there were frequent interruptions in the delivery of the bitumen, the construction workers often remained idle.

In order to find some way out of the situation, the construction workers organized the work in two shifts. They transferred specialists and equipment from the Tajik Gold Mining Combine, where construction of a vital road had had to be stopped for over 3 months. Outwardly everything appeared to be normal, but it actually turned out to be crash work with all the consequences for quality. The commission was convinced of this with their very first steps. In a number of places the runway pavement was so soft that impressions were left from their heels. To begin with, using such a runway will risk passengers' lives and disable aircraft. A tremendous amount of work still had to be done on the apron and the aircraft parking areas.

Nevertheless, Sh. Sabirov, deputy chairman of the gorispolkom, and A. Khatamov, the chief engineer of DSU-11, and others, who agreed that there obviously had been defective work, urgently appealed to the commission to sign the document attesting to the runway's readiness for flights. It is especially disturbing that S. Sidorenko, the commander of the Leninabad Aviation Enterprise who had come here earlier, had pointed out the defective

work to the construction workers, and they then assured him that they would do everything necessary: they would cut out the soft areas on the runway and make "patches" of good quality. And now the same ones who should be held responsible for the defective work have been complaining that Sidorenko did not leave written instructions...

The commission's formal document, signed by the deputies to the commander of the Leninabad Aviation Enterprise and others, states: "The condition of the synthetic runway surface is unsatisfactory. The asphalt that was laid is crumbling in different areas... The runoff basin has not been completed. The blast screens have not been fully completed..."

After these shortcomings had been corrected, the commission considered it possible to open the airport temporarily. Aircraft could land and passengers could deplane on the runway, since the parking areas had not been turned over.

The telegram from the gorispolkom chairman at the beginning of this report states that the people are indignant. It is not hard to guess that the local authorities directed the people's justifiable displeasure against the airmen. In this connection, I would like to remind the local authorities and inform the republic's residents that the construction and repair of air terminals, runways, and all the other facilities, as well as the organization of food service at airports and telephone and bus service, are entirely within the competence of the soviets.

New Lithuanian Airline in Operation

904H0132C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy: "Lithuanian Airlines' Is Ready for Takeoff"]

[Text] Vilnius—By order of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Lithuanian Administration of Civil Aviation has been reorganized into the "Lietuvos (Avialiniyos)" airline.

"Lietuvos (Avialiniyos)" remains within the structure of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, and consequently, within Aeroflot. At the same time, the new airline is beginning to operate in accordance with new laws...

Nazyryan Khusnutdinov acquainted me with the details of the change. In the former Lithuanian Administration, his position was called the first deputy chief of the administration.

"And who will you be in the Lithuanian Airlines?" I asked him. By the way, under the charter the airline has two names with equal rights—a Russian one and a Lithuanian one. "And in general, what should we pas-

sengers expect from the name change? And what can employees of the former administration expect from the reorganization?"

N. Khusnutdinov, who is in charge of matters related to economic activity, could not say anything about his new position, inasmuch as the staffing is still under development. But as one of the airline's founders, he believes that a person for a position, not a position for a person, will be the main objective now. The chairman of Lithuanian Airlines, who is the former chief of the administration, Georgiy Lyakhov, intends to recruit a team that is businesslike, mobile, and capable of raising the company to a new level of quality in its work.

"Why did we choose a path to independence under the heavy hand of the ministry?" asks N. Khusnutdinov. "Under the conditions of the system of material and technical supply which had taken shape and which is working, at the very least, we were not living in luxury, but we were able to increase the number of passengers by 100,000 over the past 2 years, all the same. Was it realistic to expect that we would succeed in ending these ties with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and concluding contracts? I think that under the most ideal situation, and if it were well disposed toward us in every respect, but with the shortage of resources that actually exists, the system of supply would collapse. Several years would be required to repair these ties. We would not only have lost prestige, but the confidence of passengers for many years in the future..."

These arguments seem convincing to me. Especially as it is not yet known how interested those 50 airports in 11 union republics would be in Lithuanian Airlines.

The new airline acquired all the administration's property for use, until it is completely obsolete and worn out, from the ministry at a cost of 165 million rubles. The yearly payment for it will be in the form of amortized deductions.

The airline henceforth will make use of all income earned at its own discretion. There is no rigid staffing schedule. There is no regulation of salaries. Although—and this is important—the minimum wage level set by the All-Union norms will be retained. But there is no "ceiling" here. They intend to provide economic incentive for the ground services first of all. The earnings of cockpit personnel will also be increased in the future.

The first step has also been taken to improve passenger service. The airline has asked the designers of the Yak-42 aircraft, with which their immediate future is linked, to provide modernized aircraft for Lithuanian Airlines which are adapted to operate on long-distance routes. It is common knowledge that today they do not have very comfortable seats and in-flight meals cannot be organized. The airline will assume the expenses, incidentally...

The conclusion of contracts with foreign airlines and the establishment of joint ventures, primarily in the service field, are in prospect.

RAIL SYSTEMS

Kharkov Transport Conference on Railway Computerization

904H0118A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by N. Zrol, YUZHNYAYA MAGISTRAL correspondent: "The Vicissitudes of Life: How Big and Small Problems of the Automated Control System Are Being Resolved on the Network"]

[Text] "It would seem, with the automated work position at stations today, you would no longer see anyone, even on our Southern Railroad. Then why are almost all the processes of processing trains and transferring their cars by junctions duplicated manually?" asks A. Vasilyeva, an automated control system [ASU] specialist on the Kupyansk Division.

"You cannot introduce computerization of traffic management by setting up a new accounting system on clearly outdated technology," is the opinion of L. Purtova.

She was proved correct by the conclusions drawn by the participants in the All-Union Seminar of Transportation Specialists in Information Science, Computer Technology, and Automated Control Systems held in Kharkov.

Computerization of the country's railroads is gaining momentum. Just the nine new systems received by computer centers of the main lines last year increased by one-third the operational potential of the network. And as S. Potapchenko, deputy chief of the ministry's Computer Technology Main Administration, promises, it will increase by another one-third this year. The delivery volumes on the whole will be maintained, but by the end of the 5-year plan the number of computers will be comparable to the number of teletypes. Today, the total number of messages coming into the railroads' automated control systems has already reached more than 310,000 per day.

Nevertheless, the deputy chief of the Technical Department of the Transport Main Administration [MA], representing the operations workers at the seminar, was forced to admit that it was too early to celebrate. The effect from using automated systems in operation on 32 railroads is far from identical. The operation of this latest equipment of the Transport MA on 15 of them is considered inefficient. This in turn adversely affects the working capacity of another 12 computer centers. The ASU is in the passive condition more than 1 hour a day on nine railroads. During this same time, 16 systems experience up to three overload "attacks."

Despite the fact that we have managed to solve a number of very complicated problems, there are gaps in the automation of the simplest processes. A network of junction computer stations has not been created to this day. We still do not even have prototypes of a system for automatic counting of passing rolling stock. Transportation has not been equipped with user stations and

sufficiently powerful multiplexers for transmitting information. Primary data acquisition on the railroads also has not yet been automated. The abundance of parallel information flows interferes with the clarity of traffic information support.

What must be done first of all? The experts of all railroads who met in Kharkov were unanimous in the opinion that the appropriate main administrations of the Ministry of Railways should ensure coordination between their subordinate designers and manufacturers of the equipment and the operations workers.

The low level of developments, interruptions in deliveries of peripherals, and the impermissibly low quality of cable products—these are the main things making it difficult to resolve the tasks of the information and computers services of the railroads. Without the necessary technical support it is impossible to receive complete and reliable information on the progress of shipments on the dynamics of controlling them.

Whereas for the Southern Railroad, for example, the average percentage of information timeliness today is 91 percent (this is the highest indicator on the network), on the Alma-Ata Railroad it drops to 43 percent, and on the Central Asian Railroad it only reaches 14.2 percent. Nevertheless, as the representative of the Computer Technology Administration of the Ministry of Railways indicates, whereas the delivery plan for large and small computers this year is close to the needs of transportation, for personal computers it would be held at last year's level. But personal computers are the equipment basis for the so-called KSARM—fully automated work position.

It is namely these, the KSARMs, that received the highest ratings by specialists of the network who saw them in operation at the junction station of the Lvov and Southern railroads. Without a doubt, it is necessary to create such work positions at major junctions of the entire network, connecting junction line enterprises to the information network. In addition to many other things, this would make it possible to reduce the number of intermediate accounting links at shunting stations.

Such experience is available not only on the Southern Railroad. The Information Computer Center of the Northern Railroad is proposing interesting developments. The workers on the Gorkiy Railroad are creating a totally new automated control system that is not typical for today's conditions.

Still, automated control systems on various railroads have to a certain extent become a usual phenomenon. Specialists consider the main task of the immediate future to be creating systems which today go by the abbreviation ADPU—automated control dispatching points. They will help resolve problems of a higher order. This includes retrieving information from signalization, centralization, and block devices, data on rolling stock en route, and how the information tie-in of dispatching sections on the railroads appears.

Are the specialists of the country's main lines close to realization of this project? Is it the same as always? Regardless of what kind of freight a consist hauls, documents are drawn up for each railcar, be there 20 or 2,000 km of track. How much paperwork is required? Okay, it could be furniture or the infamous laundry detergent. But what if it is a train with ore or coal?

On the Tselina Railroad, they have boldly switched to a paperless technology, having developed a system of transmitting information to the consignee for entire consists. There is an obvious reduction in operations. And it is worth taking a close look at the experience of the computer operators on the Southern Railroad, who work without parallel "manual" counting of railcars when transferring them by junctions.

True, the introduction of automation of junction accounting unexpectedly ran into an obstacle, and it was necessary to combine ASU technology with the actual boundaries of dispatching circles on neighboring railroads. The junction of the Southern and Donetsk railroads runs through the stations of Bukino and Tropa, but the transfer accounting is done at Krasnyy Liman. Or, say, the transfer accounting is at Kremenchug, although the actual junction with the Dnieper Railroad is quite far away—at Burty. There is the same inconsistency in the boundaries of the Southern and Dnieper railroads at the Lozovaya Junction. There are quite a few complexities from such a situation on the junctions. That is precisely why the specialists of the Information Computer Center believe that it is impossible to set up a new, we emphasize, automated accounting system on old traffic technology. The task must be resolved comprehensively.

Whereas everything is understandable with equipment, things are much more complicated with people. You see, the general computer illiteracy of transportation commanders of various levels was not just suddenly discovered.

"It is no simple matter to introduce automated control systems at junctions if the operators of the station technical offices are more competent than the chief, the dispatcher, or the chief engineer, not to mention the commanders of railway divisions," L. Purtova, deputy chief of the Information Computer Center, believes.

Is there an effective mean of quickly eliminating computer illiteracy? There is. At the meeting in Kharkov, specialists of the Far Eastern Railroad showed an innovation—a railcar-simulator. This is the mobile training center every railroad needs. It contains all the peripherals of the railroad ASU. It can come to any junction or station and train all the leading specialists to operate computers in a short period of time. The cost of this railcar is 90,000 rubles. The opinion of the computer network is clear: "Just give us a passenger car that has been written off and is in good condition, and we will do the rest ourselves."

As the amassed experience shows, automation of transport control is the way to progress. After eliminating

"manual" adding of executed traffic to the schedule, the train dispatcher is freed of 60 percent of the telephone conversations with station attendants. This is one-fifth of the work time. Thus, he is given additional time to organize train traffic and ensure accident-free operation.

Already 72 percent of the circles monitored by railroad dispatchers are now equipped with computer equipment. On the Far Eastern Railroad, the schedule is filled in only according to data from the automated operational transport control system.

In the last 3 and ½ years, the volume of information exchange between computers between railroads has expanded 19-fold. The pace is reassuring. If we listen to the needs and proposals of the specialists who gathered for the conference in Kharkov, the impact promises to be considerable.

Rail Economic Programs Critiqued

904H0118B Moscow GUDOK in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with I. Myshkovskiy, candidate of economic sciences and honored economist of the RSFSR, by M. Kosolapova: "How It Turned Out and What Was Earned"]

[Text] The introduction of full cost accounting in rail transport, to put it mildly, has not yet come about. The editorial staff asked I. Myshkovskiy, candidate of economic sciences and honored economist of the RSFSR, to state his opinion on this account.

[Kosolapova] Ilya Davidovich, in your opinion, what is the main reason for the slip of cost accounting?

[Myshkovskiy] By its nature, the cost accounting being introduced is excessively scientific and, I would say, academic. In plain words, it is isolated from the direct performer, from the person. Infatuated with the strategy of economics, we allot a place in it only for the general, but without an army.

On what do the mass media expound using all the economic formulas? The formation of a market, the creation of concerns and associations, destabilization of money turnover, leasing, ownership, and so forth. These are global problems and must be overcome. But success in this matter today is being decided at the specific work place; in essence, that is where the direct influence of the human factor on perestroika is taking place. We have not gone down to this level.

[Kosolapova] What must be done?

[Myshkovskiy] We must convey the economic tasks to the worker. But this is just a formal, although a necessary, aspect of the matter. The main thing is to instill in people the need to become economists on the job.

[Kosolapova] What does this mean?

[Myshkovskiy] Every person must learn to evaluate the results of his labor. And to do this it is necessary to know the expenses associated with his job: for example, what each hour of unproductive idle time of machinery, equipment, or the worker himself will cost the enterprise; what his personal thrift and his ability to use equipment and avoid losses will give the enterprise. Then we will see real interest.

[Kosolapova] Theoretically, it all looks simple, but what about in real life?

[Myshkovskiy] Life does not stand still. On the Moscow Railroad, engineers, technicians, and economists have already begun compiling so-called work position economic records. At the Orel Railcar Depot, for example, the costs associated with the operating a lathe-duplicating machine are estimated at 3,846 rubles per year. The lathe operator knows that the depot loses 1 ruble 80 kopecks for each hour the machine stands idle. In turn, a 1-percent savings in material when machining parts on this machine tool will make it possible to reduce expenditures by 5.1 rubles.

Here is another example. Locomotive brigades at the Moscow Shunting Depot constantly remember that increasing the weight of the train by 100 tons yields a savings of 60,000 rubles in operating funds. Reducing the time spent on the trip by 0.1 hour makes it possible to save 10,000 rubles a year. If you take the Moscow Railroad as a whole, reducing expenditures by only 1 percent at each work position will save more than 12 million rubles a year. This is a considerable figure.

[Kosolapova] Whose responsibility is it to educate the worker? Who is to help him develop a conscious approach to production affairs?

[Myshkovskiy] Good wishes will not help. It must be resolved on a network scale. How? I propose over the course of this year through the efforts of engineering and technical personnel and economists of enterprises to compile an "economic record" for each work position. Of course, not just compile it, but also to learn to use it conscientiously. I would call all of it together a production culture.

[Kosolapova] First of all, will they want to do this and, secondly, where are the guarantees that the worker will be interested?

[Myshkovskiy] If the appropriate order is given, it must be carried out; anarchy in transportation is impermissible. What about interest? Specific work results must be linked to a system of bonus payments. Not to the traditional system, but to a well thought-out one, far removed from formalism...

The experience of the Bekasovo Shunting Yard is interesting in this respect. Here the bonus fund in a brigade that has taken a contract is distributed taking into account the labor-cost coefficient for each profession.

For example, the coefficient for a gravity yard operator is 1.4, for a yardmaster is 1.2, and so forth.

[Kosolapova] Fine. We will educate the worker. But very often you encounter economic illiteracy of managers. How do you conduct restructuring with them?

[Myshkovskiy] We must honestly admit that the existing system of economic education today has not proved to be very effective. The knowledge gained in the process of instruction, as a rule, is general in nature and concerns fundamental issues of economic policy. It is not by chance that many leaders who have a fair understanding of general regulations cannot answer elementary economic questions. But since economic knowledge is not legally mandatory for managers, it is not at all tied to the right of a worker to hold a corresponding position.

[Kosolapova] What is the solution?

[Myshkovskiy] The only solution is to develop for rail transportation "Rules of Economic Activities." The basic plan, finance, and labor regulations governing the economic work of an enterprise would be concentrated in them in abbreviated form.

[Kosolapova] Another reference book will be added to office bookshelves?

[Myshkovskiy] Nothing of the sort. This should be the same kind of crucial document as the Technical Operation Rules, knowledge of which is mandatory. A manager will not be permitted to execute his duties without having passed an examination on Rules of Economic Activities. Now no one is interested in how competent he is in economics. And this is in conditions of economic reform!

[Kosolapova] Thus, it is a matter of making economic knowledge legally mandatory?

[Myshkovskiy] Absolutely. It is simply necessary to establish a procedure: before entering a position, a person must pass an examination on Rules of Economic Activities. There would be specific sections and paragraphs for each category of workers. A person would not be permitted to take a position without knowing them and would be held legally responsible for observing the Rules of Economic Activities. You see, without this, requirements to increase the economic competence of managers will remain a slogan.

[Kosolapova] And now this question. In 4 years of the 5-year plan, the average wage of railroad workers has increased more than 30 percent. Why haven't the railroads started to operate better?

[Myshkovskiy] The problem is that the percentage of the passive portion of wages is increasing, that is, the rates that are paid automatically under all conditions and regardless of the results of work. The percentage of the active portion of wages, that is, bonuses and piece-rate extra earnings, directly linked to the quantity and quality of labor, is decreasing. On the Moscow Railroad, rates

and surcharges accounted for 92 percent of the entire increase in the average wage. The percentage of bonuses in wages decreased from 20.5 to 18.7 percent, and for individual professions the difference was even greater.

[Kosolapova] You would agree that the bonus payment system itself in a number of cases is being turned into an automatic percentage surcharge to the rate. Why is this happening?

[Myshkovskiy] Bonuses, as a rule, are given for specific work and in a percentage of the rate, depending on the percentage of quota fulfillment. But the worker is not always able to determine his right to the bonus and its size. In my view, we should switch from this complicated "percentage for a percentage" to payment of bonuses for a physical indicator.

On the Moscow Railroad, they pay bonuses for passing through trains of increased weight and length, that is, according to specific rates for each train of a specific length and weight, but not for a general increase in average train weight expressed in percentage. Savings from the wage fund should be used not to increase wage rates and not to increase bonuses. The incentive importance of one ruble in bonus and piece-rate extra earnings is one and a half to two times higher than one ruble in rate. So far, there are no other methods besides bonuses and piece-rate payments to ensure a close linkage of what each person earns and the results of his labor.

[Kosolapova] Doesn't it seem to you that, besides the proposed measures, we all need some kind of impetus?

[Myshkovskiy] During the most difficult periods of our country's life, it is the railroad workers who have showed the way out of the situation that was created. I think it is appropriate to recall the work "The Great Initiative." V.I. Lenin wrote: "It turns out to be some kind of a vicious circle: to raise labor productivity, we must be saved from starvation; to be saved from starvation, we must raise labor productivity. We know that such contradictions are resolved in practice by breaking through this vicious circle, by changing the frame of mind of the masses, and by the heroic initiative of individual groups, who against the background of this change play a decisive role." In my view, these words are still timely today. Transportation is in extreme need of new initiatives. And they already exist. We just have to find them and support them.

Technical Status of Railcar Fleet Detailed

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TEPLOVOZNAYA TYAGA in Russian
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[Article by E.I. Galay and A.V. Shilovich, candidates of technical sciences, BelIIZhT [Belorussian Institute of Railroad Transport Engineers]: "The Cars on the USSR's Railroads"]

[Text] In recent years, despite the considerable number of cars delivered and improvement in their design, the

technical condition of freight and passenger cars has been getting worse. And one of the basic reasons is the increased intensity of use and the low level of repair and maintenance. It should be taken into account at the same time that the increase in the cars' intensive use has not resulted from an increase in the work they have performed, but from the more difficult conditions under which they have operated.

For freight cars with a rated load-carrying capacity of 66 to 71 tons-force, the Ministry of Railways has established standards which permit a load of 75 to 80 tons-force. The norms for calculations of car construction were worked out by taking specific safety margins into account; for this reason, substantial breakdowns in the technical condition of assemblies do not take place when there is occasional overloading. However, the systematic increase in rated loads leads to drastic deterioration in reliability indicators—the number of malfunctions increase, full operating time and the period between overhauls are reduced, the labor-intensiveness of maintenance and repair is increased, and the cars break down more often.

Freight cars are subjected to difficult tests during loading and unloading operations and when rolling stock is sorted in gravity yards and during switching. According to data from the Railcars Main Administration (TsV) [possibly: Railcars Center] of the Ministry of Railways, about 5,000 cars are damaged every day during switching and classification yard operations. As a result, the number of unscheduled repair operations is increased and the proportion of cars that are inoperative is increased. In 1981, each freight car in the operating fleet came in for routine uncoupled maintenance an average of 4.2 times and in 1984 each one came in 4.5 times, but in recent years this indicator has come closer to 5. More than 100,000 cars which have a large number of malfunctions and which have not undergone planned maintenance are "traveling" throughout the railroad system.

The plants of industry are turning out tens of thousands of freight and passenger cars each year. This rate of delivery is inadequate to bring the fleet of cars up to date, and a significant number of cars which have completed their service life or are close to that point are in operation for this reason. The fleet of cars is becoming obsolete; about 25 percent of the freight cars now operating in the rail system were built before 1964.

The differentiated system of car maintenance and repair in use on railroads in the USSR provides for planned forms of maintenance and repair: major overhaul (KR), depot repair (DR) and inspection of passenger cars; and routine repair (TR) and maintenance (TO). The Ministry of Railways has a widespread network of car repair plants, centers to prepare cars for service, passenger car technical stations, car maintenance points, and other railcar facilities to carry out these operations.

Over 300 car depots, more than 70 washing and steaming stations, about 700 car preparation centers, and 550 car maintenance points are engaged in repairing

and maintaining freight cars. Maintenance of freight cars is specified before the departure of a train that has been made up or a through train, as well as for empty cars when they are prepared for service without being uncoupled from a consist.

TR-1 routine repair is specified for empty cars that have been uncoupled from a consist when they are being prepared for service, and TR-2 routine repair is specified for cars that have been uncoupled from through trains or those that have arrived, as well as from trains that have been made up. The period of time between repairs is established in accordance with the type of cars and their specialization. Depot repair is performed annually, and 2 years after a car is manufactured and major overhaul. Major overhaul for most types of freight cars is performed after 10 years have elapsed.

Each freight car undergoes maintenance an average of 356 times per year, including 43 times when it is being prepared for service. The labor input to maintain one car adds up to 320 man-hours. However, the quality of car repair and maintenance is poor in many cases because of the low level of work organization, the shortage of skilled repair specialists, and the shortage of the basic spare parts and materials.

The transfer of enterprises and shops engaged in repairing passenger cars and preparing them for service from the railcars system to the one responsible for passengers has had a negative effect on passenger car maintenance. The shortage of skilled personnel and the lack of a repair base are being felt particularly in those railcar sections which have been taken from freight car depots. Passenger cars cannot undergo timely major overhaul because of the insufficient capacity of car repair plants. The TsV of the Ministry of Railways has been compelled to organize major overhaul of tank cars and flatcars at certain depots for the same reason.

The fact that railcars are becoming more and more specialized is characteristic of the freight car fleet at present. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the proportion of specialized cars increased from 15 to 24 percent. Depending on the type of freight carried, the freight car fleet is divided into the following basic groups: boxcars, gondolas, flatcars, tank cars, refrigerator cars, and special-purpose cars. Each of these groups includes a large number of cars which differ in purpose and construction.

Tank cars make up the group with the most variety. There are about 75 types of tank cars for transporting liquid, gaseous, and bulk loads, including tank cars for petroleum products, various acids, and other chemically corrosive materials; for foodstuffs (milk, alcohol, live fish); for molten materials (sulfur, liquid pitch); and for powdered materials (such as cement).

Boxcars make up another group which includes more than 35 types. They are designed to transport freight which needs to be protected from precipitation, including bulk freight (grain, fertilizers), packaged and crated freight, and loads of high value. There are 28 types

of gondolas in operation which carry loads in bulk (ore, coal, fluxes, industrial wood chips, peat, and so forth), as well as lumber, containers, and various machinery and equipment.

Flatcars make up a large group of general-purpose and specialized cars (16 types) for transporting long and unwieldy items which do not need to be protected from precipitation or which have been packaged in sealed containers. Bulk freight of high density or various machines, equipment, and containers are often carried on flatcars. Special flatcars with an extended base are designed to carry heavy containers.

The fleet of refrigerator cars is being replenished with five-car refrigerator units built by plants in the GDR and the Bryansk Machine Building Plant, as well as self-contained refrigerator cars (ARV). Refrigerator cars with ice and salt cooling have practically been taken out of operation.

In addition to the basic types of general-purpose and specialized cars listed, special cars designed for transporting bulk freight (hopper cars, dump cars) and heavy and large loads (transporters) are being operated on the Ministry of Railways' and industrial enterprises' lines. Seven types of hopper cars and five types of dump cars are being turned out by industry.

A numbering system was adopted for freight cars throughout the network in 1963 which made it possible for the first time to determine the type of car, the number of axles, and its basic technical features. The numbering system for passenger cars which was adopted previously on each railroad was retained. An improved system for numbering the basic forms and types of rolling stock has been introduced since 1985. The range of its application covers about 500 types of freight and passenger cars, locomotives, motorized rolling stock units and track machinery. Information on the purpose and technical-operational parameters of a given unit of rolling stock is encoded in the number.

For example, a freight car has an eight-digit number. In this case, the first digit in encoded form indicates the type of car: 2 for a boxcar, 4 for a flatcar, 6 for a gondola, 7 for a tank car, 9 for a hopper car, and so forth. The following digits contain information on the number of axles on the car, the availability of a brake platform, the car's serial number, and certain structural details (the material of which the body is made, the availability of end doors and hatches in a gondola, and so forth). The last digit is a coded protection of the number from misrepresentations. When information on a given car is processed by computer, the last number is determined in accordance with a special algorithm based on the remaining digits in the number, and the meaning obtained is compared with the actual meaning.

The 8-digit number for a passenger car is divided into two groups. In the first (3-digit) group, which begins with "0" (indicating that the number belongs to a passenger car), the second and third digits are the code for the railroad to which the car is registered; the fourth to

seventh digits in the other (5-digit) group correspond to the number of the car's technical certificate, which contains its complete description, stored in the computer memory. The technical certificate of a car is stored at the point of its registration. The fifth digit in this group (the eighth digit in the number) is a control digit to protect the number from misrepresentation.

The new numbering system also provides distinguishing features for the rolling stock which belong to other ministries and departments but have the right to use the Ministry of Railways' lines.

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Automated System for Locomotive Use Noted

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TEPLOVOZNAYA TYAGA in Russian
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[Article by MPS [Ministry of Railways] TsD [Railway Traffic Main Administration] Chief Engineer and First Deputy Chief A.D. Chernyugov and TsD Operations Administration Deputy Chief I.M. Kosikov under the rubric "Competition, Initiative and Experience": "A Course Toward the Automation of Control: Dedicated Running—Past, Present and Future"]

[Text] Questions of improving the technical state and utilization of the locomotive fleet have been, are and always will be topical ones, since the locomotive support for shipping largely determines the success of rail-transport operations. A great many contradictions and unresolved issues have presently accumulated in this realm. This also explains the certain tendentiousness and lack of objectivity of the author of the article by A.B. Vulfov in evaluating dedicated running.

The modernization of traction that was pursued at one time has created the opportunity of operating electric and diesel locomotives on large loops, which has made it possible not only to raise the indicators of locomotive utilization, but also to have a progressive influence on all operational work. The principal advantage of the new types of traction is their ability to make considerable runs without decoupling from the train. The increased in locomotive runs without decoupling has made it possible in turn to raise the speed of freight delivery and freight-routing traffic, reduce the quantity of technical stations for locomotive replacement and create the preconditions for an increase in traffic range and the throughput capability of railcar traffic.

The operation of locomotives from several depots on a single loop on a common schedule creates broad opportunities for flexibility with traction equipment. The opportunity then arises of utilizing all of the repair capacity on the loop and providing better support for the operations with the needed number of locomotives. Possible fluctuations in the upkeep of the operational fleet of one depot (through locomotives putting in for

unplanned repairs, for example) are compensated for by locomotives of another depot servicing that same tractive loop.

The access of locomotives to large tractive loops with their shift-based support by locomotive crews has created a number of difficulties in organizing train operations. This type of locomotive operation has one fundamental feature—routings are not identical and depend on the purpose of the train being serviced. The traffic schedule does not envisage a specialization of "train paths." Trains can be sent in different directions on each of them. The running of a locomotive on this or that routing is a random occurrence in this regard. The whole process of operating tractive equipment on large loops is of a probabilistic and unpredictable nature. The locomotives can "wander" among stations of a section for a long time without landing at their home depot.

The complete dependence of the locomotive traffic routings on the configuration of the train flow, as a rule, is not taken into account when determining the handling sections of locomotives or the development of the train composition plan. The regulation of locomotives operating on large tractive loops is extremely difficult. A decision to send a locomotive to this or that point, as well as the time for the locomotive crew to appear, has to be made before the composition of even the daily shift schedule, not to mention the work-in-progress schedule.

The junctures between locomotive-handling sections become potential barriers to railcar traffic throughput in the face of the prevailing irregularities in train traffic. A lack of correspondence in time of the convergence of up and down traffic flows leads to a surplus of certain locomotives and crews and a shortage of others. The randomness in locomotive operations gives rise to the procedure that exists today of setting time standards for their operation between TO-2 technical maintenance.

These and other causes have given rise to the so-called "work on ready," where the trains are sent from the technical stations not according to a plan composed in advance, but rather at the time of readiness of the train, locomotive and locomotive crew. This question, notwithstanding the increased complexity of controlling electric and diesel locomotives on long lines, has been poorly developed in a theoretical regard, and the supervision of the process is based entirely on dispatcher regulation. Whence the difficulties with the call-up of trains and the maintenance of locomotives as well; their passage along unsecured stretches and other negative phenomena. A trend toward reductions in the handling sections of locomotives, a return to "steam-locomotive" tractive hauling and the system of maintaining dedicated train crews that has been noted on some railroads is also connected with them.

The author of the article "Dedicated Running: Past, Present and Future" is trying to incline the reader toward dedicated running rather than an objective evaluation of the state of affairs and a search for ways of

surmounting existing difficulties, without particular concern for the correctness of the arguments cited therein. He cites as a basic conclusion, for example, the "successes" of the Alma-Ata Railroad, which converted to dedicated running in 1983.

The authors of this article were part of set-up crews on the Alma-Ata Railroad, which was at the time a barrier to the passage of railcar traffic, in 1984. A special collegium of MPS was held on the results of crew operations, and it took a series of steps to aid the railroad. Ten percent of the system-wide deliveries of 2TE10M diesel locomotives and 53 percent of the three-section 3TE10M locomotives in particular were sent to that mainline in the 11th Five-Year Plan, allowing the railroad to upgrade its locomotive fleet. A large quantity of spare parts for diesel locomotives, including 10D100 diesels, tractive electric engines, TK-34 turbocompressors and wheelsets, was also sent to the railroad. Some 18 percent of all tractive electric motors received from industry over this period were sent there.

Twenty million rubles, which comprised about six percent of the limit on capital investments for the MPS Locomotives Main Administration, were allocated for the development of the locomotive facilities of the Alma-Ata Railroad in the 11th Five-Year Plan overall. It was namely that injection, and not dedicated running, that allowed improvements in the state of the railroad locomotive fleet.

Well then, what about dedicated running? Dedication was abolished at Alma-Ata in 1985. It was instituted and abolished twice at the Dzhambul depot, and finally abolished for good in 1987. The dedicated running that remained at other depots has nonetheless had an effect on the utilization of the locomotive fleet. The average daily locomotive productivity on the railroad grew by 5.9 percent over six years compared to 1982. But the average daily locomotive productivity across the system overall, however, increased by 8.4 percent over the same period, and the rise in that indicator proceeded at a faster pace on some railroads of the region operating locomotives on large tractive loops. It grew by 15 percent on the West Kazakhstan Railroad, 22.5 percent on the Tselina and 29 percent on the South Urals.

A.B. Vulfov, understanding the shakiness of his position, notes that "dedicated running is viable and effective only where a locomotive turnaround schedule exists." In other words, when there are constant traffic dimensions on the railroad sections, and reserves of traffic capacity make it possible to operate according to a so-called "firm schedule." Such "greenhouse" conditions are not foreseen on the majority of the railroads in the near future.

The return to "steam-locomotive" methods of operation, including dedicated running, in our opinion, not only does not improve operational work or the utilization of locomotives and locomotive crews, but on the contrary aggravates existing shortcomings. Urgent problems should be solved on the basis of the development of

scientific and technical progress, the utilization of computer technology, improvements in the system of operations planning and the development and incorporation of flexible technologies.

Such work is currently being performed, at the behest of the MPS Shipping Main Administration, by the Soyuzzheldoravtomatizatsiya [All-Union Railroad Automation] NPO [Scientific-Production Association] in conjunction with the Northern Railroad. A technology has been created in particular for the automated control of train operations (TAUPR). This is an information-planning man-machine system, functioning on the basis of the integrated combination of multi-stage planning with flexible technological processes in train operations. The TAUPR functions using the information base of an automated shipping-operations control system (ASOUP).

The foundation of the new technology is improvements in operations planning for train operations through the creation, with the aid of a computer, of a technically substantiated daily shift plan for the dispatch of trains from the place of habitation of train crews in detail down to the "train-paths" of the schedule. This planning of train operations provides for a combination of flexibility of operations planning with the advantages of working according to a "firm schedule."

The following tasks are resolved within the framework of the TAUPR:

- forecasting the approach of trains and locomotives to stations;
- developing a daily shift plan of train operations for each section detailed down to the "train paths" of the schedule;
- linking up trains, locomotives and locomotive crews to "train paths" in the daily shift plan;
- organizing locomotive operations according to a routing system;
- regulating the operations of locomotives and locomotive crews on large tractive loops; and
- organizing the interaction of stations with adjoining sections for the purpose of ensuring the timely receipt and dispatch of trains.

It is essential to know the impending dimensions of train traffic on each section in order to develop a technically substantiated daily shift plan. Analysis shows, however, that it does not seem possible to forecast the impending dimensions of train traffic down to the "train paths" of the schedule with precision due to the complex and multi-layered nature of the processes. This task is thus not even posed in the development of the TAUPR. The aim of forecasting is to determine the impending dimensions of traffic to a depth of 1.5-2 days with a precision down to schedule version (+5-7 trains).

A forecast developed within the framework of the TAUPR is based on the utilization of data existing within the ASOUP on the availability and locations of trains, as well as statistical data accumulated in computer memory on routings and run times of trains of various classes and types. The forecast is performed for the arrival, dispatch and tracking of trains for each delineated station.

The forecast algorithm is based on the creation of a dynamically correctible system of standards used for determining the routings for train running, their run times and the rate of arrival at the station. One of the central tasks of the TAUPR is the development of a plan for train dispatch from the stations where the train crews live. The plan, in order to be fulfilled, should be technically substantiated. This is achieved through the fact that the traffic schedule version at its foundation is developed in real-time fashion in such a way that it corresponds to the impending dimensions and conditions of train traffic.

The development of the version consists of eliminating from the general schedule a certain quantity of schedule lines, as well as the discovery of firm, optional and supplemental "train paths." The "paths" with which consists, locomotives and locomotive crews should be linked up first of all are the firm ones. The optional ones are filled in next, and lastly the supplemental "paths."

The development of the schedule version that lies at the basis of the daily shift plan and the delineation of firm, optional and supplemental "train paths" within it are performed with the aid of a computer. The planner, on the basis of reference materials and intrinsic experience, assigns the parameters of impending train operations to the computer, taking as a foundation the dimensions of traffic over a prior period when they were similar to those that are expected. The computer issues in response integrated curve distributions, over the course of the day, of data on the departure of trains and the existing "train paths" in the schedule. These curves provide the opportunity of determining what "paths" in the schedule should be preserved in the daily shift plan.

The planner, making use of this technique, has the opportunity of comparing the requirement for "train paths" for upcoming operations with their availability in the operative version of the schedule on a daily basis or as necessary on the basis of the forecast.

Non-conformities in the schedule are corrected by periods of the day. If there are more "paths" than are needed in the corrected version, optional "paths" are established, and if there are too few of them, supplemental ones are envisaged.

A schedule version for the impending operations can also be executed by a special program on a microcomputer. The version developed is sent to the YeS computer of the IVTs [computer-information center]. There is a special memory array there that has been divided into five zones. The MPS schedule has zone 0, the

operative version is in 99, the version ready to take effect in the next period is in zone 98, and the working zone is 97, along with zones for the storage of other versions of the schedule. When the schedule version is assigned to zones 98 or 99, the YeS computer issues an instruction to the user (stations or depots, among others) on the time to switch over to the new version of the schedule and the schedule itself with indications of the firm, optional and supplemental "train paths."

The control of locomotives that have arrived, the distribution of schedules among the stations of the center and the linking of consists, locomotives and locomotive crews to them poses certain difficulties at major railroad centers with classification yards and at the principal locomotive depots. These functions of the operations personnel are automated within the framework of the TAUPR via the development of an automated workstation for the locomotive crew scheduler and the shift supervisors of the division and locomotive depot, as well as the development of special programs for the central ASOUP machine. A diagram of the interaction of operations personnel in organizing train operations at the center is shown in the figure.

The foundation of the organization of train operations, as has already been mentioned, is a schedule version of the daily shift plan detailed down to the "train paths." The shift supervisor and locomotive-depot scheduler develop logs of the readiness of locomotives and locomotive crews on their workstations in accordance with it and periodically (at 6-hour intervals, as well as at the request of the division shift supervisor) enter that information into the ASOUP.

The station computer executes a model of the availability of railcars on each track of the classification system at classification yards equipped with an ASUSS [classification yard automated control system]. These data, as well as information on the destinations of railcars in trains that have arrived at the station, are the basis for forecasting the readiness of trains for forming up. This forecast also enters the ASOUP and, along with the logs of the work order and readiness of locomotives, is utilized by the personnel of the railroad administration and division, stations and locomotive depots to develop and implement the operational measures of the daily shift plan of train operations.

The development of targets for the link-up of trains, locomotives and crews to the "train paths" of the operative version for a certain period (3-6 hours) is an important element of these measures. The personnel of the division shift-supervisor offices (RADTsU) develop these targets with the aid of specialized workstations.

The algorithm and program of the workstation provide an opportunity for getting information on trains, locomotives and crews from the ASOUP and developing instructions for the further utilization of the locomotives that have arrived on that basis, with a regard for the rules




Diagram of the interaction of operations personnel in organizing trains operations at a transshipment center

Key:

1. YeS computer
2. consists
3. locomotives
4. crews
5. forecast of arrivals, formation of issue
6. on receiving tracks of the station
7. departed from station
8. ASUSS computer
9. depot shift supervisor workstation
10. crew scheduler workstation
11. forecast of train formation
12. plan for issue of locomotives from depot
13. plan for issue of locomotive crews
14. instructions for further run of arrived locomotives
15. plan for link-up of consists, locomotives and crews with train paths of the schedule
16. issued to executors
17. division shift supervisor workstation
18. ASOUP
19. approach of trains
20. arrival and departure of trains
21. being developed
22. control of routing system
23. distribution of schedules to center stations
24. link-up to schedule train paths
25. corrections to approach and readiness times of trains

of the routing system for their operation and the procedures for the departure of trains, with an indication of along which "path" each train will be dispatched and what locomotive and crew will run with it.

The sequence of the execution of operations at the division shift supervisor's workstation is as follows:

- receipt of current information on the version of the schedule in effect, the link-up of locomotive crews with it, the plan for the readiness of trains of his own formation and locomotives in the depot, along with data on the arrival of trains and locomotives at the station;
- correction of the time of arrival and readiness of trains and stations of a center where a through train will be handled, and deviations from the rules of the routing system where the necessity of sending a locomotive into the depot arises;
- determination of the time for the beginning and end of the interval in which the target must be developed;

—corrections to the priorities for the linkage of trains and locomotives to "train paths" of the schedule version with the appearance of non-standard situations in train operations; and

—final coordination and announcement through the computer to affiliated workers of the procedure for the receipt and dispatch of trains from the station (or center).

The TAUPR provides for improvements in operations planning and provides an opportunity to resolve issues of regulating the work of locomotives and locomotive crews at a high technical level.

The irregularity of train traffic and other factors affecting train operations, however, could lead to disruptions in the plan. The TAUPR, in order to reduce the negative consequences of these phenomena, envisages the utilization of a number of flexible technologies, such as a routing system for locomotive operations, the organization of "sliding" junctions on handling sections and a combined method of operations for locomotive crews, among others.

The routing system is a composite of rules for the operations of electric and diesel locomotives on a tractive loop. These rules are developed for every technical

station and define the conditions for decoupling locomotives from certain trains with their subsequent issue for other trains, as well as supporting TO-2 technical maintenance for locomotives.

This new operational technology ensures the guaranteed arrival of locomotives for TO-2 technical maintenance with the optimal size of run times among crews. Clear-cut procedures for locomotive operations for a given technology make it possible to systematize the process of operating them on a large tractive loop and simplify considerably the management of that process.

The organization of locomotive operations on large tractive loops with "sliding" junctures serves to compensate for the consequences of irregularities in train traffic. The essence of this method consists of the fact that two, rather than one, technical stations establish the juncture between the turnaround sections of locomotives of the same type. The dispatcher, depending on the train situation, performs the locomotive changeover at this or that station of the "sliding" juncture.

The employment of the combined method of locomotive-crew operations produces an analogous effect. When some of the crews work without rest at the turnaround point, and another portion does get rest, then by varying the number of locomotive crews left at the turnaround point for rest and sent back with the turnaround it is possible to compensate for irregularities in train traffic, provide for the timely passage of railcar traffic, reduce the runs of crews as "passengers" and avoid prolonged rest periods at turnaround points.

The TAUPR system has been theoretically studied and tested on the Northern Railroad. The Soyuzzheldoravtomatizatsiya NPO, at the request of the railroads, can perform work to adapt the new technology for automated train-operations control for specific loops.

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Railway Accidents Reviewed

904H0127A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 23 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent Yu. Shatalov: "Shells Under the Wood Chips: When Will We Finally End the Carelessness Which Leads to Tragedies?"]

[Text] In mid-November, what appeared at first glance to be a strange report was received by the appropriate organs in Perm from neighboring Sverdlovsk Oblast. It stated that two gondolas of wood chips, under which a large amount of some kind of metal was found, are being directed to the Perm Paper and Pulp Combine. If it is taken into account that the report did not come from chance individuals, we can imagine how concerned the Perm specialists were. What was the metal underneath the wood chips? Why did they ship it to be processed

into pulp...? Where did the gondolas come from? Who shipped what in them the last time? Answers had to be found to these and other questions in a few hours, since "the cat in the bag" was already en route.

Dozens of persons concerned with the matter raised an alarm at the notification. It was established that coal had been carried in the gondolas the previous time. No one checked them before they were turned over for loading the wood chips, and what is more, no one cleaned them. A stunning piece of news was also revealed at the same time: artillery shells were found under the wood chips... It is not known how many there were, what kind they were, or what condition they were in. They sought advice from combat engineers and bomb disposal experts. The military specialists confirmed that the shells, in a thick layer of coal dust, would get to Perm without exploding. They can "open up" only when there is contact with metal objects.

After a brief exchange of views, the specialists came to the conclusion that the cars with the lethal stuffing did not have to be stopped and unloaded en route—there are no suitable sites.

In a word, they arrived at the Perm Paper and Pulp Combine in several hours. They unloaded the layers of wood chips from them with considerable caution, and then the combat engineers took out no less than 368 shells of different calibers...

Further investigation revealed that the cars had been set aside by one of the military units for shipment to a proving ground for ordnance that has been written off. After the shells had been unloaded, none of the commanders in charge of the important operation checked the cars. So the "empty cars" with the shells were sent farther along. It still remains a mystery which mine loaded coal in the gondolas in which part of the country, where they delivered it, and how many days the cars harboring death had traveled about on the state's railroads. Miraculously, it did not catch up with anyone.

One thing is clear: what happened is a consequence of the extreme irresponsibility and negligence not only of the functionaries in military uniforms, but the managers of different services on the railroads. The fact that the gondolas filled with shells were used twice to carry national economic freight can be explained only by the devil-may-care attitude of these persons toward their duties.

So ammunition was left in the cars by accident. They did not explode by accident when the cars were loaded with coal (but what if it had been metal scrap?). By accident, the shells did not spill out when they unloaded the fuel. By accident, they did not get into the furnace of a TETs, a boiler room, or a blast furnace. By accident, they discovered the "billets" in Sverdlovsk...

Aren't these too many chance occurrences for one story, and don't they attest to the fact that order on the railroads is gradually being turned into a particularly abstract concept?

It is not an idle question. On 17 October, for example, on a siding of one of the plants in the "Pernnefteorgsintez" Production Association, there was an accident which also luckily did not take the form of a tragedy—six tank cars filled with liquefied propane were derailed at one time. And three of the tank cars tipped over. We can imagine the force of the explosion that would have shaken sleeping Perm and the problems it would have caused if the circumstances had been different. Though there was tremendous damage even without an explosion: the railroad bed was put out of commission, two tank cars were written off, and traffic on this section of the line was paralyzed for 3 days.

Why did the accident happen? The main reason was the poor condition of the siding, which belongs to a plant in the "Permnefteorgsintez" Association. It is sufficient to say that the gauge of the track in the section where the cars derailed was 20 millimeters wider than permissible.

Did the enterprise managers suspect that the line was in urgent need of repair? It turns out that they not only suspected it, they knew about it. Back in July, the Perm traffic safety inspector had drawn the enterprise managers' attention to the deplorable condition of the railroad bed. However, neither V. Permyakov, the chief of the plant's transport shop, nor V. Trupanov, the chief engineer, took the steps needed. As a result, they themselves became hostage to their own indifference and subjected thousands of unsuspecting people to mortal danger.

Lack of concern and negligence have many faces, but the essence of them is the same: in all cases they lead to tragedies and moral and physical harm. Why do individual officials and ordinary workers tolerate negligence and give themselves up to indifference so often? Aren't the bitter lessons of Chernobyl, Bashkiria, and many other tragedies really teaching them anything? How much can we rely on an off-chance instead of soberly evaluating a situation?..

I asked these questions of many persons whose duty it is to keep an eye on adherence to law and order in railroad transport, and not only in this activity. I received evasive answers: yes, we must increase the responsibility of persons involved in transporting dangerous freight. But how? Moral and financial incentives do not always work. Revise certain articles of the Criminal Code which specify the responsibility for negligence, sloppiness and carelessness? But will the legislator become tougher, and isn't this a return to the old procedure to a certain extent, after all?

Looking for a way out by tightening up the screws is a thankless and useless task, of course. There will be no return to the old way. But we can and must speak about strict adherence to existing laws, since far from every case of their violation is evaluated appropriately by the organs charged with their protection.

For example, last April the "Galogen" Production Association in Uralsk sent a customer four tank cars, from

which hydrochloric acid poured out over the entire 1,000-kilometer route. In May, five tank cars left a toxic trail over the entire route to their destination. The leaks were caused by flagrant violations of the regulations on transporting powerful toxic substances and the operation of special tank cars. The point is that the tanks inside such capacities should have three coats of a chemically stable enamel, and then two coats of a superstable lacquer. However, the association's specialists do not consider themselves obliged to carry out elementary requirements. This was precisely the subject of a representation made to I. Uklonskiy, the general manager of the "Galogen" Production Association, made by S. Krasnikov, the Perm transport prosecutor, at the end of last August. But things are not moving there, as they say. On 31 December, car No 21582671 arrived at the Kirov station from "Galogen," and hydrofluoric acid was pouring out of it... And no one has assumed responsibility for this criminal negligence...

However, the negligence is not the only concern. After an explosion at the Sverdlovsk-Sortirovochnyy station, they began heading the main flow of the dangerous freight through Perm. According to the transport prosecutor's information, the number of special trains with dangerously explosive substances arriving at the Perm-Sortirovochnyy station was doubled in just the first quarter of last year. A minimum of about 10 of the most flagrant violations of the regulations for transporting so-called categorized freight took place at this station; each of the violations could have led to much the same tragedy as in Sverdlovsk.

There is every reason to believe that the likelihood of a catastrophe at the Perm classification yard has now increased significantly. Up to 20 cars with dangerously explosive freight are accumulated on the station's tracks on certain days. Many of them lay over for days here instead of the 6 hours stipulated by the norm. Where is the guarantee that some rolling stock will not be damaged because of a mistake or negligence by the person on duty at the gravity yard? And any number of other things can happen on the railroads which lead to unpredictable consequences!

Every sensible person understands that trains with explosive materials cannot be allowed through a huge city, which creates a large number of preconditions for emergencies itself. Residents of Sverdlovsk put the question precisely this way after the tragic explosion at the gravity yard and gained their objective: dangerous trains are bypassing their city. But the problem has remained, since another city with a million people—Perm—is now held hostage by the Ministry of Railways.

What is to be done? Can we discontinue the shipments of dangerous freight, which our industry cannot manage without? We cannot discontinue transporting them, of course. But we can and must do this another way—by a circumferential railroad. They are building bypasses around large cities in order not to poison the people with

exhaust fumes. But we are speaking here about substances that are much more dangerous.

But the trouble is that there is no circumferential route in the territory adjacent to Perm. They seldom thought about it before the explosion in Sverdlovsk. Now everyone is speaking out in favor building it. Only the Ministry of Railways remains silent. We do not want to think that only an emergency can push it to take decisive action.

But aren't two cars containing shells which arrive for processing into paper and pulp a very real emergency? Not only for the ones who sent death on wheels on its way, but for all of us who have become hostages to the hapless artillerymen and irresponsible railway workers, this is really the right time to clutch our heads.

International Train Delays Create Problems

904H0127D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian

13 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Hostages of the Ministry of Railways, or a Trip by Rail from Paris to Moscow"]

[Text] Paris—Just one look at the bulk of Paris' northern terminal, blackened from dirt and soot, does not put one in an optimistic frame of mind. All the same, in coming here several times a month to accompany friends or relatives, you sometimes hope for a miracle: what if this very day a Soviet railroad car which left Moscow 2 days ago arrived in Paris on time. And then your friends, burdened with baggage, will be able to calmly depart. But the persons who obtained tickets for our car (and there is no choice, for others are not going to Moscow) are not relying on anything. From their own experience or from the stories of "experienced travelers," they know that the cars most likely will not arrive, and they expect terrible ordeals for 48 hours.

As a rule, their apprehensions are bound to be realized. After barely leaving the Belorusskiy terminal, the Soviet car begins deviating from the schedule, then it is held up at some stop, and being hopelessly slow, it probably will not get to Paris. A West German city with the gentle and almost sympathetic name of Aachen, on the very border with Belgium, usually becomes its final stop.

Why Aachen? The fact is that if the Soviet car arrives at this city according to schedule, they couple it here to the "Moliere" train, which arrives in Paris at 1341. After 3 hours the car should set out on the return trip.

But the "Moliere" cannot wait for it, and the late car is forced to remain overnight in Aachen.

For this reason, the passengers (not only our fellow countrymen, but French, Spanish, Polish, and African passengers as well) get from Paris to Aachen on a West German train. But sometimes our stray car is not in Aachen, either, and no one knows where it is. Then the

trip continues by relays. At European terminals, they have already become accustomed to the sight of desperate people dragging their burdens from platform to platform toward a car which will take them farther.

But finally there is the Soviet border. The city of Brest. A train is always expected to take them from here to the Soviet capital. However, after a customs inspection, the car with the passengers is sent to a siding for some reason. And in the middle of the night, we must rush from here over the ties in the dirt and slush to a remote platform for a train that is ready to leave in a few minutes.

Is your torture over? Not at all. At the Belorusskiy terminal no one meets you, for your relatives were told that the car from Paris will arrive tomorrow.

Is this an exception? No, a similar story with some variations has been repeated for several months now.

Is it really impossible to do anything? Is there really no one who cares what is happening to our car and the dozens of people who are forced to get to Moscow by rail every day? The Embassy of the USSR in France has repeatedly drawn the attention of the USSR Ministry of Railways to this situation, but without success. Cheerful formal replies were received in return.

Perhaps we have been placed at a disadvantage by the train schedule, in which preference is given to the West German trains? Not at all. Representatives of the USSR Ministry of Railways take part in the conferences at which the international traffic schedule is made up, and one would think that they are protecting their interests.

But the situation today, the French believe, is at a dead end. The only way out for us is to adhere precisely to the schedule. Otherwise the passengers on our car, who are angry, tired, and worn out, are doomed to remain hostages to the Ministry of Railways.

Even during the summer months, when two cars have been used between Moscow and Paris, it has not been simple by having a ticket to reserve a seat on the day needed. Now, when the Ministry of Railways has left one car "on the line," the tickets are sold out many weeks in advance, and traveling by train has become a problem that is hard to resolve. It looks as if the Ministry of Railways is just arranging this state of affairs: under conditions of complete monopoly, it need not fear competition or think about how to improve train service or even create a minimum of comfort for the people.

Is the Ministry of Railways sustaining financial losses related to the chronic tardiness of our car? Undoubtedly. First of all, it is compelled to compensate passengers for the difference in the cost of a ticket, for an electric train runs from Aachen to Paris. Secondly, to all appearances it needs foreign currency to pay the West Germans for carrying our passengers to both sides between Paris and Aachen.

Moscow Metro Expansion Planned

904H0127B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by V. Belikov: "The Moscow Metro: Routes in All Directions"]

[Text] On 23 January, the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom discussed measures to develop the capital's metro.

Today the Moscow Metro itself has become a city-forming factor, as the architects say. Residential microrayons are "attached" to its routes, surface lines are brought up to them, and large stores, theaters and concert halls, and rest areas are located near them.

A week ago the section which completes the Kaluga Radius was put into operation, and the "Yasenevo" and "Bittsevskiy Park" stations in the southern part of the city began working. The next "premiere" this year will be northeast of the capital, where an extension of the Kirovskiy Radius from Preobrazhenskaya Square to the "Cherkizovskaya" station, and farther on, to the "Ulitsa Podbelskogo" metro terminal, near the Losinyy Ostrov Nature Park, will be put into operation at the beginning of summer.

In the third and fourth quarters of 1990, according to Ye. Koshelev, chief of the Mosmetrostroy [Administration for Construction of the Moscow Subway], two sections of the Timiryazevskiy Radius—from the Savelovskiy terminal to the Otradnoye housing project, and later on to the Bibirevo microrayon on the northern outskirts of Moscow—will be put into operation. It will be extended in the 1990's to Cherepovetskaya Street, where a convenient transfer to the Lianozovo platform on the Dmitrov route of the Moscow Railroad is being organized.

Extension of the metro's Rizhskiy Radius is not being discontinued, either: an underground section will be built from the "Medvedkovo" station to Chelobityevo, which is on the outskirts of Mytishchi. In the opposite direction, to the south of Moscow, it is planned to take the Serpukhov Line to the residential microrayon of Severnoye Butovo, which is adjacent to a railroad station of the same name on the Kursk route. The Gorkovsko-Zamoskvoretskaya Line, which now ends at the "Krasnogvardeyskaya" station southeast of Moscow, will be taken up to Brateyevo, where it is planned to build a depot for the blue express trains. Two more underground construction sites are planned to extend the old lines that have been in operation for a long time. These are the "Sokol" to "Ulitsa Narodnogo Opolcheniya" and the "Kiyevskaya" (Arbatsko-Pokrovskaya Line) to "Park Pobedy" sections at the end of Kutuzovskiy Prospekt.

Ye. Dubchenko, chief of the Moscow Metro, named the Lyublinskaya Line as the principal mainline under construction in the 13th Five-Year Plan; it begins at the square of the Kursk terminal with the "Chkalovskaya" station and continues for over 12 kilometers through the territory of several city rayons. In the coming years,

several more stations are to be added to the six already being built on the line; they will be located on the section from "Lyublino" to "Marino," as well as farther on, on the floodplain of the Moscow River and on its right bank, near the Borisovskiy ponds. The wastelands and dumps here have to be prepared for laying the metro line and siting new residential construction.

The Lyublinskaya Line is also to be built at the same time through the central part of the capital—Turgenevskaya Square, Sadovo-Samotechnaya Street, and later Commune Square and Sushchevskiy Embankment. S. Sestlavinskiy, chief of the Metrogiprotans [State Planning and Surveying Institute for the Construction of Subways and Transportation Facilities], noted incidentally at the the Moscow Gorispolkom session that the institute had prepared documentation for the construction of two additional stations on existing routes: the "Plushchad Kommuny" station on the Koltsevaya [Circumferential] Line and the "Khmelnitskaya" station on the Prokrovskiy Radius between the "Kursk" and "Plushchad Revolyutsii" stations. In addition to the second entrances for the "VDNKh," "Baumanskaya" and "Belorusskaya" stations already earmarked for construction, documentation has been drafted for additional vestibules at the "Kosomolskaya-Koltsevaya," "Park Kultury-Koltsevaya" and "Sokolniki" stations.

During the discussion on prospects for the capital's metro, the particular importance of coordinating the direction and timing of its construction with the development of all types of city transport above ground was repeatedly stressed. In particular, at the suggestion of V. Saykin, chairman of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom, it was decided to plot an accurate schedule for commissioning new sections and stations on the capital metro together with the plan for organizing the routes of buses, trolleybuses, and streetcars carrying passengers. A period of 10 days was set to submit this document for the approval of the Moscow Gorispolkom.

Kiev Metro Expansion Reported

904H0127C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1 Jan 90 p 1

[Report by V. Vernodubenko: "A Third Line for the Kiev Metro"]

[Text] On the last day of last year, the new third line of the metro began regular operation in the Ukrainian capital. The blue express trains are taking passengers to three stations on it—"Zolotyie Vorota," "Dvoretz Sporta" and "Mechnikova."

The metro's construction and finishing workers put a great deal of work into the new underground mainline, completing operations at a total cost of about 70 million rubles. The line proved to be very complicated. The tunnelers often encountered large flooded sections; they had to drill deep holes and freeze the earth, and only later could they drive the tunnels. Original technical solutions were applied in building the line. Thus, after

rigging the 1,000-ton reinforced concrete "shell" of an auxiliary vestibule on the surface for one of the stations, the metro builders lowered it several dozen meters underground, which made it possible to reduce the labor inputs considerably.

The unique decoration of the underground vestibules is pleasing to the eye. The "Zolotyie Vorota" station was designed in Ukrainian national style. With the colored smalt, reminiscent of ancient frescoes, the events of the Kiev Rus, particularly the half-legendary founders of Kiev—Kiy, Shchek, and Khoriv—have been brought to the present day.

"There are now 31 metro stations in Kiev, and the overall length of the metro is about 35 kilometers," says V. I. Petrenko, chief of the Kiev metrostroy. "Only the first section of the third line has been commissioned today. The next section—we are to extend the line in 1990—will be to the 'Naddneprianskaya' station. Later on, after the southern bridge crossing the Dnepr is opened, the line will cross over to the left bank, linking the city center with the new housing projects—Kharkovskiy, Osokorki, and Poznyaki."

A meeting was held to mark the opening of the new section of the Kiev Metro at the "Zolotyie Vorota" station. It was opened by V. A. Zgurskiy, chairman of the city ispolkom. The meeting was addressed by A. I. Korniyenko, member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the Kiev party gorkom.

MARITIME AND RIVER FLEETS

Economist on Rejuvenating Maritime Fleet

904H0112A Moscow VODNYY TRANSPORT
in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by B. Grishin, deputy chief of the Main Economic Administration of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet: "Currency Cost Accounting, or How To Solve the Problem of Updating the MMF Transport Fleet and Accelerate the Social Development of the Sector"]

[Text] The work experience of the sector's shipping companies and enterprises under the conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing showed that the existing system does not satisfy the requirements for a radical economic reform and needs improving. It does not permit the creation of the necessary conditions for production and social development and is inadequate for the conditions of work on world shipping markets. Even though the new conditions for economic activity have contributed to the fact that maritime transport has begun to operate more stably and steadily, has raised all its economic indicators (profit, net currency receipts, profitability, capital-output ratio, labor productivity, etc.), and reduced unproductive losses, nevertheless, virtually no headway has been made in solving many urgent problems in the sector's development in the 12th

Five-Year Plan, and some of them, for example, such as updating the fleet and social problems have even been exacerbated.

In the studies made of the System for Development and Distribution of the National Economy in the Period up to the Year 2005 in the 13th Five-Year Plan, USSR Gosplan stipulated a 5.6-percent increase in cargo conveyance by maritime transport, which determined the overall transport volume as 275 million tons. To provide this, while retaining the export of transport services at the level achieved, the demand for the fleet, in consideration of intensification of its use, will be 20.2 million tons of deadweight. That is, the transport fleet must be kept at its current level in the 13th Five-Year Plan.

In the period 1991-1995, fleet with a total deadweight of 6.8 million tons, which is technically worn out and has worked out its normative operating period, is to be written off. A study, made in conjunction with USSR Gosplan, of the Program for Shipbuilding in the Yards of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry and the Building Berths of the CEMA Member Countries and the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in the 13th Five-Year Plan shows that the need for ship supply is being only 30-percent satisfied.

The arrangement of construction of the fleet for Arctic transport, passenger ships, chemical carriers, all-purpose and timber carriers and medium tonnage tankers is particularly alarming.

The prolonged, chronic short deliveries of the fleet have led to its intensified aging. The average age of our ships has reached 15 years (as against 12.4 years for the average world level). Moreover, the proportion of ships over 20 years old is 25.8 percent. The situation is complicated by the fact that, as we know, many states have put into national legislation a ban on calls in their ports by ships over 15 years old. As a result, the relative proportion of Soviet foreign trade transport by the domestic fleet is dropping yearly.

Unless major measures are taken to increase the rates of updating the fleet, the reduction in tonnage to 14.8 million tons of deadweight in the 13th Five-Year Plan will lead to a reduction in its share in the transport of foreign trade cargoes, a yearly loss of foreign currency receipts and an increase in the country's expenditures to charter foreign tonnage.

The problem of updating the fleet can be solved only by converting the sector to currency self-financing and in this way acquiring on the foreign market the ships necessary to provide for the needs of the national economy for cargo transport by sea. According to calculations made by the GEU [Main Economic Administration], the sector's need for freely convertible currency to acquire a fleet at the building berths of the capitalist countries is 85 percent of that earned by Minmorflot [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet] if the existing system of supplying the fleet from Soviet shipbuilding industry and from the CEMA member countries is maintained.

Adoption of this proposal by the directive organs would make it possible, in the course of the 13th-14th five-year plans, to update the fleet, maintain the independence of Soviet foreign trade from the dictates of the world charter market and eliminate the yearly currency losses from reducing the export of transport services and additional expenditures by the State to charter foreign tonnage.

With a view to this, the ministry specified the initial data and made the necessary calculations with respect to the quantity and type of ships that must be purchased on the foreign market for freely convertible currency. In conjunction with Sovkomflot and Glavsudomekh, studies were begun on concluding contracts to acquire the fleet and seek the funds needed to pay for it. Coordination continues with USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance of calculations to determine the norm for currency withholdings for the MMF [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet] currency fund, as well as studies of the possibility of purchasing the fleet on credit in capitalist countries. Without waiting for the final decision of the directive organs on the conditions on 1 September 1989, however, contracts were already concluded for the purchase of 41 ships with a deadweight of 1,550,000 tons on credit in Spain, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and the FRG.

The experience of the first stage of radical economic reform is now being summarized, proposals are being worked out for a fundamental improvement in the economic mechanism, and laws and normative documents in the sphere of economic activity are being reviewed (in particular, the USSR Law "On the State Enterprise (Association)", the tax system, etc.).

One of the most important directions for improving the economic mechanism is the development of foreign economic activity. After the USSR Council of Ministers adopted normative documents, in accordance with improving it for the sectors of the national economy and enterprises, new opportunities opened up. The concepts of "currency cost accounting", "currency self-financing" and "currency cost recovery" appeared in economic literature. Great hopes are linked with them in maritime transport as well, in the sense of increasing work efficiency on the foreign market and solving problems of production and social development.

Foreign economic activity is basic to maritime transport. Its volume is 74 percent, for cargo transport in tons—69 percent, and for fleet cargo turnover in ton-miles—92 percent. The results of the foreign economic activity of Minmorflot are characterized by a generalizing indicator—the net currency receipts (revenues in foreign currency, minus expenditures in foreign currency).

The following data characterize the structure of the ChVV [net currency receipts] (in percentages), by types of activity: cargo transport of USSR foreign trade organizations—72. GIF transport—17. Servicing foreign ships at Minmorflot ports—5. Other types of foreign

economic activity (transporting passengers, salvage and rescue and underwater-engineering operations, etc.)—6. Total—100.

Minmorflot thus obtains ChVV (72 percent) in foreign currency from transporting cargo for foreign trade organizations of the USSR (on condition that Soviet tonnage is sailing). Consequently, the foreign economic activity of maritime transport is mainly aimed at providing for the country's domestic needs.

With the transition to full cost accounting and self-financing, and in accordance with subsequent decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, the rights of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet and subdepartmental enterprises and organizations in the sphere of foreign economic activity have been substantially expanded. Minmorflot and the shipping companies have obtained the right to form currency withholding funds.

The currency withholding fund of Minmorflot is formed through withholdings from the planned sum of the excess of receipts above payments in foreign currency (profits in foreign currency) in accordance with the stable norms in percentages by currency groups: the proceeds from selling, on the foreign market, ships written off for scrap metal, allowing for the expenses connected with their sale. It is also formed from the funds received from selling obsolete and economically inefficient ships abroad; from the funds received from selling, through consignment warehouses in Soviet ports, spare parts not used by the shipping companies for ships and other equipment and materials to foreign ships and firms; from funds received from foreign firms for performing dredging and underwater engineering operations.

The currency withholding funds of shipping companies are formed through withholdings in accordance with the norm in percentages (an identical norm is established for all shipping companies) from the above-plan sums received by them for the excess of receipts over payments, by foreign currency groups.

Currency withholding funds formed in Minmorflot and the shipping companies according to the established norms are extremely insignificant as compared with the ChVV earned in foreign currency, and in no way satisfy the import needs for updating the production funds and solving social problems.

It must be noted that the sector as a whole and approximately half of the shipping companies ensure currency cost recovery and earn sufficient ChVV to pay off taxes and ensure currency self-financing.

Therefore, at present, Minmorflot has hard currency from transporting GIF, from servicing foreign ships in ports, and from performing certain other operations and services. At the same time, it incurs expenses in actual currency to ensure all cargo transport in foreign shipping, as well as expenditures for chartering foreign tonnage, if this is specified by the contracts.

With the transition to economic methods of management, and granting all enterprises and organizations the rights to direct implementation of export-import operations on the foreign market, the conditions must be created to carry out the principles of currency cost recovery, currency self-financing, and currency cost accounting in maritime transport, so that these conditions stimulate the work collectives to the maximum to increase work efficiency on the foreign market and permit them to solve production and social development problems more efficiently.

The existing system of economic activity is not fully aimed at stimulating the collectives to increase work efficiency on the foreign market, because of the small size of the currency funds formed in the sector and the shipping companies. It makes it impossible to solve problems of production and social development at the necessary rates. ChVV received by the shipping companies in foreign currency is to a certain extent conditional and does not reflect the real contribution to improving the country's currency payment balance. The collectives are cut off from the results of their foreign economic activity.

The factors listed necessitate the transition of the sector and the shipping companies to currency cost accounting. In our opinion, this will make it possible, on the one hand, to solve sectorial problems more efficiently, and on the other—will contribute to improving the country's currency payment balance.

Various models of currency cost accounting are possible in maritime transport. The one proposed by Minmorflot is based on the existing system of economic activity, and develops some of its premises. This model is characterized by the fact that it preserves the existing system of the shipping companies settling with the USSR foreign trade organizations for cargo transport. It leaves unchanged the procedure for forming the currency funds for the sector and the shipping companies, and changes only the norms for forming the currency fund (toward an increase) in freely convertible currency.

The shipping companies obtain new rights. They can spend some of the currency funds to acquire consumer goods, medications and medical equipment, and reinforce the material technical base and the social-cultural sphere. They have the right to buy or sell currency for Soviet rubles at prices agreed upon at currency auctions organized by the USSR Foreign Economic Bank, and carry out other operations.

This model ensures currency cost accounting on the whole for the sector with certain restrictions. It is incomplete for the shipping companies. Nevertheless, it can be regarded as the first stage in the transition of the sector and the shipping companies to currency cost accounting. The main thing is that it makes it possible for the sector as a whole to solve the problems of updating the fleet and of social development.

Taymyr Authorities Ban Nuclear Ships

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[Article by V. Pyrkh, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent: "Controversy Surrounds the 'Taymyr' at Taymyr. Why?"]

[Text] **The troubles in the Far East of the first transport ship in our country running on nuclear fuel—the LASH ship Sevmorput—are still fresh in our memory. Something similar is now taking place in Taymyr. In the autumn, the first shallow-draft nuclear-powered icebreaker in the world, the Taymyr, built by order of the Soviet Union in Finland, should have gone on Arctic watch to escort ships taking the Northern sea route at the mouth of the Yenisey to Dudinka.**

It should have, but it did not.... The ispolkom of the Taymyr District Council of People's Deputies passed a special decree prohibiting the operation of the nuclear-powered icebreaker Taymyr on the Sibiryakova-Dudinka island route, and also prohibiting ships with nuclear-powered units from calling in Yenisey Bay and in the water area of the Dikson seaport.

"We are not certain of the safety of this equipment," says G. Nedalik, deputy chairman of the Taymyr District Ispolkom.

It is not simply the "nuclearphobia" that has arisen in many people since the Chernobyl catastrophe that lies behind these words....

The year-round maritime crossing from Dudinka to Murmansk, which makes it possible for the metallurgists of the Norilsk Mining-Metallurgical Combine to come, as it were, close to the mainland, and to set up a reliable transport conveyer even in the severe winter months, has been in operation for 10 years now. Cargo, materials and equipment for them travel along the marine "bridge", and raw material and finished products from the Taymyr Peninsula are taken to the mainland.

In order for this crossing to be made in winter, the seamen keep two diesel motorships continually on the route. Since they burn about 100 tons of fuel each per day, they cannot work at escorting ships for more than 20 days. After that they either call at their home port for fuel or are bunkered in the open sea in 50-degree frost, which is also disadvantageous, since every ton of fuel has to be delivered from the mainland for this.

The nuclear-powered icebreaker Taymyr, however, with a 50,000 horse power unit, needs to be refueled only once every two-three years of operation.

But... the year-round crossing has existed for 10 years, and the Taymyr District has only losses to show from it. Some of the cargo is left for it, but this is really less than the proverbial drop in a bucket. On the other hand, the channel, several tens of meters in width, cut through the

course of the powerful river, has seemingly split in two the life style that has been forming here for centuries.

Merely because cargo and materials have to be taken to the tundra by air, and not by land, as before, the district loses up to a million rubles a year. Hunters are out another 500,000 because of the change in the traditional migration routes of the northern deer. The Yenisey fishermen also bear a substantial loss.

Neither the Norilsk Combine nor the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Company is in any hurry to recompense the losses, however: our departments do not like to share the profits received. Therefore, as soon as it became known that there was a nuclear-powered ship in the waters of the Yenisey, the public on the peninsula sounded the alarm.

The seamen try to convince us: there is no danger at all, today the nuclear-powered Taymyr has the most ecologically pure reactor in the world, and the radioactive wastes from it are collected onto a special ship, far from inhabited places. The designers have also stipulated something else: the sides of the icebreaker are so strong that it can withstand a frontal blow at full speed from a ship with a displacement of up to 26,000 tons. In case it runs aground, a special shield protects the reactor from destruction.

"The two diesel icebreakers operating on the river right now poison it much more than the icebreaker," assert the shipping company specialists.

Perhaps this is so, but how can you explain, inquires the public, why on all the routes followed by the nuclear-powered icebreaker there are no emergency services able to come to the rescue, and that not even a basic notification to the inhabitants of the coastal settlements of its passage is specified? Why was it only when the Taymyr was launched that the peninsula learned about it? Could the local ichthyologists, who are now expressing serious concern about the polynya [unfrozen patch of water in the midst of an icebound river], more open than when the diesel icebreakers were operating, not really have been involved in the study of the consequences of its operation?

There must be an independent expert commission, it is thought at Taymyr, which would study all these problems. I will add only, on my own: why should this commission be convened after, and not before the nuclear-powered icebreaker was launched? Why, in making the decision to build it, did the maritime department not even find time to be interested in the opinions of the people living on the banks of the Siberian river?

I got in touch with Murmansk, and they assured me: an agreement has been made with the Taymyr authorities on a one-time call of the icebreaker at the mouth of the Yenisey, so that the Dudinka public could be assured of its absolute safety. Moreover, a representative delegation from the autonomous district came to the Kolskiy Peninsula. It was decided to repeal the decree of the district ispolkom on prohibiting the icebreaker's call to the inland waters of Taymyr. A few days ago the icebreaker called on the lower reaches of the Yenisey for the first time in world practice.

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